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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2019
Recent scholarship on Plato's Cratylus (= Cra.) has yielded interpretations that assign various functions of philosophical importance to the dialogue's lengthy etymological section. Barney (2001) considers the section an ‘agonistic display’ (69–73) in which Socrates beats contemporary practitioners of etymology at their own game while, at the same time, offering a cosmological theory intended for serious intellectual competition. In this context, Barney emphasizes the importance of Parmenides, a charioteer who journeys towards Truth, as a literary point of reference for Socrates’ own etymological quest after the true meaning of names which, from Cratylus’ naturalist perspective on language, are considered indicative of their referents’ essential nature. The contents of the etymologies may be a ‘rational reconstruction’ (52–7) of Cratylus’ linguistic naturalism. Sedley (2003) stresses the encyclopedic character of Socrates’ lexical interpretations and argues that these are ‘exegetically correct’ (28) in representing the opinions of the name-givers of old who subscribed to a Heraclitean view of a world in flux, as is reflected in the original form of the names they devised. Ademollo (2011) stresses that Socrates’ etymologies display the evolution of Greek intellectual thought, shown to be heavily reliant on the assumption of a universe in flux, and serve to exhibit the weaknesses in Cratylus’ naturalist view of language.
I would like to thank John Newell, Jim Lennox, Carrie Weaver, Renee Gondek and the anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on the present study.
1 Against a primarily satirical reading, as suggested already by Schleiermacher, F., Platons Werke. Teil II (Berlin, 1875), 5–6Google Scholar; further, Stallbaum, G., Platonis Dialogos Selectos. Vol. V / II: Continens Cratylum (Gotha and Erfurt, 1835)Google Scholar. More recently, Baxter, T.M.S., Cratylus, The. Plato's Critique of Naming (Leiden – New York – Cologne, 1992)Google Scholar has argued that Plato presents a ‘parody of Greek etymological practices’ (96) aimed at various Greek intellectuals. For selective reviews of earlier studies on the issue of seriousness vs parody, see Gaiser, K., Name und Sache in Platons ‘Kratylos’ (Heidelberg, 1974), 45–9Google Scholar; Derbolav, J., Platons Sprachphilosophie im Kratylos und in den Späteren Schriften (Darmstadt, 1972), 228–31Google Scholar.
2 Barney, R., Names and Nature in Plato's Cratylus (New York and London, 2001)Google Scholar.
3 Thus already Rijlaarsdam, J.C., Platon über die Sprache. Ein Kommentar zum Kratylos (Utrecht, 1978), 143Google Scholar.
4 Sedley, D., Plato's Cratylus (Cambridge, 2003)Google Scholar; see also id., ‘The etymologies in Plato's Cratylus’, JHS 118 (1998), 140–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 First noted by Goldschmidt, V., Essay sur le “Cratyle” (Paris, 1940), 93Google Scholar.
6 Ademollo, F., The Cratylus of Plato (New York, 2011), 251–2Google Scholar. Further proponents of the ‘serious’ reading are, for example, Rijlaarsdam (n. 3); Dalimier, C., Platon Cratyle (Paris, 1998)Google Scholar.
7 According to Sedley (n. 4 [2003]), 108–9, Plato would presumably have accepted etymologies which claim to reveal the nature of our physical world, but rejected the name-givers’ erroneous assumptions concerning moral and intellectual virtues; cf. Barney (n. 2), 73. This view is criticized by Ademollo (n. 6), 207–8, who argues that Plato portrays the name-givers in an unqualifiedly negative light, not merely in the context of their opinions on abstract values.
8 Steiner, A., ‘Die Etymologien in Platons Kratylos’, AGPh 22 (1916), 109–32Google Scholar; Barwick, K., ‘Probleme der Stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik’, in: Abh. sächs. Akad. Wiss. zu Leipzig, phil.-hist. Kl. 49/3 (1957)Google Scholar; and most fervently Boyancé, P., ‘La “doctrine d'Euthyphron” dans le Cratyle’, REG 54 (1941), 141–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar argued that the motif of Euthyphro's influence on Socrates goes beyond exemplifying the dangers of uncritical acceptance of religious authority, assuming that Euthyphro provided the doctrinal raw material for Socrates’ etymologies of divine names.
9 Sedley (n. 4 [2003]), 40–1 offers a less negative evaluation of Euthyphro's influence, arguing that he might, indeed, have held authority in the field of etymology. The fact that Socrates’ etymologies, owing to Euthyphro's inspiration, cannot be held to be his own distances Socrates from the practice without signalling disapproval. Ademollo (n. 6), 241–6 offers a more cautious appraisal of Euthyphro's influence; Barney (n. 2), 57–60 notes the parallels with Socrates’ divine inspiration in the first speech on Eros in the Phaedrus and stresses its effect of distancing Socrates from the contents. Similarly, Heitsch, E., Willkür und Problembewußtsein in Platons Kratylos (Mainz, 1984), 44–6Google Scholar speaks of an ‘ironische Distanzierung’ (at 46).
