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Ethical Naturalism and the Justification of Claims about Human Form

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2016

JESSY JORDAN*
Affiliation:
Mount St. Mary’s University

Abstract

Recent defenders of Philippa Foot, such as Michael Thompson and John Hacker-Wright, have argued that it is a mistake to think that Foot aims to justify a substantive conception of human soundness and defect. Instead, she relies on the acceptance of certain groundless moral norms to underwrite her views about what is characteristically human. I maintain that this is a weakness and that the Footian-style proponent of natural normativity needs to provide a story about how we might achieve justified self-confidence regarding moral norms. In this paper, I offer a coherentist model for doing so, thereby addressing the justification gap.

Des défenseurs récents de Philippa Foot, comme Michael Thompson et John Hacker-Wright, ont affirmé qu’il est faux de penser que Foot vise à justifier une conception substantielle ce qui est sain ou défectueux dans l’être humain. La conception de Foot repose plutôt sur l’acceptation de certaines normes morales dénuées de fondement afin de soutenir ses vues sur ce qui est typiquement humain. Je maintiens qu’il s’agit là d’une faiblesse, et que ceux qui suivent le raisonnement de Foot sur la normativité naturelle doivent expliquer comment on pourrait atteindre une confiance en soi justifiée en ce qui concerne les normes morales. Dans cet article, je propose un modèle cohérentiste pour y parvenir, ce qui me conduit à aborder l’écart de justification.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2016 

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