¹ These and other fragments are cited by their numbers in the Diels-Kranz Collection (Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. Diels, H., Kranz, W.,¹⁰ [Berlin], 1961)Google Scholar.

² e.g. by Havelock, E. A., The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics (London, 1957), p. 126Google Scholar.

³ It has been suggested, by von der Mühll, P. (‘Epikurs κυρ⋯αι δ⋯ξαι und Demokrit‘, Festgäbe für Kaegi [1919], 172–8)Google Scholar and Philippson, R. (‘Demokrits Sittensprüche’ [Hermes 59 (1924), 369–419])Google Scholar, that Democritus or some immediate follower had compiled an epitome of his ethical works, on the lines of Epicurus’ κυρ⋯αι δ⋯ξαι or Epictetus’ Encheiridion. Of such an epitome, if there ever was one, there is not a trace in Stobaeus or anywhere else. The ‘Γποθ⋯και mentioned by Dionysios of Alexandria (B 119) may well, as von der Mühll and Philippson suggest, have been an anthology. But we know nothing of its arrangement, contents or compiler.

⁴ See particularly Hense, O., ‘Ioannes Stobaios', RE 9.2549–86 at 2557–63Google Scholar.

⁵ Barns, J., ‘A New Gnomologium: with Some Remarks on Gnomic Anthologies’, CQ 44 (1950), 126–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 45 (1951), 1–19.

⁶ This exercise, incidentally, was on the curriculum not only of the rhetoricians but also of some philosophical schools, notably the Peripatos (D.L. 5.3, Strabo 13.1.54). See Arnim, H. v., Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa (Berlin, 1898), pp. 81–3Google Scholar. In the rhetorical handbooks, εἰ γαμητ⋯ον is the stock example of the θ⋯σις or quaestio infinita (Quint. 3.5.8, Hermogenes 11, Theon 12, etc.). See Barns, , art. cit. (n. 5), 13Google Scholar.

⁷ There is in fact considerable overlap of material. Lortzing, F. (‘Ueber die ethischen Fragmente Demokrits’, Progr. Sophien-Gymnasium 8 [Berlin, 1873], p. 10)Google Scholar neatly demonstrated that Stobaeus must have used either ‘Democrates’ or its Vorlage as one of his sources for Democritean material.

⁸ Barns, , art. cit. (n. 5), 16Google Scholar. One other class of anthology could also be mentioned here – the collections of copy-book sentences for use as writing or dictation exercises in elementary schools (see Barns, , art. cit. (n. 5), 18f)Google Scholar. The simplicity, not to say puerility, of much material in the ‘Democrates’ Collection might well suggest some such purpose.

⁹ cf. Blake, W. E., AJP 86 (1965), 317fGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ DK draw attention to one such apparent reformulation when they compare B 235 from Stobaeus (in 6.65) with B 71 (Democrates 36).

¹¹ A prime example is Democrates 80, where a phrase from an important Democritean fragment (B 181) reappears in a sentence of highly un Democritean content.

¹² See, further, §2 fin. on the possible interpretations of B 62 and B 43.

¹³ See von Arnim, H., GGA 11 (1894), 883Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Most importantly by Vlastos, G., ‘Ethics and Physics in Democritus’, Philosophical Review 54 (1945), 578–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 55 (1946), 53–64. A recent and ambitious exercise on the same lines can be found in Farrar, C., The Origins of Democratic Thinking (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 172–264CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ By, for instance, Luria, S., ‘Zur Frage der materialistischen Begründung der Ethik bei Demokrit’, D. Ak. Wiss. z. Berlin Alt. Wiss. 44 (Berlin, 1964)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ By Havelock, , op. cit. (n. 2), pp. 115–54Google Scholar, and Cole, A. T., Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology (Ann Arbor, 1967)Google Scholar. See also Müller, R., ‘Die Stellung Demokrits in der antiken Sozialphilosophie’, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Democritus, ed. Benakis, L. (Xanthi, 1984), i. 423–34Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Rather more than half of Farrar's chapter on Democritus (see above), for instance, is devoted to this sort of question.

¹⁸ Plutarch, , V. Per. 26Google Scholar= DK 30 A 3. In the fourth century, Archytas of Tarentum was seven times ‘general of the citizens’ and never once defeated (D.L. 8.79, 82).

¹⁹ Suda. DK 68 A 2.

²⁰ May, J. M. F., The Coinage of Abdera (London, 1966)Google Scholar, places this group (LXXXVII) of coins towards the end of his Period V (c. 439/7–411/10 B.C.). Previous numismatists (e.g. Fritze, H. v., Nomisma 3 [1909], 23f.)Google Scholar dated them to about 443. This dating led to denials (e.g. by H. v. Fritze) that the coins had anything to do with Democritus the philosopher. It was also used by Stella, L., ‘Intorno alia cronologia di Democrito’, RFIC 21 (1942), 36Google Scholar, as evidence that he must have been a generation older than the Apollodoran chronology indicates, while Seltman, C. (Greek Coins [London, 1933], p. 143)Google Scholar, asserted that the coin was ‘issued at a time when he might have been a priest of Apollo between the ages of twenty and thirty.’ (‘The annual priest would…be…perhaps a young man whose youthfulness should correspond to that of the deity himself. It is tempting to suppose…’). For Bicknell, P. J. (Apeiron 4.1 [1970], 1–3)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, ‘the magistracy will have been a token of their (sc. his fellow-citizens') appreciation.’

²¹ The name Democritus was not, of course, unique. It was borne by, amongst others, a Naxian trierarch at Salamis (Hdt. 8.46.3), a Chian man of letters mentioned by Aristotle (Rhet. 1409b26. Cf. D.L. 9.49) and at least three Athenians (see Pape-Benseler, s.v. Δνμόκριτος).

²² Fragments marked * will be printed with text and commentary in an appendix to this article, forthcoming in CQ.

²³ Particularly to individuals counting, as many could, on a network of foreign connections or f evoi to fall back on in the event of national disaster. See Herman, G., Ritualized Friendship and the Greek City (Cambridge, 1987)Google Scholar.