10 Cf. e.g. Apol. 21b.
11 Cf. Baxter (n. 1), 90: ‘The leitmotif of Euthyphronic inspiration is not such as to inspire confidence in the results of the etymologies.’
12 For a fuller discussion on the implications of this remark, see Ademollo (n. 6), 243–6. See also Gaiser (n. 1), 49–53; Vries, G.J. De, ‘Notes on some passages of the Cratylus’, Mnemosyne 8 (1955), 290–7, at 294CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
13 Barney (n. 2), 61 points out that a further significant horse-race takes place at Il. 23.362–532, which she terms the ‘primal scene of Greek epistemology’. In this race, staged on the occasion of the funeral games in honour of Patroclus, Nestor appeals to ingenuity (μῆτις) as the quality that will see his son Antilochus win second prize despite the fact that his are the slowest horses (23.309–10). Barney, moreover, points to literary echoes of this race in Parmenides (75).
14 ἀλλ’ ἄγ’ ἐμῶν ὀχέων ἐπιβήσεο, ὄφρα ἴδηαι, οἷοι Τρώϊοι ἵπποι ἐπιστάμενοι πεδίοιο κραιπνὰ μάλ’ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα διωκέμεν ἠδὲ φέβεσθαι (transl. Lattimore, with minor modifications).
15 ἵπποι δ’ οὐ παρέασι καὶ ἅρματα τῶν κ’ ἐπιβαίην· […] ὣς λίπον, αὐτὰρ πεζὸς ἐς Ἴλιον εἰλήλουθα τόξοισιν πίσυνος· τὰ δέ μ’ οὐκ ἄρ’ ἔμελλον ὀνήσειν (Il. 5.192; 204–5; transl. Lattimore, with minor modifications).
16 Socrates feigns regret about not having attended Prodicus’ ‘fifty-drachma lecture’ (384b3) on etymological interpretation, thus professing himself unable to expound the sophist's teachings. At Euthyd. 277c Prodicus is associated with learning about the ‘correctness of names’. W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, 1962–81), 3.222–3 discusses Socrates’ relationship with Prodicus. See also Baxter (n. 1), 151–6; Ademollo (n. 6), 28; and Pl. Prt. 341a and Meno 96d. In the Iliad, Pandarus at 5.230–8 turns down Aeneas’ invitation to take over the reins, arguing that they will fare better if Aeneas remains in control of his own domain.
17 At 414b2–4 Socrates is making such speed in his interpretations ‘as to get hurled off his race course’ (ὥσπερ ἐκτὸς δρόμου φερόμενον ἐπειδὰν λείου ἐπιλάβωμαι). See below, 8–9.
18 τῆς γάρ τοι γενεῆς ἧς Τρωΐ περ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς δῶχ’ υἷος ποινὴν Γανυμήδεος …
19 ἤριπε δ’ ἐξ ὀχέων, ἀράβησε δὲ τεύχε’ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ αἰόλα παμφανόωντα, παρέτρεσσαν δέ οἱ ἵπποι ὠκύποδες· τοῦ δ’ αὖθι λύθη ψυχή τε μένος τε.
20 Incidentally, Diomedes’ stolen horses win first prize in the race in Iliad Book 23, putting him before Antilochus and his μῆτις. Cf. n. 13 above.
21 οὐδ’ υἱὸς Καπανῆος ἐλήθετο συνθεσιάων τάων ἃς ἐπέτελλε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Διομήδης (…) Αἰνείαο δ’ ἐπαΐξας καλλίτριχας ἵππους ἐξέλασε Τρώων μετ’ ἐϋκνήμιδας Ἀχαιούς.
22 See Baxter (n. 1), 113: ‘What [Euthyphro] passes on is […] the hubristic desire for divine knowledge through inspiration’.
23 We recall the description of his activity as χρησμῳδεῖν at Cra. 396d3, 396c6–d1, which implies a connection to Apollo's oracle; see pp. 2–3 above.
