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Is Thinker a Natural Kind?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Paul M. Churchland
Affiliation:
University of Manitoba

Abstract

Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is here criticized from the perspective of a more naturalistic and less compromising form of materialism. Parallels are explored between the problem of cognitive activity and the somewhat more settled problem of vital activity. The lessons drawn suggest that functionalism in the philosophy of mind may be both counterproductive as a research strategy, and false as a substantive position.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1982

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