²⁴ As does Xenophon, , Mem. 3.7.9Google Scholar: κα⋯ μ⋯ ⋯μ⋯λει τ⋯ν τ⋯ς π⋯λεως… το⋯των γ⋯ρ καλ⋯ς ⋯χ⋯ντων…κα⋯ ο⋯ σο⋯ φ⋯λοι κα⋯ αὐτ⋯ς σὐκ ⋯λ⋯χιστα ὠφελ⋯σῃ.

²⁵ Thuc. 2.65.11.

²⁶ Aristotle, , Pol. 1302b15–21Google Scholar. Cf. 1308b16–19. In fourth-century Athens, various other devices, such as the γραφ⋯ παραν⋯μων, served the same purpose.

²⁷ It was on this principle, on whether they were designed to serve the ‘common good’ rather than some sectional interest, that Aristotle was to distinguish ‘correct’ constitutions from their ‘deviations’ (1279a17–20).

²⁸ At least six of Heracles’ twelve labours are against wild beasts. Theseus is a still more Democritean hero, slaying as he does not only the Minotaur, the Crommyonian sow (Plutarch, , V. Th. 9)Google Scholar and the bull of Marathon (14), but also such brigands as Sinis the Pine-bender (8), Sciron (10) and Procrustes (11). Plagues of wild animals, no less than floods, pestilence or famine, were a recognized catastrophe, capable of annihilating whole peoples. See Dicaearchus, fr. 24 W (= Cic. Off. 2.16): ‘est Dicaearchi liber de interitu hominum,…qui collectis ceteris causis eluvionis, pestilentiae, vastitatis, beluarum etiam repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet quaedam hominum genera esse consumpta…’

²⁹ Plato, , Prt. 322bGoogle Scholar; Isoc. 12.163; Hermarchus ap. Porphyry, , Abst. 1.1O.lffGoogle Scholar. (= LS 22 N).

³⁰ Plato, , Prt. 322bGoogle Scholar. See Cole, , op. cit. (n. 16), p. 123Google Scholar. It also led, on one version (Polybius 6.6.8), to the rise of monarchy, through the award of privileges – on the lines prescribed in B 258 – to individuals for outstanding service against the most dangerous animals.

³¹ Or, at any rate, external enemies. Brigands and pirates operate outside city limits, on the high seas and in the no-man's-land between city territories.

³² Cole, , op. cit. (n. 16), p. 124Google Scholar.

³³ See Friedländer, , Hermes 48 (1913), 613 n. 3Google Scholar.

³⁴ Tod, 23, Meiggs–Lewis, 30.

³⁵ See W. Kroll, RE sv. ‘Seeraub’, Badian, OCD sv. ‘Piracy’, Paneris, J. R., Philologus 127 (1983), 301f.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, etc.

³⁶ See Hirzel, R., Themis, Dike und Verwandtes (Leipzig, 1902), pp. 212–20Google Scholar.

³⁷ [Demosthenes].25.26 (printed by Untersteiner as part of the Anonymous Περ⋯ ν⋯μων).

³⁸ B 89 = Democrates 55 ⋯χθρ⋯ς οὐχ ⋯ ⋯λλ⋯ ⋯ βουλ⋯μενος. B 87 = Democrate s 53 τ⋯ν φα⋯λον παραφυλ⋯ττειν δεῖ, μ⋯ καρο⋯ λ⋯βηται. B 68 = Democrates 33 δ⋯κιμος ⋯ν⋯ρ κα⋯ ⋯δ⋯κιμος οὐκ ὐξ ὧν πρ⋯σσει μ⋯νον ⋯λλ⋯ κα⋯ ⋯ξ ὧν βο⋯λεται.

³⁹ cf. Thuc. 6.38.4: … τοὐς δ⋯ τ⋯ τοια⋯τα μηχανωμ⋯νους κολ⋯ζων μ⋯ μ⋯νον αὐτοφώρους (χαλεπ⋯ν γ⋯ρ ⋯πιτυγχ⋯νειν), ⋯λλ⋯ κα⋯ ὧν βο⋯λονται μ⋯ν, δ⋯νανται δ' οὐ (τ⋯ν γ⋯ρ ⋯χθρ⋯ν ωὐχ ὧν δρᾷ μ⋯νον, ⋯λλ⋯ κα⋯ τ⋯ς διανο⋯ας προαμ⋯νασθαι χρ⋯, εἴπερ κα⋯ μ⋯ προφυλξ⋯μεν⋯ς τις πρωπε⋯σεται Cf. 6.18.2.

⁴⁰ B 62 = Stob. III 9(περ⋯ δικαιοσὺνης). 29 = Democrates 27: ⋯λαθ⋯ν οὐ τ⋯ μ⋯ ⋯δικεῖν, ⋯λλ⋯ τ⋯ μηδ⋯ ⋯θ⋯λειν.

⁴¹ B 217 = Stob. III.9.30 μο⋯νοι θεοφιλ⋯εσ ⋯σοισ ⋯χθρ⋯ν τ⋯ ⋯δικ⋯ειν. I take θεοφιλ⋯εσ actively, as ‘loving the gods’, ‘pious’ (as at Isoc. 4.29), equivalent to φιλ⋯θεοι (Ar. Rhet. 1391b2), rather than passively ‘dear to the gods, divinely favoured’, though this is certainly the commoner meaning. What seems highly rash is to draw theological conclusions from this translation, and infer that Democritus believed in ‘love and friendship between man and deity’, ‘in the possibility of a spiritual relationship’ (McGibbon, D., Hermes 93 [1965], 393)Google Scholar.

