A Man whose height is four feet is short; adding one tenthof an inch to a short man's height leaves him short; therefore, a man whose height is four feet and one tenth of an inch is short. Now begin again and argue in the same pattern. A man whose height is four feet and one tenth of an inch is short; adding one tenth of an inch to a short man's height leaves him short; therefore, a man whose height is four feet and two tenths of an inch is short. In this way, it seems, we can reach the absurd result that a man whose height is four feet plus any number of tenths of an inch is short. For, if the first argument is sound, so is the second; and if the second, so is the third; and so on. There appears to be no good reason for stopping at any one point rather than at another; it is hard to see why the chain of arguments should ever be broken. But the conclusion is ridiculous; it is, for example, preposterous to say that a man whose height is seven feet is, nevertheless, short.

Quand meurt un philosophe tous les autres héritiers. La disparition rećente de Gaston Bachelard n'a donc pas seulement pour effet d'endeuiller la pensée françhise, elle est ressentie comme une invitation à dresser un premier bilan de l'ceuvre qu'il nous a léguée. Or cette oeuvre surprend autant par la profondeur de ses assises culturelles que par l'aisance avec laquelle elle s'introduit puis s'impose, en des secteurs de l'activité humaine qui paraissent souvent fort éloignés les uns des autres. Chez Bachelard ce n'était pas seulement un philosophe doublé d'un homme de science qui parlait, ce qui eut déjà constitué une performance remarquable. C'était aussi un artiste attentif aux rêveries et aux songes et un poète autant qu'un analyste du subconscient. Bachelard a done fait œuvre d'imagination aussi bien que de raison. Il a voulu mener la double vie de l'homme nocturne et de l'homme diurne et de ce fait s'est acquis la double audience des hommes de lettres et des hommes de science.

The usual interpretation of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding is that he tried to show that all of men's complex ideas were formed by a process of compounding simple ideas. Some commentators say this represents his actual approach o t human knowledge, others say that while parts of the Essay are written in this manner it does not represent his final views. All agree that if this compositionalism is Locke's position then it is inadequate and contains numerous contradictions. It is the thesis of this paper that Locke never was a compositionalist in the required sense and that therefore the inadequacies and contradictions do not exist. Since the compositionalists interpret the Essay mainly on the basis of the classification of ideas in the first edition rather than that in the fourth it will be necessary to examine the two classifications in the Essay to see which does represent Locke's position. It will be found that the fourth edition classification represents his views and that this refutes compositionalism.

Autour de quelques points de références, indiqués par des sous-titres, nous voulons grouper en ces quelques pages des réflexions d'ordre purement psychologique sur le libre arbitre. On insiste aujourd'hui sur le caractére subjectif du choix libre, comme expression de toute la personne humaine en son unité la plus profonde. Pourtant, 1'acte libre passe par des facultés réellement distinctes. Les éléments intellectuel et volontaire qui le composent vitalement sont conceptuellement divers et irré-ductibles l'un à l'autre. Comment s'exercent à Pintérieur de Pame l'és relations dynamiques qui les relient l'un à l'autre, c'est-à-dire concrètement entre les jugements d'ordre pratique et les mouvements volontaires? La mise en valeur du caractére subjectif du choix libre se fera-t-elle aux dépens de son objectivité? Et comment cet acte subjectif s'insére-t-il librement au sein d'un indéniable dérminisme, celui de I'éducation, de la culture, du milieu social, etc.?

I May, at a gathering, notice that Peter is sitting very stiffly in his chair. I say to myself, “Perhaps he has a pain. Yes, I think he has some sort of pain.” I have inferred a feeling of some sort from bodily behavior. It is not an impossible thing to do, to infer sometimes a feeling from bodily behavior. But it is a puzzling thing to do, at least in a philosophieal sense. Because we ordinarily hold that we cannot “observe” the feelings of another, that we can never directly confront these feelings, that feelings as actually felt are private to each of us. There may be interesting ways of challenging this sort of remark—for instance, by way of telepathy. But there is an advantage in puzzling over the kind of inference indicated, without the challenge of telepathy or similar abilities.

Is Perception a form of judgment? The importance of this question is that it brings to the fore a crucial issue for modern perceptionempiricism. If perception is not a form ofjudgment, it is possible o t maintain, though still with considerable difficulty, that the senses acquaint us directly with the physical world and that a metaphysical account of reality can be excluded without undermining what the ordinary layman and the scientist alike claim to know. Judgment can then be discussed from the linguistic standpoint without raising any serious ontological questions. If, on the other hand, perception is judgment, or if in perceiving we inevitably go beyond that which is presented to the senses, then metaphysics is unavoidable unless we are prepared to abandon the hope of knowing anything at all.

As philosophers attempt to treat aesthetic evaluationof some distinctive use sentences are put to, a prime model in terms suggested for offering a “value-judgment” has been that of rendering a verdict. Collingwood, for example, some time ago wrote that the critic and civil magistrate are alike in their use of language, for judgment “means” verdict. More recently, Arnold Isenberg and Frank Sibley have agreed that at least some aesthetic judgments are verdicts, and the late Margaret Macdonald has written a widely anthologized paper defending in detail this conception. In spite of its currency, the model has fatal deficiences and rather than illustrating important aspects of our critical talk, succeeds only in revealing some dubious assumptions at work in the search for special sentence uses. Since Miss Macdonald has offered the most extensive and subtle suggestions on this topic, I will concentrate on her paper, “Some Distinctive Features of Arguments Used in Criticism of the Arts” to illustrate the points I wish to make.

Une analyse minutieusen du XXVIe discours de Thémistius, philosophe néo-platonicien et commentateur des œuvres d'Aristote qui fonda une école de philosophie à Constantinople vers 345 ap. J.-C., a fait découvrir à l'auteur qu'il s'agit d'une œuvre d'un socratique du IVe siècle av. J.-C. Ce discours aurait été écrit contre a l conception de la rhétorique exposée par Platon dans le Phédre. Thémistius non seulement s'en serait inspiré, mais I'aurait copié d'un bout à l'autre (p. 143). Dans un ouvrage antérieur (Antisthène. De la Dialectique. Université de Louvain, Recueil de travaux, Conférence d'Histoire et de Philologie. 2e s., 31e fasc, Louvain, 1935.) l'auteur avait suggéré le nom d'Antisthfène. Les critiques de E. De Strycker l'ont fait reculer. Dans cet ouvrage, il laisse tomber le nom d'Antisthène pour se rallier à un socratique anonyme, adversaire de Platon.