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ON PROVIDING EVIDENCE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 July 2018

Abstract

Obligations to provide evidence to others arise in many contexts. This paper develops a framework within which to understand what it is to provide evidence to someone. I argue that an initially plausible connection between evidence-providing and evidence-possession fails: it is not the case that in order to count as providing evidence to someone, the intended recipient must have the evidence. I further argue that the following is possible: evidence is provided to an agent, the agent does not have the evidence, but it is not the case that the agent is culpably ignorant of the evidence.

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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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ON PROVIDING EVIDENCE
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