No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2019
In the first two books of De finibus (= Fin.), Cicero deals with the Epicurean view of the final goal of life. This philosophical discussion, which is preceded by a rhetorical proem that stands on itself, is framed as a dialogue between Torquatus, who defends the Epicurean position, Cicero, who attacks it, and Triarius, who confines himself to a few critical interventions. If philosophy starts in wonder, according to the celebrated passage from Plato's Theaetetus (155d), the company meets this criterion admirably well, for the actual discussion starts with Torquatus’ surprise about Cicero's aversion to the Epicurean view (Fin. 1.13). He even suggests that this aversion has nothing to do with a fundamental disapproval of Epicurus’ doctrines but that it should rather be sought in stylistic concerns.
1 It may have originally belonged to the separate uolumen prohoemiorum mentioned in Att. 16.6.4; see Baraz, Y., A Written Republic. Cicero's Philosophical Politics (Princeton, 2012), 113–27Google Scholar for a recent painstaking analysis.
2 Contrary to Torquatus, who regards his master Epicurus as ‘the only person who has discerned the truth’ (eum quem ego arbitror unum uidisse uerum, 1.14). The translations, unless otherwise indicated, are borrowed from the Loeb Classical Library.
3 On Cicero's Academic position, see, for example, Glucker, J., ‘Cicero's philosophical affiliations’, in Dillon, J.M. and Long, A.A. (edd.), The Question of ‘Eclecticism’. Studies in Later Greek Philosophy (Berkeley – Los Angeles – London, 1988), 34–69Google Scholar and Steinmetz, P., ‘Beobachtungen zu Ciceros philosophischem Standpunkt’, in Fortenbaugh, W.W. and Steinmetz, P. (edd.), Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos (New Brunswick and London, 1989), 1–22Google Scholar vs Görler, W., ‘Silencing the troublemaker: De legibus 1.39 and the continuity of Cicero's scepticism’, in Powell, J.G.F. (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher. Twelve Papers (Oxford, 1995), 85–113Google Scholar and (with special reference to De finibus) Brittain, C., ‘Cicero's sceptical methods. The example of the De finibus’, in Annas, J. and Betegh, G. (edd.), Cicero's De Finibus. Philosophical Approaches (Cambridge, 2016), 12–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 It is well known that rhetoric plays an important part in the philosophical argumentation of De finibus (as in that of other philosophical dialogues). See on De finibus, for example, Brinton, A., ‘Cicero's use of historical examples in moral argument’, Ph & Rh 21 (1988), 169–84Google Scholar and Inwood, B., ‘Rhetorica disputatio: the strategy of de Finibus II’, in Nussbaum, M.C. (ed.), The Poetics of Therapy. Hellenistic Ethics in its Rhetorical and Literary Context (Edmonton, 1990), 143–64Google Scholar, and more in general Michel, A., ‘Rhétorique et philosophie dans les traités de Cicéron’, ANRW 1.3 (Berlin and New York, 1993), 139–208Google Scholar; Smith, P.R., ‘“A self-indulgent misuse of leisure and writing”? How not to write philosophy: Did Cicero get it right?’, in Powell, J.G.F. (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher. Twelve Papers (Oxford, 1995), 301–23Google Scholar; Schmidt, E.G., ‘Philosophische Polemik bei Cicero’, RhM 138 (1995), 222–47Google Scholar; Leonhardt, J., Ciceros Kritik der Philosophenschulen (München, 1999)Google Scholar.
5 Classen, C.J., ‘Cicero and Lucretius on Epicurean philosophy’, Eikasmos 19 (2008), 175–88, at 175Google Scholar connects this approach with a rhetorical strategy that can often be found in Cicero's speeches too.
6 See Görler, W., Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Philosophie (Heidelberg, 1974), especially 74–5Google Scholar.
