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FREEDOM UNDER AN INDIFFERENT DICTATOR: INTENTIONALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2016

Frank Hindriks*
Affiliation:
University of Groningen, Faculty of Philosophy, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712GL Groningen, the Netherlands. E-mail: f.a.hindriks@rug.nl. URL: http://www.rug.nl/staff/f.a.hindriks/.

Abstract:

Freedom is often analysed in terms of the absence of intentionally imposed constraints. I defend the alternative view on which the relevant constraints are those for which some agent can be held morally responsible. I argue that this best captures the relation between freedom and respect. Berlin (1969) correctly points out that intentional restrictions exhibit ill will and hence are disrespectful. However, the same holds, I argue, for restrictions that are due to indifference. Berlin also observed that it would be counterintuitive if an agent could increase her freedom by changing her preferences. I criticize the argument that Dowding and Van Hees (2007, 2008) present according to which this observation counts in favour of explicating freedom in terms of intentionality.

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Articles
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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