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WHAT DOES “EPISTEMIC” MEAN?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2016

Abstract

In this paper I consider the meaning of the term “epistemic.” I discuss the idea that “epistemic” means “of or relating to knowledge,” and consider some uses of “epistemic” that do not jibe with this characterization of its meaning. I argue that “epistemic” is ambiguous: it is sometimes used to mean “of or relating to knowledge” and sometimes to mean “of or relating to belief.” I raise some worries about this ambiguity, and sympathetically consider the prospects for eliminating “epistemic” from our philosophical lexicon.

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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

Barnes, J. 1982. ‘The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist.’ Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society (New Series), 28: 129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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