These comments are a response to Professor John King-Farlow's criticism of three of my essays that have recently been reprinted in the volume Analytical Philosophy of Religion in Canada, edited by Mostafa Faghfoury. I shall try to present them in a way that is intelligible to those not familiar with the book; but, inevitably, the choice of topics will be determined by the particular disagreements between King-Farlow and myself that emerged there, and will not deal with the many questions on which we have similar views.

To read a paper of Professor Penelhum's is usually to learn more about carefulness and truth. In the first part of this reply I try to meet his challenge on a matter where we clearly seem to disagree. In the second part I attempt to show that religious believers need not be so very worried about such a challenge, and that this conclusion affects materialists far more than Penelhum. In the third part I clarify where my haste i n expression clouded a point of agreement with Penelhum, other than those which he has generously pointed out already.

Depuis 1967, Donald Davidson defend l'idée qu'une théorie de la signification pour une langue naturelle doit prendre la forme d'une théorie tarskienne de la vérité. Je me propose ici d'exposer les grandes lignes de l a conception davidsonienne de la sémantique des langues naturelles et de chercher à préciser en quel sens une theorie tarskienne de la vérité pour une langue L constitue, selon Davidson, une théorié de la signification pour L. Je ferai pour cela abstraction des obstacles qu'il pourrait y avoir à la réalisation du programme de Davidson (et des stratégies suggérées par ce dernier pour les surmonter).

One speaks of a person having a duty to do something and also of a person having a duty to another person to do something. It seems natural to treat the first as a case of a two-termed relation and the second as a case of a three-termed relation. However, the problem is what to take as the second term of a case of the two-termed relation and the third term of a case of the three-termed relation. For a long time act, instances of which would seem natural contenders, has been a suspect concept; its deficiency being integrally connected with the lack of a specification of how to individuate acts. This paper urges a particular solution to what sort of entity could serve as that which a person has a duty to do. Although discussion will be limited to the legal relations of duty, right, and so on, the problem is similar for the basic moral relations of duty, right, and so on, and the same solution avails for that problem. Before providing the solution to what sort of thing it is that people have a duty, right, etc. to do, it is important to set out what conditions an adequate solution must satisfy.

Opposer modernité et post-modernité relève d'un procédé simplifica-teur certes commode à des fins polémiques et tactiques, mais qui achoppe rapidement sur la vanité de toute tentative cherchant à s'ac-crocher à la modernité comme à une valeur immuable. II faudrait pour que ce fût possible que la modernité n'eût pas changé et qu'elle cons-titue, à partir d'une date précise, un complexe susceptible d'une définition univoque. Or, un rapide survol historique des usages de ce terme, même s'il tente d'introduire une première délimitation entre la conception antique et la conception chrétienne du rapport anciens/modernes, montre bien plutôt un processus de redéfinition permanente: la Be-griffsgeschichte rend à peu près possible une périodisation, non une définition univoque, en sorte que cette périodisation ressemble bien plutôt à une scansion mettant en relief des périodes de crise et de mutation idéologiques qui prennent conscience d'elles-mêmes au moyen des catégories anciens/modernes, aujourd'hui: modernes et post-modernes.

Plusieurs ont pu dire de Heidegger qu'il était résolument contre la technique. Et—il faut bien le reconnaître—beaucoup de choses dans ce qu7apos;il a écrit ou exprimé permettent effectivement d'avancer une telle thèse, quoique Heidegger ait lui-même protesté contre cette simplification de sa pensée. L'on pourrait citer ici un auteur, dont la critique touchant cette question ne présente rien de vraiment original, mais quijustement par son manque d'originalité traduit assez bien l'opinion la plus largement répandue, et aussi la plus facilement acceptée

As is well known, the Humean account of causal inference gives a central location to inference habits. Some of these habits one can discipline. Thus, one can so discipline oneself as to reason in accordance with the “rules by which to judge of causes and effects” (173ff.), that is, one can discipline oneself to think scientifically, rather than, say, in accordance with the rules of prejudice (146f.), or of superstition (271). All such judgments, even those of science, are, however, upon the Humean account fallible. Some, or rather very many, have raised the issue about how any such causal judgment or inference is justified. That is, how can such inference habits be justified, shown to be reasonable. Hume meets this challenge by arguing that there are some habits all men do and must have. Because we must have them we ought to have them. They are, therefore, justified.