The discovery of the inscription with the name of [M]iltiades, which confirmed the statement in Dionysius Halicarnassensis 7. 3. 1 that a Miltiades was archon at Athens in 524/3, prompts a reconsideration of the problems presented by the accounts in Herodotus and in Marcellinus Life of Thucydides concerning the Philaid family. To the question, who is this Miltiades, the following answers have been given. ‘He is not a Philaid.’ The objection to this answer is that the Peisistratids either occupied the archonship themselves or gave it to members of leading families, such as Cleisthenes the Alcmeonid in 525/4; if then this Miltiades was a member of a leading family, he is almost certainly a member of the Philaid family. ‘He is the elder Miltiades who founded the settlement in the Chersonese.’ In Herodotus' account (6. 34–37) Miltiades left Athens, where he was already powerful, at the beginning of a tyranny by Peisistratus; then after several operations in the Chersonese Miltiades was rescued by Croesus. The year in which Miltiades left Athens was either 561/0 or 556/5 and almost certainly the latter; for in 561/0 Croesus was not on the throne. The year 546 may be excluded; for in 546 autumn and winter Croesus had neither the time nor the opportunity to concern himself with Miltiades, since Cyrus was then at war with Lydia and seized Sardis.2 If Miltiades was powerful in 556/5, he was at that date no youngster but at least in his thirties—a man born say c. 590. In 524/3, being well on in his sixties and having spent thirty years and more in the Chersonese (for Herodotus does not suggest that he ever came back to Athens), this Miltiades is unlikely to have been the eponymous archon. We conclude, then, that the archon Miltiades in 524/3 was a different and younger Miltiades. Having cleared the ground on these two points, I turn to the central problem, whether there were two men called Miltiades, one born c. 590 and the other the general who died of a wound soon after 489, or whether there were three men called Miltiades, one of whom was in a generation intermediate between Miltiades born c. 590 and Miltiades dead c. 489. Either solution is chronologically possible.

The farthest east on the transcontinental road to China which ancient travellers from the Mediterranean borderlands are known to have attained was reached by a party that made its way as far as the Stone Tower, a station in the region of the Pamirs, not far from the watershed between the Mediterranean and the Yellow Seas. This expedition was organized by a member of an old business family, named and described as The only reference to Maes in ancient literature is in a brief notice by Ptolemy (i. II. 7), which he derived from his main source, the geographer Marinus of Tyre. Can we find out anything more about this great entrepreneur?

The influence which the Pythagorean society and its leading doctrines exercised upon Athenian intellectual and political developments in the late fifth century leads us to seek in Pythagoras a figure of greater stature and more clear-cut features than modern scholarship is prepared to allow. To us he is a great name but little more, the large body of detailed information about his life which is available in later writers being dismissed as fabulous. This scepticism was reasonable enough when the reader was faced with the garbled hotchpotch of an Iamblichus or a Porphyry. But since the task has been put in hand of determining what portions of this tradition can safely be attributed to the various authorities who concerned themselves with the Pythagorean story in the fourth century, and of considering the respective historical value of these authorities, the scepticism of, for example, Burnet's account becomes unjustified. It is now possible to present a fairly detailed account of Pythagoras' activity, which has at least as much claim to credence as a great deal of what we now readily accept as ancient history, and is furthermore consistent with the general picture of the man that emerges from a careful scrutiny of classical sources. Not only for its own sake, but in the context of the increasingly fruitful investigation of fifth-century Athenian movements, I feel that it may be useful to put together such an account of Pythagoras. It will certainly be regarded by some as mere fiction, but may nevertheless provide others with a convenient summary of what the fifth- and fourth-century writers thought and believed about a man and a movement that had profound influence upon their times. I hope at the same time to suggest some links between what Pythagoras thought and did and the main tradition of Greek social behaviour. If Pythagoras was, as I believe, not so much an innovator as a reformer and developer of some of the central institutions of Greek life, the possibility will be opened of regarding various phenomena in mainland Greece which we have been asked to call Pythagorean, e.g. the Socratic phrontisterion as it appears in the Clouds, not as deriving from Pythagoras but as a parallel growth to the Pythagorean synedria and nourished by the same root.

