There is no universal definition of religion under English law. Instead, different definitions have been developed by courts and tribunals in relation to different religious rights. Although there have been moves towards the harmonisation of these different definitions, recent decisions have reversed that trend. This article explores for the first time how this has led to a confused and contradictory case law. It begins by surveying how religion has been defined in registration law, charity law, human rights law and discrimination law, the moves towards harmonisation and the counter-tendencies in the recent decisions. It places the recent decisions within their broader legal context and points out a number of contradictions and uncertainties. Arguing that a universal definition of religion under English law is now needed, it synthesises the case law to identify the elements of a universal definition that already exist. The article examines how these can be refashioned in order to remove inconsistencies that exist in different areas of law. Drawing upon insights from the sociology of religion, the article concludes by proposing a new definition.

The fact that the criminal law in England and Wales continues to afford protection to spouses who conspire together to commit crime is considered by many to be an anachronism. That a person cannot be guilty of conspiracy if the only other person with whom he or she agrees is his or her spouse, is to be found in section 2 of the Criminal Law Act 1977. The origins of the rule are said to be based on biblical principles pertaining to marriage. The difficulty with that is that the concept of marriage has changed significantly over time, which raises the question of whether or not the existence of the exemption can today be justified. In R v Yilkyes Finok Bala and Others [2016] EWCA Crim 560, the Court of Appeal was faced with the question of whether or not the legislative exemption applied to those who were party to a polygamous marriage. While acknowledging that there are arguments in support of the proposition that the exemption is outmoded, the Court of Appeal nevertheless interpreted the statutory provision in such a way so as to encompass parties to a polygamous marriage recognised under English law as valid. By virtue of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, the exemption was extended to cover civil partners. The expansion of the exemption is curious in the light of prevailing attitudes towards the applicability of the exemption at all in modern times. Furthermore, other statutory provisions (relating to analogous matters) have either been enacted or repealed to reflect present-day understandings of how the issue of marriage interacts with the criminal law. Yet, for reasons which are not altogether clear, the spousal exemption vis-à-vis the criminal offence of conspiracy remains in force.

In recent years, those involved in regulating, forming or advising faith communities have had much to contend with: the expansion of the vicarious liability doctrine, the status of ministers of religion and the decision in Shergill v Khaira, not to mention the General Data Protection Regulation. These issues share a common denominator: they require faith communities to give close consideration to the values which they seek to articulate and foster in the expression of their own autonomy and right of self-determination. That is, they serve as a prompt to reconnect with the intellectus and vinculo iuris of their own ecclesial norms. This article is intended to encourage such an exercise and to contribute to a discussion of the potential points of collaboration between the civil law and faith communities in securing dispute resolution by which ecclesial values may be accommodated.

This article examines the Church of England's stewardship of its silver plate. It explains the way in which the use of chalices, patens and flagons changed over time and considers the legal basis on which church plate is held by churchwardens. It explains how, having initially discountenanced all sales of redundant church plate, consistory courts came to authorise sales to museums. It also explains how, following a series of judgments by George Newsom QC, acting first as Chancellor of both London and St Albans dioceses and later as Deputy Dean of the Court of Arches, sales on the open market were more frequently allowed and then how, following the judgment of the Court of Arches in re St Lawrence, Wootton, a more restrictive approach was re-imposed. It considers the practical and legal issues arising out of that judgment. Finally, it considers the role of the Court of Arches as a maker of policy.

This article provides a general account of the universal law of sanctions in the Roman Catholic Church. The crisis of the Catholic Church caused by clergy sexual abuse of minors has revealed, among other things, the widespread well-intentioned but naïve inclination to resort to penal law as opposed to any theology of mercy and forgiveness. Although the author argues that penal law has a proper place in the Catholic Church, he considers that in a voluntary community that shares a homogeneous system of moral values without strong penalties involving deprivation of liberty – a community like the Catholic Church – moral and administrative sanctions could be more effective than penal sanctions. A distinction between administrative sanctions and penal sanctions, and therefore between administrative tribunals (should they be established) and penal tribunals, is highly recommended.

Hate preaching is capable of constituting both hate crime and hate speech, lies at the centre of many religions’ understanding of the manifestation of their religion, and frequently raises the contentious issue of regulation of the use of sacred scriptures. This brief article explores the regulation of hate preaching by criminal law, discussing the particular problems posed by oppositional religious speech, before concluding with suggestions for a number of ways to reduce these problems.

This article compares the use of the term ‘pastoral’ in the canon law of the Western Latin Church as it occurred in the 1917 Pio-Benedictine Code of Canon Law and then in the revised Code of 1983. This is because the revised Code increased the use of the term ‘pastoral’ and I wish to see if its meaning had changed and, if so, in what way. Hence, the article considers how ‘pastoral’ occurred in the 1917 Code and then in the equivalent canons in the 1983 Code. There follows comparison with the earlier canons, which were sources for the 1983 canons to see if the term has changed in meaning and, if so, what that change is. I am interested to track the use of ‘pastoral’ because it has become ubiquitous in the churches and in society and has different meanings and expectations associated with it. As far as canon law and ecclesiastical law generally are concerned, it is interesting to consider how the term is used and this article is a contribution to an understanding of ‘pastoral’ in the law of the Roman Catholic Church.