7 Of course, Cicero's explanations reflect an outsider's point of view. Several other explanations are not mentioned (e.g. the attractiveness of Epicurean friendship, or the fact that Epicurean philosophy frees its followers from their unjustified fears; cf. Gigante, M., ‘L'epicureismo a Roma da Alcio e Filisco a Fedro’, in id., Ricerche filodemee [Napoli, 1983], 25–34, at 28–9Google Scholar), and those that are mentioned are not always completely convincing. The basics of Epicureanism, for instance, were as easy as the elementary principles of Stoicism or scepticism, but as soon as one focusses on technical details, questions become much more complicated, in Epicureanism as in other philosophical schools. Cf. Velleius’ remark on the subtlety of Epicurus’ philosophy in Nat. D. 1.49.
8 Reid, J.S., M. Tulli Ciceronis. De finibus bonorum et malorum libri I, II (Cambridge, 1925), 41Google Scholar.
9 This was the view of Hirzel, R., Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften. II. De finibus. De officiis (Leipzig, 1882), 630–68Google Scholar and Philippson, R., ‘M. Tullius Cicero. Die philosophischen Schriften’, RE VII.a.1 (Stuttgart, 1939), 1104–90, at 1136–7Google Scholar.
10 Thus Reid (n. 8), 41: ‘The argument in the source on which Cicero drew must here have been abbreviated and obscured.’
11 See, for example, the more nuanced approach of d'Anna, G., Alcuni aspetti della polemica antiepicurea di Cicerone (Roma, 1965), 32–52Google Scholar.
12 See especially Fin. 1.16 and Fam. 13.1.2; cf. also Nat. D. 1.93; Phil. 5.13. The available evidence on Phaedrus is discussed in Raubitschek, A.E., ‘Phaidros and his Roman pupils’, Hesperia 18 (1949), 96–103CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
13 For Lucretius, see Gatzemeier, S., Ut ait Lucretius. Die Lukrezrezeption in der lateinischen Prosa bis Laktanz (Göttingen, 2013), 27–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar (where earlier literature can be found); for Philodemus, see D. Delattre, ‘Philodème dans la “Correspondance” de Cicéron’, BAGB (1984), 27–39 and Tsouna, V., ‘Cicéron et Philodème: quelques considérations sur l’éthique’, in Auvray-Assayas, C. and Delattre, D. (edd.), Cicéron et Philodème. La polémique en philosophie (Paris, 2001), 159–72Google Scholar (more sceptical is M. Erler, ‘Response to Voula Tsouna’, in Auvray-Assayas and Delattre [this note], 173–8).
14 Cf. Maso, S., Capire e dissentire. Cicerone e la filosofia di Epicuro (Napoli, 2008), 61Google Scholar.
15 See, for example, Inwood (n. 4); Stokes, M.C., ‘Cicero on Epicurean pleasures’, in Powell, J.G.F. (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher. Twelve Papers (Oxford, 1995), 145–70Google Scholar; Roskam, G., A Commentary on Plutarch's De latenter vivendo (Leuven, 2007), 49–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Warren, J., ‘Epicurean pleasure in Cicero's De finibus’, in Annas, J. and Betegh, G. (edd.), Cicero's De Finibus. Philosophical Approaches (Cambridge, 2016), 41–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
16 See Bailey, D.R. Shackleton, Cicero: Epistulae ad familiares. Volume II: 47–43 b.c. (Cambridge, 1977), 378Google Scholar on the problems regarding the reconstruction of what happened.
17 Cassius’ combination of Epicurean philosophy and a political career, albeit not self-evident as such, was not exceptional. In the Late Roman Republic, many more examples can be found, as appears from Castner, C.J., Prosopography of Roman Epicureans from the Second Century b.c. to the Second Century a.d. (Frankfurt am Main – Bern – New York – Paris, 1988)Google Scholar and Benferhat, Y., Ciues Epicurei. Les épicuriens et l'idée de monarchie à Rome et en Italie de Sylla à Octave (Bruxelles, 2005)Google Scholar; cf. also the seminal article of Momigliano, A., ‘Rec. B. Farrington, Science and Politics in the Ancient World (London, 1939)’, JRS 31 (1941), 149–57Google Scholar.