24 In the course of his appropriation by Hellenistic authors, the Phrygian figure of Marsyas was likened to both a satyr and a Silenus without apparent distinction. Greek sources commonly cited for the anecdote include Hdt. 7.26.3; Xen. An. 1.2.8; Apollod. Bibl. 1.24; Paus. 1.24.1; Diod. Sic. 3.59.2–5 (see also 3.58.2); Plut. De cohibenda ira 456b4–c7 and Ath. Deipn. 14.7.4–20. Athena's displeasure about her distorted face is noted in fr. 805(a) PMG (ed. D.L. Page, 1967, first edn corr.) of the early fifth-century b.c.e. poet Telestes: ‘I do not believe in my heart that the clever one, divine Athena, took the clever instrument in the mountain thickets and then in fear of eye-offending ugliness (δυσόφθαλμον αἶσχος) threw it from her hands to be the glory of the nymph-born beast Marsyas who claps his hands. For why should a keen yearning for lovely beauty distress her, to whom Clotho had dealt out virginity without marriage and child’ (transl. Campbell, D.A., Greek Lyric, vol. 5 [London, 1982]Google Scholar, with minor modifications). Athena's distorted face may be referenced also on an Apulian bell-krater (Boston, Museum of Fine Arts 00.348) attributed to the Boston Painter, dated by A.D. Trendall and A. Cambitoglou (RAVp vol. 1, 267 no. 48 pl. 89.2) to c.370–360 b.c.e. The vase depicts Athena who is sitting by a tree and playing the double-flute, while a young man holds a mirror to her face. Marsyas appears to Athena's right. The anecdote is common also in the Latin tradition: e.g. Ov. Fast. 6.697–708, Met. 6.382, Ars am. 3.505–6; Gell. NA 15.17; Hyg. Fab. 165; Stat. Silv. 5.3; Fulg. Myth. 3.9.87. For surveys of variations on the anecdote, see A. Weis, ‘Marsyas’, LIMC VI.1 (1992), 366–78 and Roscher, Lex. 2440–59.
25 ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἕτοιμός εἰμι παρέχειν ἐμαυτὸν τοῖς ξένοις, καὶ ἐὰν βούλωνται δέρειν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν δέρουσιν, εἴ μοι ἡ δορὰ μὴ εἰς ἀσκὸν τελευτήσει, ὥσπερ ἡ τοῦ Μαρσύου, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀρετήν. See also Pl. Leg. 3.677d4, Resp. 3.399e1–2, where Maryas appears in the context of musical education.
26 According to Plut. Alc. 2.4–6, Alcibiades so despised flute-playing and its distorting effect on the player's facial expression (2.5.5–2.6.1) that it was eventually removed from the liberal arts curriculum (2.7.5–6).
27 Symp. 215a5–b4: φημὶ γὰρ δὴ ὁμοιότατον αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς σιληνοῖς τούτοις τοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἑρμογλυφείοις καθημένοις, οὕστινας ἐργάζονται οἱ δημιουργοὶ σύριγγας ἢ αὐλοὺς ἔχοντας, οἳ διχάδε διοιχθέντες φαίνονται ἔνδοθεν ἀγάλματα ἔχοντες θεῶν. καὶ φημὶ αὖ ἐοικέναι αὐτὸν τῷ σατύρῳ τῷ Μαρσύᾳ.
28 Symp. 217e–219e. See North, H.F., ‘“Opening Socrates”: the eikon of Alcibiades’, ICS 19 (1994), 89–98, especially 93–5Google Scholar; Sheffield, F.C.C., ‘Alcibiades’ speech. A satyric drama’, G&R 48 (2001), 193–209, at 202Google Scholar with references. Sheffield assesses Alcibiades’ entry in the Symposium as a satyric play.
29 Gagarin, M., ‘“Hybris” and Alcibiades’ failure’, Phoenix 31 (1977), 22–37, at 31–3 with n. 39CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also the portrayal of Marsyas by Diodorus Siculus, who says that Marsyas was ‘admired for his sagacity and moderation’ (θαυμαζόμενον ἐπὶ συνέσει καὶ σωφροσύνῃ, 3.58.3, 3.58.6–7).
30 Note Socrates’ interpretation of the name ‘Apollo’ itself as indicative of the ‘four powers’ (405a1, 406a1–2) of the god, music, prophecy, medicine and archery. A specific domain of the god is that of purification, both in the field of medicine and in the field of prophecy (see 405a8–b2, b6–7)—we recall Socrates’ call for purification after his own ‘prophetic’ performance of interpreting names (396e3–397a1; cf. p. 3 above; see Anceschi, B., Die Götternamen in Platons Kratylos (Frankfurt, 2007), 116–18Google Scholar. Apollo's connection with prophecy is accounted for by Socrates with the etymological link between the god's name and the term τὸ ἁπλοῦν, ‘the simple’, which he declares to be identical in meaning with τὸ ἀληθές, ‘the truthful’ (405c2).
