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Utilitarianism, Self-Forgetfulness, And Spontaneity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
Extract
When we critically investigate a moral theory, such as utilitarianism, we are interested not only in the moral judgments such a theory would yield, but also in the attitudes and actions characteristic of the moral practitioner, in this case a utilitarian. For moral theories must be practical. Such theories can be distinguished in part from each other on the basis of he practices and attitudes adopted by their adherents. So it is fair to ask of any moral theory two basic questions: (i) is the theory ‘practicable’ and (ii), if it is, does its practice seem moral? If (i) a moral theory is not practicable because, say, its practice frustrates its intention, then that theory as it stands is not acceptable as a moral theory. If (ii) it is practicable but its characteristic practices seem immoral (e.g. the theory's practice involves routine lying and cheating), then at best the theory stands in need of some defence by its advocates. They may either explain away the appearance of immorality by showing that contrary to first impressions the practices are not opposed to our untutored moral views, or that our untutored moral views are more questionable than the theory's practices (e.g. our everyday practices are inconsistent with each other).
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- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , September 1980 , pp. 422 - 435
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1980
References
Notes
1 My asserting the truth of the first is not idiosyncratic. See Kant's assertion at the beginning of The Groundwork that the happy life would be largely unreflective and even instinctual (pp. 62–4 in Paton's translation).
2 See my remarks below on other-regarding self-forgetful pleasures.
3 Williams', Bernard remarks on integrity in Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge, 1973) p. 108ffGoogle Scholar. seem to suggest that the latter, identifying oneself with a cause, is a crucial part of self-definition; we become so much an adherent of a cause that according to Williams we should not (or even, could not) view it neutrally as ‘just a cause’. While I disagree with Williams about the undesirability (or is it the ‘impossibility’?) of neutral evaluation, I agree that such self-identification with causes and persons is an important feature of a satisfying life.
4 I realize that many absorbing activities, such as hockey, having sexual relations, teaching philosophy, and running a university, necessarily involve others and not always as opponents; thus, there is team spirit and comradeship. But involvement with allies or opponents doesn't require love or hatred; there may well be an absence of a benevolent or malevolent concern for their well-being as such.
5 This is why the suggestion that we can extend experienced life time by engaging in utterly boring pursuits is amusing. This point about the costs of absorbing pleasures was suggested to me by one of Dialogue's referees.
6 It is worth mentioning two other discussions of this or a closely related problem. The first is in Chapter VII of Bradley's Ethical Studies when he discusses “Selfishness and Self- Sacrifice”. The second is Alan Montefiore's “Self-Reality, Self-Respect, and Respect For Others” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume III: Studies in Ethical Theory. p. 200 ff. There Montefiore makes reference to work by Taylor and Wren on a concern with one's own virtue and in particular with what he labels ‘moral self-indulgence’.
7 Cf. Locke, Don, “Why the Utilitarians Shot President Kennedy”, Analysis 36, pp. 153–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
8 I have borrowed this example from Derek Parfit's unpublished manuscript Against Prudence. The embellishments are my own.
9 Appropriately directed calculativeness is also compatible with innocence: “… be ye therefore as wise as serpents, and harmless as doves” (Matt. 10:16)
10 See Adams, R.M., “Motive Utilitarianism”, Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976) pp. 467–481CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for an extended consideration of these issues.
11 See Mill's remarks on the ‘sanctions of the principle of utility’ in ch. III of Utilitarianism. 12 A confirmed utilitarian needn't, for example, have the risk aversion tendencies of Rawls' contractors.
13 Here I am departing from what Aristotle says about the ‘adventitiousness’ of pleasures, viz. that it is a drawback peculiar to non-virtuous pleasures. Nichomachean Ethics, Ross, W.D. trans. (Oxford, 1963) 1098b 15–16.Google Scholar
14 For example, one can decide to have sex and thereby have it, but one cannot decide to have it and thereby enjoy it. In this connection, Augustine's remarks on the pleasures of sex in The City of God, Walsh, et alii, trans, (Garden City, 1958) pp. 315–6Google Scholar are interesting; Augustine writes: Curiously enough, not even those who love this pleasure most -whether legitimately or illegitimately indulged - can control their own indulgences. Sometimes, their lust is most importunate when they least desire it; at other times, the feelings fail them when they crave them most, their bodies remaining frigid when lust is blazing in their souls. Thus, lustitself, lascivious and legitimate, refuses to obey, and the very passion that so often joins forces to resist the soul is sometimes so divided against itself that, after it has roused the soul to passion, it refuses to awaken the feelings of the flesh.
15 Now it may still be objected that I do not allow for the possibility of a utilitarian agent over the usual course of a normal life being wholly self-forgetful and spontaneous. However, I don't see how an advocate of any type of ethical theory could allow for such a possibility. By this I don't mean that such a life might not have value-and in fact great hedonic value for the individual leading it and those he affects-but that such a life couldn't have moral value. It would rather be a life led in some blessed state that is beyond the reach of morality, i.e. a life in which there would never be questions about the neglect or performance of duties. My claim is that like other ethical theorists utilitarians can urge leaving a place in persons' lives for spontaneous and self-forgetful activities, and moreover that in the course of a normal life providing for such a place can be from the utilitarian perspective praiseworthy.
16 See Williams', Bernard “Egoism and Altruism” in Problems ofthe Self (Cambridge, 1973) p. 258ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar. and Bernard Mayo's lecture in the Royal Institute of Philosophy's Lectures for 1976–7 (forthcoming). Also see Grice's, RussellThe Grounds of Moral Judgement (Cambridge, 1967) pp. 135–140.Google Scholar
17 The point I am making relates to two claims advanced on behalf of MU by its formulator Adams (see note 9) and also some of Mackie's arguments in Chapter 8 of Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin, 1977).
18 This paper was read at the 1978 meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association. I have profited from the criticisms sent me by the two anonymous referees for the CPA and by those sent me by Ted Bond (Queens) who commented on my paper at the meeting. Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to the two referees for Dialogue for their detailed and perspicious comments.