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Keynesian Uncertainty and the Weight of Arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Jochen Runde
Affiliation:
Cambridge University

Extract

In Chapter 12 of the General Theory, on “The State of Long-Term Expectation,” Keynes writes: “It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain” (CW VII, p. 148). In a footnote to this sentence, Keynes points out that by “very uncertain” he does not mean the same as “very improbable” and refers to the chapter on “The Weight of Arguments” in his earlier Treatise on Probability (CW VIII, pp. 77–85). The purpose of this article, in the first place, is to provide an account of, and to sort out the relations between, Keynes's views on probability, uncertainty, and the weight of arguments.

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Essays
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1990

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