31 See Stallbaum (n. 1), 89 and Ademollo (n. 6), 248: ‘“Becoming wiser than he should” probably amounts to transgressing some boundary he should not transgress.’
32 At Symp. 214d2–4 Alcibiades anticipates a comparison between Socrates and the gods with his ironic accusation that Socrates would be jealous if he praised Eros, like the other symposiasts had done before him: ‘It is he who won't keep his hands off me if I praise any god or man other than himself in his presence.’
33 North (n. 28), 96 comments: ‘[…] the comical surface of Socrates’ logoi is compared to the skin of a hubristic satyr (221e3–5). The “opening” of the silenus-statues is substituted for the flaying’.
34 At Symp. 216d4–7 Socrates wears his outer shell (τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ) of ignorance like a Silenus statue, ‘but once his surface is removed, can you imagine how full to the brim he is with moderation?’ (ἔνδοθεν δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶς πόσης οἴεσθε γέμει, ὦ ἄνδρες συμπόται, σωφροσύνης).
35 Symp. 222a1–6; see Sheffield (n. 28), 199–200.
36 Socrates himself had previously, at 402a1, described as ‘laughable’ the sudden ‘swarm of wisdom’ (σμῆνος σοφίας, 401e6) that overcomes him. See, however, M. Mader, ‘Das Problem des Lachens und der Komödie bei Platon’ (Diss., Tübingen, 1973), who points out that Plato may portray as ridiculous views that may contain truth. Cf. Ademollo (n. 6), 302–6, 315. Gagarin (n. 29), 24 n. 11 notes that Socrates also describes his analysis of mimetically formed first names as ‘hybristic and ridiculous’ (ὑβριστικὰ εἶναι καὶ γελοῖα, 426b6); see similar remarks at 425d1, 426b6, 432d5. On the relation between the first and the secondary names in the etymological section, see Ademollo (n. 6), 257–67.
37 The parallels between Parmenides’ poem and the Cratylus are emphasized by Barney (n. 2), 73–80. Baxter (n. 1), 90 and Goldschmidt (n. 5), 108–9 downplay the race motif; see Barney (n. 2), 61.
38 See Barney (n. 2), 60–1.
39 Following an emendation by Adam that seems preferable to Méridier's θεῷ, which yields ‘there is an end to the god's [inspiration]’ (a reading chosen by Schleiermacher). With the acute accent, θέω, ‘I run’, along with τέλος, may form an accusative of spatial extent: ‘running over the finish line’; alternatively, a terminal accusative omitting a preposition: ‘running to the finish line’. The latter option is preferable, since Socrates subsequently indicates that he has not yet crossed the finish line: ‘I still (ἔτι) want to examine further words’, vowing to continue while his strength lasts (420e3–4). Alternatively, τέλος may be taken as an adverbial accusative: ‘At last, I am running’—an unlikely option, given that Socrates comments on his speed at 414b2–4. Cf. Goldschmidt (n. 5), 108 with n. 2.
40 ὥσπερ ἐκτὸς δρόμου φερόμενον ἐπειδὰν λείου ἐπιλάβωμαι. Etymologies are coming to Socrates with such ease as to distract him from words of philosophical significance: see Barney (n. 2), 61; Sedley (n. 4), 157.
41 Socrates’ speed is in contrast to Nestor's counsel at Il. 23.318–25 (see n. 14 above), where he explains that ‘he who has put all his trust (πεποιθώς, 23.319) in his horses and chariot and recklessly makes a turn that is loose, one way or another, finds his horses drifting out of the course (ἀνὰ δρόμον, 23.321) and does not control them. But the man, though he drive the slower horses, who takes his advantage, keeps his eye always on the post and turns tight, ever watchful …’ (transl. Lattimore with minor modifications).
42 401a4–5.
43 Note, moreover, that one of Apollo's domains is archery, with his name signifying ‘ever-darting’ (τὸ ἀεὶ βολῶν, Cra. 405c5–6; see n. 31 above and Anceschi [n. 30], 115, 121). Socrates’ own attempt at archery with the help of the flux-δόξα may be yet another unsuccessful attempt to match the god's skill—we recall that ‘Apollo’ at 405c2 is connected with τὸ ἀληθές, ‘the truthful’.
44 Barney (n. 2), 73–7 considers the Cratylean etymologies and Parmenides’ δόξα agonistic displays of cosmological theories intended for serious intellectual competition. The danger to which both Plato and Parmenides point, however, is that both Parmenides’ δόξα and the etymologies’ underlying intellectual framework of flux are deceptive and may be mistaken for the truth (Barney [n. 2], 76–80).