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Some Reflections on the Role of a Political Opposition in New Nations*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 June 2009

D. E. Apter
D. E. Apter
Affiliation:
University of California, (Berkeley)
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Extract

The role of a political opposition has proved ambiguous in most newly independent nations. New governments rarely see the necessity for a regular opposition party nor do they always accept the idea of opposition as a normal feature of government. There are many reasons why this is so. Most new nations have come into being after a prolonged period of struggle with colonial authorities which has caused nationalist leaders to monopolize loyalties. Also, opposition groups having themselves been associated with nationalism at some stage of their existence, often have an anti-government reflex common to those whose political actions have been aimed at changing the fundamental character of a country rather than accepting well established rules of political life and working within them. Indeed, many opposition leaders in new nations regard the new government much as they did their colonial nredecessors, i.e. as basically illegitimate.

Type
Research Article
Information
Comparative Studies in Society and History , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , January 1962 , pp. 154 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 1962

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References

1 Such as the Sahel-Benin Entente.

2 See Feith, Herbert, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952–1953; a Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia (= Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, 1958), pp. 165–193.Google Scholar

3 See Soils, E., “The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma”, World Politics, Vol. XI, No. 1 (10 1958).Google Scholar

4 This view is shared by other observers. For example, Pye indicates that “the fact that the ruling party in most non-western countries identifies itself with an effort to bring about total change in the society makes it difficult to limit the sphere of political controversy.” See Pye, Lucian W., “The Non-Western Political Process”, The Journal of Politics, XX (1958), p. 473.Google Scholar

5 See deJouvenel, Bertrand, Sovereignty, trans. Huntington, J. F. (Chicago, 1957), pp. 265–266.Google Scholar

6 See the discussion on planning by Lewis, W. Arthur, “On Assessing a Development Plan”, The Economic Bulletin, the Journal of the Economic Society of Ghana, 06–07 1959.Google Scholar

7 The question has been raised whether or not an opposition could survive at all. The assumption here is that such opposition members have the choice of nominal opposition or oblivion. The benefits of opposition are preferable to oblivion. Hence recruits to the opposition can be found, especially where they do have an impact on government policy.

8 See Apter, D. E., and Lystad, R. A., “Bureaucracy, Party, and Democracy”, Transition in Africa, ed. by Carter, and Brown, (Boston, 1958), pp. 42–43.Google Scholar

9 See Schumpeter, J. A., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York, 1942), p. 269.Google Scholar

10 There are, of course, exceptions. Where the middle spectrum does not show an identity of interest or is very small, political parties exacerbate differences. The Third and Fourth French Republics are good examples of what can happen.

11 Where government is composed of the extremists these generalizations are of course inoperable. Rarely is it the case in new nations that extremists do in fact run the government.