⁴² A similar ambiguity occurs in B 43 = Democrates 9 μεταμ⋯λεια ⋯π’ αἰσχροῖσιν ἔργμασι β⋯ου σωτηρ⋯α: ‘remorse at shameful deeds: life's salvation’. This could mean, and doubtless the anthologist took it to mean, that repentance is the start of a new and more wholesome life – ‘initium est salutis notitia peccati’ (Epicurus 522 U = Seneca, Ep. 28.9. Cf. Cebes, , Pinax 11. 1Google Scholar, Hierocles, , in Carm. Aur. 14Google Scholar, Nilus – P G 79.1249c: ⋯ρχ⋯ σωτηρ⋯ας ⋯ ⋯αυτο⋯ κατ⋯γνωσις, etc.). But the penitent wrong-doer might also be ‘saved’ in the sense of receiving a lighter punishment or no punishment at all (cf. Isoc. 17.17f.:‘realizing that there would be no chance of escape (οὐδεμ⋯αν αὑτῷ σωτρ⋯αν) if the case came up before you…’, Sophocles, , Philoct. 1270Google Scholar, Euripides, , Andr. 1003f.Google Scholar, Thucydides 3.46.1, Aristotle, , Rhet. 1380a13–15Google Scholar, etc. On this more probable interpretation, the fragment was originally not about the ‘salvation’ of his soul, but about the treatment which he can expect to receive from others. (Farrar, Contra, op. cit. [n. 14], pp. 236f.)Google Scholar

⁴³ Fr. 62, according to Philippson, (op. cit. [n. 3], p. 417)Google Scholar, ‘nimmt den kantischen Grundsatz voraus: Gut ist allein der güter Wille.’ Likewise Ibscher, G., Demócrito y sus sentencias sobre ética y educatión (Lima, 1983–1984), ii. 199fGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁴ Xen, . Mem. 40.4.12Google Scholar: ἂλλ' ἒμην ἒγωγε ἒφη ⋯ Σωκραιάτης, τ⋯ μ⋯ θ⋯λειν ⋯δικεῖν ἱκαν⋯ν δικαιοσ⋯νησ ⋯π⋯δειγμα εἱναι. Cf. Philemon, fr. 94K: ⋯ν⋯ρ δ⋯κι⋯ς οὐ μ⋯ ⋯δικ⋯ν, | ⋯λλ’ ⋯στις ⋯δικῖν δυν⋯μενος μ⋯ βοὺλεται.

⁴⁵ For what we do know, or can reasonably infer, see May, , op. cit. (n. 20), pp. 147–53, 179–89, 239–13Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Even if Athens did not impose democracy on every city in the league (see Meiggs, R., The Athenian Empire (Oxford, 1972), pp. 207–19)Google Scholar, this was the primary form of government among the Eastern Greeks (Meiggs, p. 208). Their number would include Abdera, a colony of Teos.

⁴⁷ Abdera probably seceded at the same time as Thasos from the Athenian Empire. The two cities were reconquered for Athens by Thrasybulus in 407 (Diod. Sic. 13.72. 1f.). See May, , op. cit. (n. 20), pp. 179–82Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Bailey, C., The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (Oxford, 1928), p. 211Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Hdt. 3.80.6: πάλω μ⋯ν ⋯ρχ⋯ςι ἂρχει, ὑπε⋯θυνον δ⋯ ⋯ρχ⋯ν ἒχει, βουλεὺματα δ⋯ π⋯ντα ⋯ς τ⋯ κοιν⋯ν ⋯ναφ⋯ρει.

⁵⁰ At any rate to the less demanding offices. See , Ps.-Xenophon, Ath. Pol. 1.2Google Scholar.

⁵¹ B 49, B 267. Cf. B 75 and B 47 (on the slightly different subject of the pre-eminence due to the wise). See Appendix (forthcoming, cf. n. 22) on B 254.

⁵² Barker, E., The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1948), p. 83 n. 1Google Scholar.

⁵³ Aristotle, , Pol. 1292b5–10, 1293a30–4Google Scholar. Cf. Thuc. 3.62.3, etc. For further lexicographical material, see Aalders, G. J. D., ‘The Political Faith of Democritus’, Mnemosyne 3 (1951), 302–13, at p. 304 n. 11CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁴ So long, of course, as it is not democracy in its extreme form whereby the mob rules and the law (as in a ‘dynasty’) is subordinate (Ar. Pol. 1292a3–5, 1293a9f.).

⁵⁵ Or perhaps ‘enjoyed the optimal form of constitution’. The interpretation of Thucydides 8.97.2: οὐχ ⋯κιστα…εὖ πολιτε⋯ςαντες is a notorious teaser. See Gomme-Andrewes-Dover ad loc.

⁵⁶ Ps.-Xenophon 1.9 etc. For material on the political, social and moral connotations of terms like χρηστ⋯ς and κακ⋯ς in Ps.-Xenophon (1.8f.) and Aristophanes, see Croix, G. de Ste, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London, 1972), pp. 36f, 358f, 374fGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁷ See Gomme on Thuc. 2.40.2. See also Carter, L. B., The Quiet Athenian (Oxford, 1986), pp. 26–51Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Guthrie, W. K. C., A History of Greek Philosophy ii (Cambridge, 1965), p. 491Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Like B 278 which demonstrates that having children is by no means as straightforward a need as you might have thought.

⁶⁰ Unless, like Pericles, you happen to have a first-rate steward (Plut, . V. Per. 16. 5)Google Scholar.

⁶¹ I translate the text as in DK, with Meineke's addition of μ⋯ before ⋯μελ⋯οντι See Appendix (forthcoming).

⁶² One might recall here B 48 (Democrate s 14, Stob. III.38.46): μωμεομ⋯νων φλα⋯ρων ⋯ ⋯γαθ⋯ς οὐ ποιεῖται λ⋯γον ‘to the censures of the bad the good man pays no heed.’ Cf. Theogn. 795f.

⁶³ Compare the attitude of the sycophant in Aristoph. Plutus 909–19.

⁶⁴ With this interpretation compare that by Moulton, C., ‘Antiphon the Sophist and Democritus’, MH 31 (1974), 129–39, at p. 133Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Thus the fragment need not be what nearly all interpreters since Jacobs (quoted by DK ad loc) have claimed it to be, a critique of some specifically democratic institution, like the εὔθυνα or ‘audit', whereby the δ⋯μος sought to control its officials.

