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Incline Without Necessitating

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Storrs McCall
Storrs McCall
Affiliation:
McGill University
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Extract

A stranger runs out of a bank while I am sitting at the wheel of my car waiting for the lights to change; he jumps in beside me, points a gun at me, and says, “Drive me to St. Bruno.” This is Andre Gombay's example, from his excellent paper on duress. The question that interests Gombay and me is: Could I refrain from doing what the gunman asks?

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 24 , Issue 4 , Winter 1985 , pp. 589 - 596
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1985

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References

1 Gombay, André, “Necessitate Without Inclining”, Dialogue (this issue), 579–587Google Scholar.

2 Frankfurt, Harry G., “Coercion and Moral Responsibility”, in Honderich, T., ed., Essays on Freedom of Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 78Google Scholar.

3 Breuer, J. and Freud, S.. Studies on Hysteria, vol. 2 of Freud's Complete Psychological Works, ed. Strachey, James (London: Hogarth Press. 1955). 38Google Scholar.

4 Nozick, Robert. “Coercion”, in Morgenbesser, S. et al.. eds.. Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1969).Google Scholar cited in Greenspan, P. S.. “Behaviour Control and Freedom of Action”. Philosophical Review 87 (1978). 232CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Greenspan, “Behaviour Control”, 227–232Google Scholar.

6 Frankfurt, “Coercion”, 78Google Scholar.

7 This, I think, is Brenda Baker's view of duress. Thus, she says: “Duress is different from physical coercion. … Duress is a kind of pressure which operates by explicitly giving the person subject to it reason to do some definite course of action. … Usually, the main reason for doing the action is that the agent considers the disadvantages of non-performance … to override the disadvantages of performance” (“Acting Under Duress”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 [1974], 517–518).

8 Kenny, Anthony, “Freedom, Spontaneity and Indifference”, in Honderich, T., ed.. Essays on Freedom of Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 89–104Google Scholar.

9 Austin, J. L., “A Plea for Excuses”, in his Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 138.Google Scholar Austin's principle is, “no modification without aberration”. I suppose similar qualms should also apply to “intentional”.