I Consider first line 58, though its interpretation cannot be separated from that of the ensuing lines. The editors put a comma after iuuenem and must therefore intend propiorque iubenti to be taken with conticuit. It seems more natural, however, to take it with what precedes. The obvious function of propior in such a case is to qualify or amplify an idea already stated, as in Stat. Ach. 2. 94–95:

It has commonly been assumed that, on ancient Greek instruments of the lyre-type (lyre, barbitos, cithara), when a string had been tuned to a certain note, that note and that note only could be played, until the string was retuned; thus, that a separate string was required for each note of a given scale. This (which may be called the orthodox) view involves certain difficulties. The canonical number of strings was seven, and seven-stringed lyres and citharas continue to be represented in art throughout the classical period. But, with one note to each string, a seven-stringed lyre could not even play a complete diatonic octave.

The purpose of this note is to redirect attention to some of the literary evidence that concerns the site of Apollo's temple on the Palatine. For this evidence has an irritating habit of refusing to confirm what would otherwise be irrefutable archaeological proof of the temple's site. It is now fashionable to identify the site of the temple with that occupied by the temple-core that was originally assigned to Iuppiter Victor on the south-west angle of the Palatine in the region of the Scalae Caci, the Temple of Magna Mater, the Casa Romuli, and the so-called House of Liuia. This was, in the view of most scholars, Euander's citadel that Virgil calls Pallanteum and this must be the site of the Augustan buildings. Now the House of Liuia has been identified with apparent probability as the House of Augustus, and we know from literary evidence (Suet. Aug. 29, 72, Vell. 2. 81, Dio Cass. 49. 15. 5) that the temple of Apollo, Augustus' private house, and the house decreed to him by the senate (Richmond, J.R.S., 1914, pp. 194 f.) must have been in close proximity to each other. The temple-core on the south-west of the Palatine is of Augustan date and is built over the remains of houses of the late republic1 which appear to have been demolished for the purpose. If Liuia's House was the house of Augustus then Iuppiter Victor's temple must be assigned to Apollo.

The publication of Mr. R. S. Bluck's stimulating Phaedo prompts me to ask the following questions concerning the traditional interpretation of the cosmographical passage beginning 108 e. (1) Do the terms of 108 e-109 a in combination with 110 b 5 ff. and Timaeus 40 b-c and 62 d ff. prove conclusively that in the Phaedo Plato thinks of the earth as a spherical body? (2) Granted that he does, need his description of the earth, as a setting for his eschatological myth, conform with the spherical theory?

Professor Skutsch has convicted me of one error—the inclusion of Eun. 465 in my list on p. 208. I do not feel, however, that he has proved that Phaedria (nom. or voc.) is a dactyl in Terence. The essence of his argument, as I see it, depends on the figures in the last two rows of the first two columns on p. 90, and may be stated as follows: ‘Forms undeniably dactylic, such as Pamphile, are always followed by a disyllabic thesis. The thesis after all critical examples of Phaedria is disyllabic. Therefore “Phaedria is proved to be a dactyl”.’ My objection to this argument is not that it is not a logical syllogism, but that it seeks to establish the prosody of Phaedria (3 examples only) without considering the prosody of the other Phaedria-typt1 names in Terence. These are listed on p. 208 of my article (but omitting Eun. 465). The following cases, I suggest, merit consideration:

Hesiod is among the most difficult Greek poets for problems of text. This is especially true in the case of the Theogony. Today we consider an over-scrupulous analysis of the logical consistency of a text a characteristic of nineteenth-century pedantry. Yet such latitude is not always allowed the Theogony. It was only twenty-five years ago that there appeared the most ruthless survey of its contents. This was Jacoby's edition of 1930, when only a mutilated remnant of the surviving text was left the original poet; the rest was added by a whole series of subsequent rhapsodes. Hesiod received very much the same treatment four years later from Schwenn. Recently, however, two developments have gone a long way towards the defence of passages excluded by scholars from what they think the authentic text of Hesiod's Theogony. Many single lines or groups of verses have been bracketed by the editors of Hesiod, since they reproduce some other part of the poem in a similar or even identical form. The researches of the Dutch scholar Otterlo have now revealed that the fault is rather that of these editors. When they stigmatize the passages with the description of aimless repetition, they fail to appreciate what Otterlo claims as an inherent principle of oral recitation, or literature derived from an oral prototype. Otterlo's term for what would be an essential feature of this literature is ring-composition. A rhapsode provides a loose unity for his poem by repeating at the conclusion to the sections of the poem the verses which also introduced them. These repetitive verses announce the beginning and then the end of each section. We are wrong if we think that they have only been transferred from their original place in the poem to some later passage because there has been a lack of proper care in the process of transmission. Certainly this repetition is no adequate reason for us to suppose their occurence a second time in our text spurious.