⁶⁶ Antiphon 87 B 44 C 1.3–19 (DK II p. 353f.).

⁶⁷ cf. Furley, D. J., ‘Antiphon's Case against Justice’ (in The Sophists and their Legacy, ed. Kerferd, G. B., Hermes Einzelschr. 44 [1981], 81–91), pp. 86–8Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ ⋯δικ⋯α, as an indictable offence by an official, could mean little more than mal-administration or culpable inadvertence. See Aristotle, , Ath. Pol. 54. 2Google Scholar and MacDowell on Aristoph.V. 896.

⁶⁹ B 159* = Plutarch, , fr. de lib. el aegr. 2Google Scholar. The final words of the fragment may possibly be Plutarch's. See Appendix (forthcoming).

⁷⁰ Though anyone reading on to the fragments which follow in Stobaeus (B 257–260; see §2) with their prescriptions for the slaughter of animal and human enemies, would soon discover one thing which ‘needs doing’!

⁷¹ The Antiphon papyrus opens by saying: ‘So justice is to refrain from transgressing the laws and customs of the city in which one is a citizen’; from which it goes on to argue that one would do best to respect those laws when people are watching, and to follow the demands of nature when they are not (DK. 87 B 44 A col. lf). Epicurus’ definition of ‘natural justice’ as ‘a guarantee of utility with a view to not harming one another and not being harmed’ (RS 31) provides a basis for further doctrines about the objective status and scope of justice (RS 32, 33, 36), about the validity of laws (RS 37), and so forth.

⁷² Cic. Off. I 23 (cf. M. Ant. 9.5: ⋯δικεῖ πολλ⋯κις ⋯ μ⋯ ποι⋯ν τι), Lact. Ira 17.7: ‘bonorum enim salutem custodit qui malos punit…ergo et deus cum malis obest, nocens non est; is autem nocens qui aut innocenti nocet aut nocenti parcit, ut pluribus noceat.’

⁷³ cf. Thuc. 2.69.1: …οὐ γ⋯ρ ⋯ δουλωσ⋯μɛος ἃλλ’ ⋯ δυν⋯μεος μ⋯ν πα⋯σαι περιορ⋯ν δ⋯ ⋯ληθ⋯στɛρον αὐτ⋯ δρᾷ. This sentence is quoted in Stobaeus (Iv 5.49), immediately after a group of Democritean fragments (iv 5.43–8) that begins with B 261 and 262.

⁷⁴ See Gomme ii. 112f. on Thuc. 2.37.3. Help given by Athens to oppressed foreigners, usually in the mythical past, was a regular theme in panegyric and of plays like the Suppliants and the Heracleidae.

⁷⁵ Aristotle, , Ath. Pol. 9.1Google Scholar (the epithet used here is δημοτικώτατα ‘most in the interests of the common people’). Cf. Plutarch, , V. Sol. 18.5Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ Aristotle, , Ath. Pol. 9.1Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ cf. B 38 = Democrate s 4: καλ⋯ν μ⋯ν τ⋯ν ⋯δικ⋯οντα κωλὺειν εἰ δ⋯ μ⋯ μ⋯ ξυναδικ⋯ειν: ‘Fine it is to prevent the wrong-doer, or failing that, not to join in the wrong’ – as you would, if you condoned it.

⁷⁸ Above all in Antiphon's Tetralogies, demonstration pieces of forensic oratory.

⁷⁹ Antiphon 4.1.4. Cf. Plato, , Euthyphro 4b–cGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁰ Ar. V. 999–1003.

⁸¹ And is thus guilty of injustice as ‘defined’ in B 256.

⁸² With what follows, cf. Bossu, B., ‘La crainte dans la morale de Démocrite’, Rev. Philol. 56 (1982), 287–300Google Scholar.

⁸³ Athenian jurors were sworn to ‘judge according to the laws and decrees of Athens’ (Demosthenes 20.118, 23.96, 24.150, 39.40, 57.63; Aeschines 3.6) and there must have been some similar practice at Abdera.

⁸⁴ And far from straightforward. See Eisenberger, H., ‘Demokrits Vorstellung vom Sein und Wirken der Götter RM 113 (1970), 141–58Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ For divination, see A 138 = Cicero, Div. 1.5.131. For the evil eye, see A 77 = Plutarch 734f.

⁸⁶ B 166 = Sextus, M. 9.19: κα⋯ το⋯των τ⋯ μ⋯ν εὖναι ⋯λαθοποι⋯ τ⋯ δ⋯ κακωποι⋯.

⁸⁷ If he had, his Epicurean critics would surely have noted the fact. As we have them, Epicurean criticisms of Democritean theology are either that it is confused (e.g. A 74 = Cicero, , N.D. 1.29Google Scholar) or that, while seeing the gods as ‘images’, it still credits them with impossible powers of perception, thought and communication (Diogenes Oen., new fr. 1.2.7f. = Long and Sedley ii.16 g). But this is a long way from the cardinal error (for an Epicurean) of relying on divine intervention.

⁸⁸ RS 34. ‘In the Epicurean theory, where injustice is bad solely for its consequences, its badness consists not in the possibility of punishment but in the certainty of fearing punishment’ (Long and Sedley, ii. p. 130).

⁸⁹ This is by no means the only translation possible of the highly ambiguous Greek. See Appendix (forthcoming).

⁹⁰ Lucretius 3.1018.

⁹¹ But not entirely psychological, if B 215 is implying that there is some real disaster looming over the unjust.

⁹² DK 87 B 44 A 2.3–8: τ⋯ οὖν ν⋯μιμα παραβα⋯νων εἰ⋯ν λαθ⋯ι τοὺς ⋯μολογ⋯σαντας κα⋯ αἰσχ⋯νησ κα⋯ ζημ⋯ας ⋯π⋯λλακται… The perfect example, in theory, of this opportunity was Gyges with the ring which made him invisible (Plato, , Rep. 359d–60c)Google Scholar.