Not a single day goes by without Pope Francis making charity and mercy – central characteristic traits of any Christian – the pivot of his sermons, exhortations and proclamations, formal and informal alike. The last holy year, concluding in November 2016, which explicitly featured the motto of mercy, offers a welcome opportunity for the canonist to contemplate the relationship between mercy and justice. Certainly, there is no lack of warning speeches and auguries against the oversimplification of the canonical norms through invoking a false understanding of an imperative of indefinite mercy. To do so would be to neglect the crucial and central commandment of justice, which ensures both legal certainty and an equal treatment of similar cases. The papal address given to the Tribunal of the Roman Rota in 2009 may serve as an eloquent example. In his address Benedict XVI emphasised the interrelation of love (caritas) and justice (iustitia), but at the same time explicitly cautioned against over-pastorally motivated charity as far as the application of the law is concerned:

An ecumenical group of experts in church law produced a Statement of Principles of Christian Law based on a comparative examination of the internal regulations of their respective churches. This article examines the detail of the Statement from the point of view of the regulations and practice of Quakers in Britain and concludes that, based as it is on a Trinitarian, sacramental view of ‘the Church’, while there is much in it with which Friends – and members of other non-sacramental, non-hierarchical denominations – would agree, there is also much which has little resonance for them.

The use of credentials in an ecclesiastical context is a means of assuring that a minister is who he or she claims to be and is therefore trained and qualified to exercise ministry within a particular church tradition as determined by individual denominations. The concept and use of credentials has developed over time. Using primary sources in the main, this article examines the use of credentials as a tool for ‘inclusion’ or a means of ‘exclusion’, or both, in the history of the largest Presbyterian church in Southern Africa and its predecessors. The research question under study is to what degree, if any, were credentials used to control ministers and to cleanse and purify the church of radical – such as anti-apartheid – elements?

As foreshadowed in the previous report for February to May, in June the Conservatives concluded a ‘Confidence and Supply’ agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party in order to give them a small working majority in the Commons. The Queen duly delivered the Gracious Speech on 21 June, outlining the legislative programme for a Parliamentary session that, unusually, will run from 2017 to 2019. In July, the new Government published the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and in September it was given a second reading by 326 votes to 290 and committed to the Committee of the whole House for eight days of detailed debate.

Finds of treasure in England, Wales and Northern Ireland are currently governed by the Treasure Act 1996. The definition of ‘treasure’ in the Act is complex, but in broad and general terms an object of treasure may be said to be an object of value, at least 300 years old, which has usually, but not necessarily, been found buried in the earth, the true owner of which is unknown or cannot be traced. Treasure belongs neither to the finder nor to the owner or occupier of the land on which it was found, but to the Crown or to its franchisee to whom the Crown has granted the right to treasure. A find of an object which the finder believes or has reasonable grounds for believing is treasure must be reported to the coroner for the area in which the object was found. He or she will hold an inquest to determine whether or not the object is treasure. Until the nineteenth century, treasure was regarded simply as a source of revenue for the Crown or its franchisee. But from that time the law of treasure came to be regarded as the means by which valuable objects of historical, archaeological, or cultural interest might be preserved for the nation.

This report covers the groups of sessions held in February 2017 and July 2017. Both groups of sessions saw significant amounts of legislative business, with earlier items being completed and new items being introduced. A number of them gave effect to proposals emerging from the simplification strand of the Archbishops’ Council's ‘Renewal and Reform’ programme or were in other ways intended to simplify or streamline the Church's substantial body of statute law; in a related area, one was directed towards simplifying the procedures for changing that law.

The freedom of the individual can easily come into conflict with his or her obligation to integrate in society. The case of Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium provides a good example. It is evident that some restrictions of citizens’ freedoms must be accepted for a state to function and, more basically, persist; as a consequence, it is acceptable that certain demands, incorporated in criminal law, are made of citizens. The issue of the extent to which such restrictions are justified has increasingly become a topic of discussion. The present case raises a number of important questions with respect to the right to wear a full-face veil in public if the societal norm is that the face should be visible, the most salient of which are whether women should be ‘protected’ from unequal treatment against their will and to what extent society may impose values on the individual. I will argue that Belgian law places unwarranted restrictions on citizens and that the values behind it testify to an outlook that is difficult to reconcile with the freedom of conscience and religion.

This comment is based on two recently published reports from the Constitution Unit, University College London, prepared by Professor Robert Hazell and the writer. This work followed a 2016 study ‘The Queen at ninety: the changing role of the monarchy, and future challenges’, which charted the further decline of the sovereign's personal constitutional powers and analysed the remaining functions. While the subsequent exercise was principally directed at examining the royal accession and coronation oaths, work was also undertaken to research the context of the oaths. The outcome was the two reports published in May 2018: ‘Swearing in the new king’, on the oaths, and ‘Inaugurating a new reign’, an account of past coronations and an analysis of the factors that might influence the shape of the next coronation. This article is in two parts: the first concentrates on the next coronation; the second examines the three statutory oaths that a new sovereign must swear, taking in also the traditional non-statutory personal declaration made at the sovereign's first Privy Council meeting. The first part concludes that the next coronation cannot be on the scale of the last and that the rite, although remaining Anglican-led, must find ways to reflect Britain's greater religious diversity. On the oaths, the second part points out that their imposition of personal duties was predicated on a constitutional situation where the sovereign was still head of the executive, rather than now, at most, speaking on its behalf. Granted the present, utterly changed position of the sovereign, alternative reformulations are offered for discussion and, absent amending legislation, suggestions are examined for how announcement clarifying their current meaning might be undertaken.

The General Assembly met in Edinburgh from 20 to 26 May with the Rt Revd Dr Derek Browning, Minister of Morningside in the Presbytery of Edinburgh, installed as Moderator. This year's Lord High Commissioner to the General Assembly was the Princess Royal.