The present paper proposes to discuss three passages in Tacitus, Histories 3 where current interpretations have led to difficulties which can be shown to be baseless so soon as it is realized that Tacitus is willing on occasion to sacrifice truth and clarity to stylistic effect. In each of these passages the same literary device lies at the root of the matter, a device which (for want of a better term) may be labelled ‘die grouping of participles’: the juxtaposition of participles in a sentence to die detriment of strict chronological order.

A Fragment of ancient philosophy is like a code message which it is the task of the scholar to decipher. The cryptogram has come down to us, but not the key. In case this beginning should be thought obvious by anyone, let me say at once that I do not believe a word of it, though I believe that the attitude it epitomizes is by no means uncommon and is part of the explanation of a tendency to mishandle philosophical fragments. The attitude is to be found, for example, in some things M. Untersteiner has said in his recently translated book on the Sophists1 about the meaning of the well-known statement of Protagoras:

Although not tenable in details, Porphyrion's interpretation seems to me generally preferable to Bentley's, despite the very wide acceptance of the latter. Horace is in all seriousness defending his claim to originality. On the Bentleian interpretation, it is a curious defence that he is made to offer:

In his monumental edition of Callimachus, R. Pfeiffer has questioned the authenticity of three epigrams. More than fifty years ago U. v. Wilamowitz- Moellendorff had rejected Ep. 33 and Ep. 36 4; but Pfeiffer seems to be the first critic to exclude Ep. 63 (= Anth. Pal. 5. 23) from the collection of Callimachus' epigrams. Although he sets forth his objections in a long footnote, none of the reviewers has so far discussed this point.

The last epigrammatist named by Meleager as contributing to his Garland is Phanias, who, with Meleager's customary irrelevance, is said to be represented there by cornflowers . No inferences can be drawn from his place in the catalogue, which is neither chronological nor topographical in arrangement, and with one possible exception the epigrams give no hint of his home or date. In A.P. 6. 299.

Lucian's suggestions as to what was meant by the man who called him a literary Prometheus by no means exhaust the possibilities. This is perhaps to be expected, as Lucian's reply to this lawyer is probably a or introduction to the reading of a major dialogue, and he has merely taken advantage of the fact that he was called a literary Prometheus to do some self-advertisement as the founder of a new literary genre.

Thus the passage is printed in the Teubner edition of Seneca's Dialogues by E. Hermes, who, on the strength of Aen. 8. 702 f. (‘et scissa gaudens vadit Discordia palla, quam cum sanguineo sequitur Bellona flagello’), adds a note on the quotation ‘versus sunt Vergilii a Seneca licenter mutati’.

Now the imputation to Seneca of such gross alteration of Virgil can only be supported if we disregard or eject the evidence to the contrary. As only the last five words are actually Virgilian; as Seneca himself says ‘aput vate nostra?’; as out at the beginning of the second line may introduce a second quotation (so Rossbach); and as est, which Gertz secluded, has a part to play if the lines are by different poets, it is safer to take a step backwards and dispose the passage thus:

In a recent paper I discussed the origin of the concept of the climata in Greek geography, and adduced reasons for attributing the formulation and elaboration of the concept to Hipparchus (fl. 150 B.C.). The above passage in Strabo was naturally mentioned in the course of the argument, and I drew attention in a footnote to the unsatisfactory nature of the account given by him of the climata. I now propose to examine the passage in more detail