⁹³ Critias, D K 88 B 25.9–24.

⁹⁴ The contrast between brute force which merely compels and gentle persuasion which ensures willing obedience was a commonplace in fifth- and fourth-century thought. Its most famous exponent was Gorgias (DK 82 B 11.13f.; Plato, , Phlb. 58ab)Google Scholar. See, further, Buxton, R. G. A., Peitho… Persuasion in Greek Tragedy (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 58–63Google Scholar. Cf. Plato, , Lg. 722bGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁵ B 268 = Stob. IV.7 (ὑποθ⋯και περ⋯ βαςιλε⋯ασ). 13: φ⋯βοσ κολακείην ⋯ργ⋯ζεται, εὔνοιαν δ’ οὐκ ἔχει εὔνοια here has the heightened sense of ‘loyalty’ as at Isoc. 2.28 (quoted by Stobaeus in the same chapter [iv 7.32], 10.37, etc.).

⁹⁶ EN 1179b4–16. On which, see Burnyeat, M. F. ('Aristotle o n Learning to Be Good’ in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Rorty, A. O. [Berkeley, 1978], 69–72), pp. 75ffGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁷ By numerous scholars, from Philippson, (op. cit. [n. 3], pp. 407fGoogle Scholar.) onwards.

⁹⁸ τοὐς δ⋯ τοιο⋯τους τ⋯ς ἂν λ⋯γος μεταρρυθμ⋯σαι. Cf. Democritus B 33:… κα⋯ γ⋯ρ ἢ διδαχ⋯ μεταρρυσμοῖ τ⋯ν ἢνθρωπον, μεταρρυσμο⋯σα δ⋯ φνσιοποιε⋯.

⁹⁹ With what follows, cf. Erffa, C. E. v., ‘‘α⋯δώς und verwandte Begriffe von Homer bis Demokritos’, Philologus Suppl.30. 2 (1937)Google Scholar, and, still more, Redfield, J. M., Nature and Culture in the Iliad (Chicago, 1975), pp. 113–19Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁰ Dodds, E. R., The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, 1951), p. 18Google Scholar.

¹⁰¹ He defines αἰδώς as φ⋯βος τις ⋯δοξ⋯ας (EN 1128b11) and αἰσχ⋯νη as λ⋯πν τις ἤ ταραχ⋯ περ⋯ τ⋯ ⋯ς ⋯δοξ⋯αν φαιν⋯μενα φ⋯ρειν τ⋯ν, ἤ παρ⋯ντων ἤ γεγον⋯των ἤ μελλ⋯ντων (Rhet. 1383b12–14). The difference between the two emotions is one of ‘tense’: αἰδώς must, while αἰσχὺνη need not, look to the future, to what people are going to say. This distinction, repeated by Aristoxenus (Fr. 42c Wehrli) and the Stoa (SVF III.416), was somewhat artificial. The two terms were distinct in etymology (see Frisk, svv. αἰδώς αἷσχος) and associations, but had already become largely interchangeable by the time of Thucydides (1.84.3. See Erffa, v., art. cit. (n. 99), 185–92)Google Scholar.

¹⁰² Evoked by ν⋯μεσισ in others, αἰδώς is an internalized anticipation of it. Conversely, a lack of αἰδώς can provoke ν⋯μεσις. See Redfield, , op. cit. (n. 99), p. 116Google Scholar.

¹⁰³ ν⋯μεσις at its weakest can be a reaction simply to impropriety, as in the phrase οὐ ν⋯μεσις’ ‘perfectly understandable’. See Redfield, , op. cit. (n. 99), p. 116Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁴ Xen, . Mem. 2.1.22 etcGoogle Scholar. Aristotle, (EN 1128b15–33)Google Scholar in fact argues that it is an emotion appropriate only to the young.

¹⁰⁵ cf. the account in Plato's Protagoras (325e–326b) of how these elementary disciplines are meant to instil εὐκοσμ⋯α.

¹⁰⁶ See Il. 16.544, Od. 2.64 (νεμεσσ⋯θτε), Od. 4.158 (νεμεσσ⋯ται).

¹⁰⁷ Such reflexive formulations were not uncommon in the fifth century. Cf. Eur. Hipp. 1080: …σαɛτ⋯ν σ⋯βειν.

¹⁰⁸ ‘Pythagoras’s Golden Verse’ 12 (quoted below in Greek) in an eighteenth-century(?) translation, embroidered on a sampler in the author's possession by one ‘Elizabeth Parkinson aged 11 Years, A.D. 1801’. It continues: ‘And gard the sacred temple of thy soul.’

¹⁰⁹ Stobaeus ascribes versions of it to Theophrastus (m 31.10), Musonius (m 31.6) and Cato (in 31.11). Cf. [Pythagoras] carm. aur. 12.: π⋯ντων δ⋯ μ⋯λιστ’ αἰσχὺνεο σαυτ⋯ν (quoted and discussed by Galen π. ψυχ⋯σ παθ⋯ν. 26f.), Seneca, , ben. 7.1.7Google Scholar. The young should have αἰδώς, said Demetrius of Phaleron (Fr. 117 Wehrli = D.L. 5.82), ‘in the home towards their parents, in the street towards any they meet, in solitude towards themselves.’ Cf. [Ausonius, ] Sept. sap. sent. 43Google Scholar: ‘turpe quid ausurus te sine teste time’ (ascribing the dictum to Anacharsis).

¹¹⁰ Seneca, , Ep. 11.8Google Scholar = Epicurus, , fr. 210 U. Cf.Ep. 25.5Google Scholar = Epicurus, fr. 211 U: ‘sicfacomnia tamquam spectet Epicurus.’

