Hostname: page-component-7d684dbfc8-26pbs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2023-09-24T05:38:32.165Z Has data issue: false Feature Flags: { "corePageComponentGetUserInfoFromSharedSession": true, "coreDisableEcommerce": false, "coreDisableSocialShare": false, "coreDisableEcommerceForArticlePurchase": false, "coreDisableEcommerceForBookPurchase": false, "coreDisableEcommerceForElementPurchase": false, "coreUseNewShare": true, "useRatesEcommerce": true } hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Modeling Rational Players: Part I

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Ken Binmore
Ken Binmore
Affiliation:
London School of Economics
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Game theory has proved a useful tool in the study of simple economic models. However, numerous foundational issues remain unresolved. The situation is particularly confusing in respect of the non-cooperative analysis of games with some dynamic structure in which the choice of one move or another during the play of the game may convey valuable information to the other players. Without pausing for breath, it is easy to name at least 10 rival equilibrium notions for which a serious case can be made that here is the “right” solution concept for such games.

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , October 1987 , pp. 179 - 214
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1987

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Abreu, D., and Rubinstein, A. 1986. “The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata.” ICERD discussion paper 86/141, London School of Economics.Google Scholar
Aumann, R. 1974. “Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Mixed Strategy.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 1:67–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aumann, R. 1983. “Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality.” Mimeo. Hebrew University, Jerusalem.Google Scholar
Banks, J., and Sobel, J. 1985. “Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games.” Mimeo. Cambridge: M.I.T.Google Scholar
Basu, K. 1985. “Strategic Irrationality in Extensive Games.” Mimeo. Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.Google Scholar
Bernheim, D. 1984. “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior.” Econometrica 52:1007–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binmore, K.G. 1984. “Equilibria in Extensive Games.” Economic Journal. 95:51–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binmore, K.G. 1987. “Experimental Economics.” European Economic Review. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Brandenburger, A., and Dekel, E.. 1985a. “Common Knowledge with Probability 1.” Research paper 796R, Stanford University.Google Scholar
Brandenburger, A., and Dekel, E.. 1985b. “Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge.” Research paper 841, Stanford University.Google Scholar
Brandenburger, A., and Dekel, E.. 1985c. “Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibrium.” Mimeo. Harvard University.Google Scholar
Brandenburger, A., and Dekel, E.. 1986. “Bayesian Rationality in Games.” Mimeo. Harvard University.Google Scholar
Cho, I., and Kreps, D. 1985. “More Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria.” Mimeo. Stanford University.Google Scholar
De Finetti, B. 1974. Theory of Probability. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Friedman, J., and Rosenthal, R. 1984. “A Positive Approach to Non-Cooperative Games.” Mimeo. Blacksburg, Va.: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.Google Scholar
Fudenberg, D., Kreps, D. and Levine, D. 1986. “On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements” Mimeo. Stanford University.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, J. 1967/1968. “Games of Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players.” Parts I, II and III. Management Science 14:159–82, 320–34, 486–502.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. 1975. “The Tracing Procedure.” International Journal of Game Theory 5:61–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J., and Selten, R. 1980. “A Non-Cooperative Solution Concept with Cooperative Applications.” Chap. 1. Draft. Center for Research in Management, Berkeley, Cal.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, J., and Selten, R. 1982. “A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games.” Chap. 3. Draft. Bielefeld working paper 1114, Bielefeld.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. 1948. “Economics and Knowledge.” In Individual and Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Kalai, E., and Samet, D. 1982. “Persistent Equilibrium in Strategic Games.” Discussion paper. Northwestern University.Google Scholar
Kline, M., 1980. Mathematics, the Loss of Certainty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kohlberg, E., and Mertens, J. 1983. “On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria.” C.O.R.E. discussion paper 8248. Université Catholique de Louvain.Google Scholar
Kohlberg, E., and Mertens, J. 1986. “On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria.” Econometrica 54:1003–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kolmogorov, A. 1950. Foundations of the Theory of Probability. New York: Chelsea.Google Scholar
Kreps, D., and Wilson, R. 1982a. “Sequential Equilibria.” Econometrica 50:863–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kreps, D., and Wilson, R. 1982b. “Reputations and Imperfect Information.” Journal of Economic Theory 27:253–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lakatos, I. 1976. Proofs and Refutations, the Logic of Mathematical Discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. 1976. Cotintcrfactuals, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Luce, R., and Raiffa, H. 1957. Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Maynard, Smith J. 1982. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Marschak, T., and Selten, R. 1978. “Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames and Oligopolistic Equilibria.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 92:71–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McAfee, P. 1984. “Effective Computability in Economic Decisions.” Mimeo. University of Western Ontario.Google Scholar
Moulin, H. 1981. Théorie des jeux pour l'économie et la politique. Paris: Hermann. (A revised version in English is published by New York University Press under the title Game Theory for the Social Sciences.)Google Scholar
Myerson, R. 1978. “Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept.” International Journal of Game Theory 7:73–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Myerson, R. 1984. “An Introduction to Game Theory.” Discussion paper 623. Northwestern University.Google Scholar
Myerson, R. 1986. “Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans.” Discussion paper 691. Northwestern University.Google Scholar
Nash, J. 1951. “Non-cooperative Games.” Annals of Mathematics 54:286–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neyman, A. 1985. “Bounded Complexity Justifies Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma.” Economics Letters 19:227–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pearce, D. 1984. “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection.” Econometrica 52:1029–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reny, P. 1985. “Rationality, Common Knowledge and the Theory of Games.” Mimeo. Princeton University.Google Scholar
Rosenthal, R. 1981. “Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox.” Journal of Economic Theory 25:92–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rubinstein, A. 1985, Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma.” ST-ICERD discussion paper 85/109. London School of Economics.Google Scholar
Savage, L. 1954. Foundations of Statistics. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Selten, R. 1975. “Re-examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium in Extensive Games.” International Journal of Game Theory, 4:22–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Selten, R. 1978. “Chain-Store Paradox.” Theory and Decision 9:127–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Selten, R. 1983. “Evolutionary Stability in Extensive 2-Person Games.” Bielefeld working papers 121 and 122. Bielefeld.Google Scholar
Selten, R., and Leopold, U. 1982. “Subjunctive Conditionals in Decision Theory and Game Theory. Studies in Economics, Vol. 2 of Philosophy of Economics, edited by Stegmuller, /Balzer, /Spohn, . Berlin: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
Sen, A. 1976. “Rational Fools.” Scientific Models of Man, The Herbert Spencer lectures, edited by Harris, H.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Simon, H. 1955. “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 69:99–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simon, H. 1959. “Theories of Decision-Making in Economics.” American Economic Review 49:253–83.Google Scholar
Simon, H. 1976. “From Substantive to Procedural Rationality.” In Method and Appraisal in Economics, edited by Latsis, S.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Simon, H. 1977. Models of Discovery. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tan, T., and Werlang, S. 1984. “The Bayesian Foundations of Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and Nash Equilibrium Behavior.” Mimeo. Princeton University.Google Scholar
Tan, T., and Werlang, S. 1985. “On Aumann's Notion of Common Knowledge: An Alternative Approach.” Serie B-028-jun/85. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto de Matematica pura e aplicada.Google Scholar
Werlang, S. 1986. “Common Knowledge and the Game Theory.” Ph.D. Thesis. Princeton University.Google Scholar