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TEAM REASONING AND A MEASURE OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE IN GAMES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2017

Jurgis Karpus  and
Mantas Radzvilas
Jurgis Karpus
Affiliation:
King’s College London, Department of Philosophy, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK. E-mail: jurgis.karpus@kcl.ac.uk.
Mantas Radzvilas
Affiliation:
London School of Economics, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. E-mail: m.radzvilas@lse.ac.uk. URL: https://sites.google.com/site/mantasradzvilas/.
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Abstract:

The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application produces multiple solutions of games, some of which seem less compelling than others. The recent development of the theory of team reasoning addresses this by suggesting that interacting players in games may sometimes reason as members of a team – a group of individuals who act together in the attainment of some common goal. A number of properties have been suggested for team-reasoning decision-makers’ goals to satisfy, but a few formal representations have been discussed. In this paper we suggest a possible representation of these goals based on the notion of mutual advantage. We propose a method for measuring extents of individual and mutual advantage to the interacting decision-makers, and define team interests as the attainment of outcomes associated with maximum mutual advantage in the games they play.

Keywords

Game theorybest responseteam reasoningteam interestsmutual advantage
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 1 - 30
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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