¹¹¹ Seneca, , Ep. 25.5Google Scholar: ‘omnia nobis mala solitudo persuadet, cum iam profeceris tantum ut sit tibi etiam tui reverentia, licebit dimittas paedagogum: interim aliquorum te auctoritate custodiaut Cato ille sit aut Scipio aut Laelius aut alius cuius interventu perditi quoque homines vitia supprimerent, dum te efficis eum cum quo peccare non audeas, cum hoc effeceris et aliqua coeperit apud te tui esse dignatio…’

¹¹² Notably by Natorp, P. (Die Ethika des Democritos [Marburg, 1893], p. 102)Google Scholar and, at greater length, by Ibscher ii.225–30. Cf. Farrar, , op. cit. (n. 14), p. 239Google Scholar: ‘Man enforces upon himself a law which he alone has enacted… This act of self-legislation… embodies man's own purposes, his pursuit of his own good.’ See also Aristotle, EN 1128a33.

¹¹³ ‘The word…now denotes the capacity for judging the lightness of actions either considered generally, or actually proposed or already performed’. O.D.C.C. sv. CONSCIENCE.

¹¹⁴ Epiphanius, , Adv. Haer. 3.2.9Google Scholar = DK 68 A 166: … ⋯λε⋯νοιαν γ⋯ρ κακν τοὺς ν⋯μους ἔλεγε α‘οὐ χρ⋯ ν⋯μοις πειθαρχεῖν τ⋯ν σοφ⋯ν ⋯λλ’ ⋯λευθερ⋯ως ζ⋯ν'. The authenticity of the final utterance here has been defended, and its content misunderstood, by Luria, (op. cit. [n. 15], pp. 20f. n. 34)Google Scholar, who compares the wording of Epicurus, fr. 196 U: …οὐ κατ⋯ ν⋯μους ⋯λευθ⋯ρας, βιοι⋯ς, and Aalders, (Mnemosyne 3 [1951], 307)Google Scholar who argues that in Democritean theory, ‘written law is only a necessary evil. The wise man should not like a slave obey the latter, but live freely according to the true standards of justice and righteousness.’ Talk about ‘freedom’ here is off the point. The adverb in Epiphanius’ text is not ⋯λευθ⋯ρως but ⋯λευθ⋯ρως ‘liberally’, ‘open-handedly’; ⋯λευθ⋯ρως ζ⋯ν means to ‘enjoy a high standard of living’ (cf. Xen, . Mem. 1.6.3Google Scholar, Aristotle, , Pol. 1326b31Google Scholar). Epiphanius is crediting Democritus with the view that the wise man should put himself into the right income-bracket without worrying about the law.

¹¹⁵ A passage which, on one interpretation, might offer a parallel is Eur, . IA 561–6Google Scholar (especially 563:…τ⋯ τε γ⋯ρ αἰδεῖσθαι σοφ⋯α). But the syntax here is all too ambiguous, and the gist of the passage, on any interpretation, is that wisdom, τ⋯ αἰδεῖσθαι and insight into τ⋯ δ⋯ον are all the product of good education.

¹¹⁶ EN 1116a17–b3.

¹¹⁷ Burnyeat, , art. cit. (n. 96), p. 89 n. 13Google Scholar.

¹¹⁸ Rep. 5.6. Cf. Plutarch, , sept. sap. conv. 154eGoogle Scholar (discussing democracy):…κλε⋯βουλος ἔφη μ⋯λιστα σωφρονεῖν δ⋯μον ⋯που τ⋯ν ψ⋯γον μ⋯λλον οἰ πολιτευ⋯μενοι δεδο⋯κασιν ἤ τ⋯ν ν ⋯μο’ lifetime. Gorgias made a speech in 392 at Olympia on the subject (Plut, . mor. 144bc = DK 82 B 8a)Google Scholar.

¹²⁰ phrase, M. Oakeshott's, ‘Political Education’, in Laslett, P., Politics, Philosophy and Society (Oxford, 1956), p. 17Google Scholar.

¹²¹ With the possible exception of the dubiously authentic B 247.

¹²² cf. Hdt. 5.78 on the merits of ἰσηγορ⋯η: εἰ κα⋯ ’αθηναῖοι τυραννευ⋯μενοι μ⋯ν οὐδαμ⋯ν τ⋯ν ςφ⋯ας περιοικε⋯ντων ἦσαν τ⋯ πολ⋯μια ⋯με⋯νους, ⋯παλλαχθ⋯νδες δ⋯ τυρ⋯ννων μακρῷ πρ⋯τοι ⋯γ⋯νοντο. Democritus’ cool, and correct, observation that civil harmony is a necessary condition for the successful conduct of wars is a good deal less startling than Plato's recommendation that arithmetic be studied ‘both for the sake of war and to attain ease in turning the soul itself…to truth and reality’ (Rep. 525c). Cf. Aristotle, , Pol. 1330a16–18Google Scholar (on a proposed distribution of land-ownership): τ⋯ γ⋯ρ ἴσον ὔτως ἔχει κα⋯ τ⋯ δ⋯καιον κα⋯ τ⋯ πρ⋯ς το⋯ς ὐστυγε⋯τονασ πολ⋯μουσ ⋯μονοητικώτερο’ catalogue, D.L. 9.48.

¹²⁴ Plutarch, , mor. 1126a = B 157*Google Scholar.

¹²⁵ EN 1167a26–b4.

¹²⁶ cf. Democritus B 186: ⋯μοφροσὺνη φιλ⋯αν ποιεῖ.

¹²⁷ Plato, , Lg. 743cGoogle Scholar.

¹²⁸ cf. Hdt. 7.237.2, an d Aristotle's definition of φθ⋯νος at Rhet. 1386b18–20 an d 1387b22ff.: λὺπδ τις ⋯π⋯ εὐπραγ⋯αν ποιεῖ.

¹²⁹ What Thucydides calls the ⋯ξοɛσ⋯α πλοὺτοɛ (1.38.5, cf. 1.123.1).

¹³⁰ Aristotle, , Pol. 1266b16–18Google Scholar.

¹³¹ Eur, . Suppl. 238–3Google Scholar.

