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ARGUMENTATION AND THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF REASONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2015

Patrick Rysiew
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Abstract

Jennifer Nagel suggests that Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of reasoning can shed light on “why we commonly think of perceptually and testimonially supported judgments as justified despite feeling worried, on reflection, that only what is internally available can justify”. While I agree that there is indeed a natural path (or paths) from the argumentative theory to this asymmetry, and instability, in our epistemic judgments, I am not sure that it is quite the one that Nagel identifies. Having registered some reservations about Nagel’s account, I make an alternative suggestion as to how the argumentative theory might help to explain the naturalness of the relevant judgments.

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Episteme , Volume 12 , Special Issue 2: 10th Anniversary of Episteme , June 2015 , pp. 309 - 317
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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