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Relational Repression in China: Using Social Ties to Demobilize Protesters*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 July 2013

Yanhua Deng  and
Kevin J. O'Brien
Yanhua Deng*
Affiliation:
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu.
Kevin J. O'Brien
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley.
*
Email: deng1999@gmail.com (corresponding author).
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Abstract

Chinese local officials frequently employ relational repression to demobilize protesters. When popular action occurs, they investigate activists' social ties, locate individuals who might be willing to help stop the protest, assemble a work team and dispatch it to conduct thought work. Work team members are then expected to use their personal influence to persuade relatives, friends and fellow townspeople to stand down. Those who fail are subject to punishment, including suspension of salary, removal from office and prosecution. Relational repression sometimes works. When local authorities have considerable say over work team members and bonds with protesters are strong, relational repression can help demobilize protesters and halt popular action. Even if relational repression does not end a protest entirely, it can limit its length and scope by reducing tension at times of high strain and providing a channel for negotiation. Often, however, as in a 2005 environmental protest in Zhejiang, insufficiently tight ties and limited concern about consequences creates a commitment deficit, partly because thought workers recognize their ineffectiveness with many protesters and partly because they anticipate little or no punishment for failing to demobilize anyone other than a close relative. The practice and effectiveness of relational, “soft” repression in China casts light on how social ties can demobilize as well as mobilize contention and ways in which state and social power can be combined to serve state ends.

Keywords

protest controlsoft repressionpolicingwork teamsthought worksocial networkChina
Type
Articles
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 215 , September 2013 , pp. 533 - 552
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2013 

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Footnotes

*

For helpful comments, we would like to thank Hermann Aubie, Loren Brandt, Lei Guang, Rongbin Han, William Hurst, Andrew Kipnis, Richard Madsen, Barry Naughton, Jean Oi, Eva Pils, Scott Rozelle, Rachel Stern, Nicolai Volland, Xueguang Zhou, the journal's two anonymous referees, and especially Lianjiang Li. Generous financial support was provided by the China National Social Sciences Foundation (project code: 12CSH041), the China Fieldwork Fund, and a Residential Research Fellowship from the Institute of East Asian Studies, UC-Berkeley.

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