¹³² e.g. Phaleas of Chalcedon, (Ar. Pol. 1265a37f.Google Scholar). Cf. Aristotle's own observation (1265b12, in a discussion of Plato's Laws): ἢ δ⋯ πεν⋯α στ⋯σιν ὐμποιεῖ κα⋯ κακουργ⋯αν.

¹³³ cf. Aristotle's view that the most important, and most neglected, means of ensuring the stability of a constitution lies in the proper education of its citizen-body and, still more, of its ruling class (Pol. 1310a12–36).

¹³⁴ See Aristotle, , Pol. 1266a36–1267a17Google Scholar.

¹³⁵ According to B 279, you should divide your disposable goods among your children, while keeping an eye on them. This will make them a lot thriftier, keener to acquire and more competitive. ‘For joint expenditures do not cause such vexation as personal expenditures, nor do joint acquisitions bring on such good spirits, but far less’ (ὐν γ⋯ρ τῷ ξυνῷ τ⋯ τελεὺμενα οὐκ ὐνιᾷ ⋯σπερ ὐδ⋯⋯ οὐδ’ εὐθυμεῖ τ⋯ ⋯πικτώμενα πολλῸ ἢσσον). Aristotle was to elaborate the point in his criticisms of Plato's, Republic (Pol. 1262b22f., 1263a40f., etc.Google Scholar).

¹³⁶ Pol. 1267b57: τ⋯ν οὖν τοιοὺτους παρασκευ⋯ζειν, τ⋯ τοὺς μ⋯ν ⋯πιεικεῖς τ ῇ φὺσει τοιοὺτους παρασκευ⋯ζεσθαι ⋯στε μ⋯ βοὺλεσθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, το⋯ς δ⋯ φαὺλους ῶστε μ⋯ δὺνασθαι…

¹³⁷ e.g. by Havelock, , op. cit. (n. 2), p. 143Google Scholar.

¹³⁸ Nor can its perspective be described as ‘historical'. Democritus is not dealing with ‘man's situation after a certain event of great importance’ in the far distant past (pace Cole, , op. cit. [n. 16], p. 121)Google Scholar. As the opening word ‘whensoever’ indicates, he is offering a generalization about something which can regularly happen.

¹³⁹ Or are the final words simply a throwaway, ‘and all the other blessings which I cannot be bothered to enumerate’?

¹⁴⁰ Phaleas ap. Aristotle, , Pol. 1266b1–4Google Scholar, Plato, , Lg. 736deGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴¹ cf. Aristotle, , Pol. 1263a38fGoogle Scholar. (quoted below).

¹⁴² Pol. 1309a20 (oligarchies), 1320a32–b9 (mostly about democracies; note the final sentence, χαρι⋯ντων δ’ ⋯στ⋯ και νο⋯ν ὐχ⋯ντων γνωρ⋯μων κα⋯ διαλαμβ⋯νοντς το⋯ς ⋯π⋯ρους ⋯φωρμ⋯ς διδ⋯ντας τρ⋯πειν ⋯π’ ⋯ργσ⋯ας), 1263a36–40 (Sparta), 1320b8-ll (Tarentum).

¹⁴³ Aristotle, , Ath. Pol. 27.3Google Scholar. See Finley, M. I., Politics in the Ancient World (Cambridge, 1983), p. 40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Millett, P., ‘Patronage and its avoidance in classical Athens’ (in Patronage and Ancient Society, ed. Wallace-Hadrill, A. [London, 1989]), pp. 23–5Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁴ κα⋯ δή κα⋯ τοῖς ὐπ⋯ροις προεδ⋯νειζε χρ⋯ματα πρ⋯ς τ⋯ς ὐργασ⋯ας, ⋯στε διατρ⋯φεσθαι γεωρ⋯ντας, taking a ten percent levy on the produce (Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 16.2).

¹⁴⁵ ‘This is perhaps the earliest reference to a charitable spirit in social relationships’ (Sinclair, T. A., A History of Greek Political Thought [London, 1951], p. 65)Google Scholar. Cf. Havelock, , op. cit. (n. 2), p. 144Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁶ For some useful material, see Stevens, E. B., ‘Some Attic Commonplaces of Pity’, AJP 64 (1944), 1–25Google Scholar. See also Burkert, W., Zum altgriechischen Mitleidsbegriff, Diss. Erlangen (1958)Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁷ Plato, Rep. 606ab, SVFl 214, III 450, 452.

¹⁴⁸ Mem. 2.6.21f.

¹⁴⁹ cf. the words of Macaria, at Euripides, Hrcld. 548Google Scholar who has volunteered herself for sacrifice, rejecting the suggestion that she draw lots with her sisters for the role of victim; ‘I would not leave my death to chance: χ⋯ρις γ⋯ρ οὺ πρ⋯σεστι’.

¹⁵⁰ Anonymus lamblichi 7.2f., Isocrates 7.31–5. Both writers (Anon. 7.8f., Isoc. 6.64–7) present a contrasting picture of ⋯νομ⋯α and ⋯μιξ⋯α. The idea of a ‘mixture’ or ‘blend’, an interdependence, of rich and poor goes back to the fifth century. See Euripides, fr. 21 N² Thucydides (8.97.2) speaks similarly, in a political context, of a μετρ⋯α σὺγκρασις of the few and the many.

¹⁵¹ ⋯φορμή (Isoc. 7.31). Cf. Aristotle, Pol. 1320a39.