18 See, in general, Roskam, G., Live Unnoticed (Λάθε Βιώσας). On the Vicissitudes of an Epicurean Doctrine (Leiden and Boston, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and, on the situation of the Late Roman Republic, Armstrong, D., ‘Epicurean virtues, Epicurean friendship: Cicero vs the Herculaneum papyri’, in Fish, J. and Sanders, K.R. (edd.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition (Cambridge, 2011), 105–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar and J. Fish, ‘Not all politicians are Sisyphus: what Roman Epicureans were taught about politics’, in Fish and Sanders (this note), 72–104.
19 See Fam. 15.16.3: ‘But to whom am I talking? Why, to the most gallant gentleman alive (cum uno fortissimo uiro), whose every action since entering public life has been in the fullest accord with his exalted standing’ (nihil fecisti nisi plenissimum amplissimae dignitatis). Reid (n. 8), 41 perceptively remarks that homines optimi is ‘a phrase rare in Cicero compared with uiri optimi, which is often applied to the Epicureans’. This is true, but Cicero's phrasing here is explained by the fact that the more current formula uiri optimi often betrays a condescending attitude (see Lévy, C., ‘Cicéron et l’épicurisme: la problématique de l’éloge paradoxal’, in Auvray-Assayas, C. and Delattre, D. [edd.], Cicéron et Philodème. La polémique en philosophie [Paris, 2001], 61–75, at 68–9Google Scholar), which, of course, would be improper in Cassius’ case.
20 In his letter quoted above (Fam. 15.19.2): Catii et Amafinii, mali uerborum interpretes. Cf. also 15.19.1.
21 Fam. 15.16.3: ‘I am afraid that even this system of yours must have more spunk (plus neruorum) in it than I had supposed, that is, if you are really an adherent.’
22 Cf. also Fam. 15.16.3: ‘I am just testing your reactions.’
23 On Cassius’ biased quotation from Epicurus, viz. his omission of φρονίμως, which is a key term in this context, see Griffin, M.T., ‘Philosophical badinage in Cicero's Letters to his Friends’, in Powell, J.G.F. (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher. Twelve Papers (Oxford, 1995), 325–46, at 344–5Google Scholar.
24 Cassius cleverly argues that the Epicurean argument is not only true (uerum) but also probable (probabile). This is especially relevant for Cicero, whose focus as an Academic is on plausibility rather than on certain truth; cf. Griffin (n. 23), 346.
25 See e.g. Diogenes of Oenoanda, frr. 3.I.11–13, 32.II.9–III.1, 29.III + NF 207.I.13 – NF 207.III.13 (with the analysis of G. Roskam, ‘Epicurean philosophy in open access: the intended reader and the authorial approach of Diogenes of Oenoanda’, Epigraphica Anatolica 48 [2015], 151–74, at 151–6); Plut. De lat. uiu. 1129A (πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις); Adu. Col. 1126F (πρὸς πάντας ἐγράφετο καὶ πάσας); Sen. Ep. 14.18 (omnibus dixit).
26 Thus Griffin (n. 23), 346; cf. McConnell, S., Philosophical Life in Cicero's Letters (Cambridge, 2014), 26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
27 See e.g. Diog. Laert. 10.138 (= fr. 504 Us.): διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς αἱρεῖσθαι, οὐ δι᾿ αὑτάς.
28 On this intrinsic connection, see also Ep. ad Men. 132 (ἀχώριστον); Diog. Laert. 10.138. Cicero is quite sceptical on this point (Tusc. 3.47 = fr. 507 Us.: ‘Epicurus has severed the highest good from virtue’), although he cannot but acknowledge that Epicurus indeed denied that we can live pleasantly without living virtuously (Tusc. 3.49 = fr. 506 Us.).
29 Pace Erler, M., ‘Cicero und ‘unorthodoxer’ Epikureismus’, Anregung 38 (1992), 307–22, at 320 and Griffin (n. 23), 346Google Scholar.
30 Shackleton Bailey (n. 16), 376.
31 Cf. Philippson (n. 9), 1135 and Bailey, D.R. Shackleton, Cicero's Letters to Atticus. Volume V: 48–45 b.c. 211–354 (Books XI to XIII) (Cambridge, 1966), 316Google Scholar.
32 See Att. 13.32.3 (dated to 29 May 45 b.c.); cf. Att. 13.5.1 (5 June 45 b.c.).