¹⁵² Another passage which touches on this general theme is Archytas, Fr. 3 (DK 47 B 3 = Stob. IV 1.139) from a work Пερ⋯ μαθηυάтων. The text falls into two incongruous parts, one on the acquisition of knowledge (‘One must acquire knowledge either by learning from another or by finding out for oneself…’), the other on the social value of λογισμός which here must mean something like authoritative ‘accounting’: σтάσιν μ⋯ν ἒπαυσεν, ⋯μόνοιαν δ⋯ αὒξησεν λογισμ⋯ς εὓρθείς πλεονεξία тε γŰρ υὐκ ἒσтι тούтον γενομένου κα⋯ ἰσόтας ἒσтιν тούтῳ γŰρ περ⋯ т⋯ν συναλλαγμάтων διαλλασσ⋯μεθα. διŰ тο⋯тον οὖν οί πένηтες λαμβάνονтι παρŰ т⋯ν δυναμένων, οἱ δ⋯ πγούσιοι διδόνтι тοῖς δεομένοις, πισтεύονтες ⋯μϕόтεροι διŰ тούтω т ⋯ ἶσον ἒξειν. κтλ. The two texts could hardly have begun life right next to each other. But they are written in the same Gorgianic style, and could both have come from the preface to a mathematical work. It was standard practice to introduce a technical treatise with a few words on how its subject could be learned and also with an advertisement of its practical usefulness and moral value. In that case, the praise here of λογισμός as an instrument for όμόνοια and economic cooperation will not be a piece of serious political theorizing so much as an established commonplace, widely accepted by the time of Archytas.

¹⁵³ Havelock, , op. cit. (n. 2), p. 146Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁴ Contrast Aristotle's, Pol. 1263 a 37–40Google Scholar: ϕανερ⋯ν тοίνυν ὂтι βέλтιον εἶναι ἰδίας κтήσεις, тῇ δ⋯ χρήσει ποιεīν κοινάς (which is roughly wha t Democritus is seeking). ὃπως δ⋯ γίνονтαι тοιο⋯тοι тο⋯ νομθέтου тο⋯т' ἒργον ἲδιόν ⋯σтιν.

¹⁵⁵ Democritus B 227–230 all come from a chapter in Stobaeus (III 16) Пερί ϕειδωλίας. The longest and most interesting of these, B 228, is probably intended, like B 280, to persuade parents to spend money on their children's education.

¹⁵⁶ Antiphon, DK 87 B 54.

¹⁵⁷ The play on words in the Greek (see Appendix, forthcoming) is hardly translatable.

¹⁵⁸ The sentence which follows this in Stobaeus (iv 31. 121 = B 78) probably touches on the same theme.

¹⁵⁹ See Anonymus Iamblichi 3.4f. On the possible connections between this passage and Cicero, , off. 2.52–71Google Scholar, see Cole, , HSCP 65 (1961), 128–30Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁰ Thuc. 2.40.4f.: κα⋯ τŰ ⋯ρεт⋯ν ⋯νηνтιώμεθα тο⋯ς πολλοῖς οὐ γŰρ πάσχονтες εὖ, ⋯λλŰ δρ⋯νтες κтώμεθα тοὺς ϕίλους… κα⋯ μ⋯νοι οὐ тο⋯ ξυμϕέρονтος μ⋯λλον λογισμῴ ἣ т⋯ς ⋯λευθείας тῷ πισтῷ ⋯δε⋯ς тινα ὠϕελο⋯μεν.

¹⁶¹ Fr. 544 U.

¹⁶² Pol. 1267b5–8.

¹⁶³ The implications of ⋯πικαινουρλεῖν in B 191 are the same as those of νεωтερίζειν.

¹⁶⁴ …εὐθυμόтερόν тε διάξεις κα⋯ οὐκ ⋯λίγας κ⋯ρας ⋯ν т⋯ι βίωι διώσεαι, ϕθόνον κα⋯ ζ⋯λον κα⋯ δυσμενίην. Whose? ‘Envy, jealousy and malice’ could (1) be emotions aroused in others the great and successful (which is what you might mistakenly aspire to be) are notoriously prone to the envy and hostility of their fellow men (Pindar, N. 8.22 etcGoogle Scholar. See above on B 245). Or equally (2), they could be emotions which you yourself feel, perhaps as a consequence of unsatisfied ‘desire for more’. Cf. B 88: ⋯ϕθονέων ⋯ωμт⋯ν ὡς ⋯χθρ⋯ν λυπέει (also a commonplace. Cf. Isoc. 9.6; Stob. in 38.1, 11, 18, 29; Antiphon, fr. 82 and Caizzi ad loc.) and Plutarch 468b. Either interpretation is possible. But I suspect that (1) was the commoner in antiquity. Epicurus was possibly echoing these words of Democritus when he asserted: βλάβας ⋯ξ ⋯νθρώπων ⋯ διŰ μῑσος ἣ διŰ ϕθόνον ἣ διŰ καтαϕρόνησιν γίνεσθαι ὧν ⋯ σοϕ⋯ς λογισμῷ περιγίνσθαι. Cf. the sentence ascribed to Democritus at DEI (= ‘Gnomologium Byzantinum ⋯κ т⋯ν Δημοκρίтου, Ἰσοκράтους, Ἐπικтήтου e variis codicum exemplis restitutum’, ap. Wachsmuth, K., Studien zu den griechischen Florilegien [Berlin, 1882], pp. 162–216), 200Google Scholar: тŰ μέγισтα т⋯ν κακ⋯ν οἱ πένηтες ⋯κπεϕύγασιν, ⋯πιβουλ⋯ν ϕθόνν κι⋯ μῑσος, οἱ πλούσιοι κα' ήμέραν συνοικοῡσιν.

¹⁶⁵ See, above, §2.

¹⁶⁶ See, above, §4.

¹⁶⁷ B266. See, above, §3.

¹⁶⁸ B 284. Cf. B 283, 219.

¹⁶⁹ Epicurus, fr. 135 U: ‘si vis’, inquit, ‘Pythoclea divitem facere, non pecuniae adiciendum sed cupiditati detrahendum est’ (=Seneca, , Ep. 21.7), εἰ βούλελ πλούσιόν тινα ποι⋯σαι, μ⋯ χρημάтων προσтίθει, т⋯ς δ⋯ ⋯πιθυμίας ⋯ϕαίρει (= Stob. Ill 17.23). The words come from a letter to Idomeneus ‘regiae tune potentiae ministrum et magna tractantem’Google Scholar(, Sen.Ep. 21.3)Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁰ As Seneca, , Ep. 21.8, proceeds to point outGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷¹ Seneca, , Ep. 9.18Google Scholar.