1. The Party Centre issued documents equating “bourgeois liberalization” with “spiritual pollution” soon after Hu's resignation. New York Times, 8 03 1987Google Scholar. For Peng Zhen's comment opposing “spiritual pollution,” see Asia Week (hereafter, AW), 18 01 1987, p. 19Google Scholar, and Xinhua, , 12 01, 1987Google Scholar. Although “conservative” is often equated with “leftist” in China, these two opinion groups are clearly distinguished by the former's opposition to mass political movements and a leader cult generally favoured by the latter. Party conservatives also support the institutional authority and political monopoly of the CCP, substantial economic planning emphasizing grain production and heavy industry, and less reliance on deficit spending and foreign loans, but without the radical economic egalitarianism favoured by leftists. Furthermore, conservatives oppose the social spontaneity promoted by both leftists and pro-western intellectuals. Major conservatives at the national level included: Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, Deng Liqun, Song Renqiong, Bo Yibo, Yu Qiuli, Hu Qiaomu, Wang Zhen, Li Xiannian, Xu Dixin, Wang Heshou, Yang Shangkun, Yang Dezhi, He Jingzhi, Xi Zhongxun, Peng Zhong, Chen Pixian, and, at times, Li Peng and Qiao Shi. These leaders often exhibited considerable differences on specific policy issues, however.

2. New York Times, 26 03 1987Google Scholar; similar conservative critiques with “leftist” overtones occurred in 1981, when the PLA cited Bai Hua's writings to attack “bourgeois liberalization,” and in the 1983 “Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign.”

3. AW, 25 01 1987, p. 13Google Scholar. Peng Zhen's 28 October 1986 speech (published after Hu's dismissal) emphasized that “people [should] get rich together.” See, Renmin ribao (People's Daily) (Overseas Edit.), 15 01 1987Google Scholar, transl. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service–China (hereafter, FBIS–CHI), 16 01 1987, p. K14.Google Scholar

4. Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 22 01 1987, pp. 12–13Google Scholar, and AW, 25 01 1987, p. 11, and 8 03 1987, p. 18Google Scholar. Renmin ribao (Overseas Edit.) (16 01 1987)Google Scholar, also attacked the statement in Shehui bao (Sociological News) that “selfishness… is a motivating force for the development of human society.”

5. For CCP policy shifts on grain production, see FEER, 29 01 1987, p. 11, 19 02 1987, p. 92, and 19 03 1987, pp. 78–80Google Scholar, plus AW, 8 03 1987, p. 18Google Scholar; for the retreat on factory reform, see AW, 15 03 1987, p. 25, and 22 03 1987, p. 25Google Scholar, and FEER, 19 03 1987, pp. 73–77, and 9 04 1987, p. 13Google Scholar. Renmin ribao (Overseas Edit.) (11 01 1987)Google Scholar, also challenged the overall economic results of the reform, while FEER (19 03 1987)Google Scholar, AW (15 03 1987)Google Scholar, and Ban yue tan (Bi-Monthly Talks) (No. 17, 10 09 1985)Google Scholar described the recent economic problems (e.g. tripling of short-term foreign debt, decline in chemical fertilizer production, coal and electricity shortages, and local authorities' excessive spending on housing, worker bonuses and banquets), which substantiate such criticism.

6. AW, 25 01 1987, p. 13Google Scholar. Liao Gailong proposed “three central committees which will mutually supervise and impose constraints on one another,” ideas Hu Yaobang initially supported but later criticized. See, Gailong, Liao, “The ‘1980 Reform’ programme of China,” Qishi niandai (The Seventies) (Hong Kong), 1 03 1981Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI 16 03 1981Google Scholar; and “Hu Yaobang July 1979 speech,” Zhongbao (Central News), Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Hong Kong), 03 1980Google Scholar. Peng Zhen also supported some institutional reform proposals favouring the conservatives' political power position, such as the separation of government and Party, which as NPC chief he apparently used to resist the authority of the Party Secretariat. AW, 15 03 1987, p. 28.Google Scholar

7. For an example of political reforms proposed in the summer of 1986 and simed at reducing the “over-concentration of authority in the Party,” see, Yin, Chen, “Zhengzhi tizhi gaige shi jingji tizhi gaige de baozheng” (“Reform of the political structure is the guarantee of economic reform”)Google Scholar, speech presented to “Theoretical Seminar on Political Reform of the Central Party School,” Summer 1986, n.d.Google Scholar, no place of pub. At the 13th Party Congress Zhao Ziyang offered few proposals for substantial political reform in his political report. Beijing Review, 9–15 11 1987, pp. 23–49.Google Scholar

8. Banners and casual comments by students indicated widespread support for reform, but demonstrations observed by this author and Hong Kong-based reporters revealed some anti-reform sentiment-especially against price and tax hikes – and opposition to both Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang as expressed in such demonstrators' chants as “Deng Xiaoping wan shui” (“10,000 taxes under Deng”) and “Hu dao bang” (“Hu, the destroyer of China”). AW, 4 01 1987, p. 25Google Scholar and Chengming (Contend), No. 111, 1 01 1987, p. 10.Google Scholar

9. Provinces publishing substantial conservative criticisms included: Heilongjiang, Shanxi (where Peng Zhen has old ties), Ningxia, Gansu, Shaanxi, Guangxi, Guizhou, Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Liaoning, Hunan, and Beijing and Shanghai cities. As old centres of leftist support during the Cultural Revolution, many of these provinces' leaders have also voiced periodic opposition to reform since 1978, especially on such problems as price reform and inflation. See, Solinger, Dorothy J., “The 1980 inflation and the politics of price control in the PRC,” in Lampton, David M. (ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 96 and 103.Google Scholar

10. Hongqi (Red Flag), No. 16, 16 08 1986Google Scholar, in Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter JPRS), 9 10 1986Google Scholar. Bo also threatened possible purges by arguing “it was necessary to ‘remove from the Party those who only want to enjoy the advantages of being members of a ruling party.’” Contrary to CC member Li Rui, Bo also advocated using “political integrity” (i.e. ideological purity) over “ability” as the major criterion to recruit cadres.

11. Hongqi, No. 12, 16 06 1986Google Scholar and Dang de jiaoyu (Party Education), No. 10, 1 10 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 28 01 1986, p. 76Google Scholar. Similar criticisms were voiced in 1981. See, “Party Life Column,” Renmin ribao, 5 01 1981.Google Scholar

12. Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily), 15 01 1986.Google Scholar

13. Renmin ribao, 29 06 1986Google Scholar and Wan zhai bao (China Digest), No. 318, 5 01 1986Google Scholar. Other articles also attempted to separate “unhealthy trends” in the Party from the reforms. See, Xibei xinxi bao (Northwest News) (Xi'an), 23 06 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 14 07 1986Google Scholar. The January 1986, 8,000 Cadres Conference established a leading group to attack corruption.

14. Sun Weiben was elevated to secretary of the Heilongjiang provincial committee in November 1985, after serving as a rural cadre primarily in Liaoning. He has advocated close co-operation between the military and civilian sectors in economic construction and reportedly favours increased trade with the Soviet Union and extensive contacts with North Korea. Issues and Studies, Vol. 22, No. 11 (11 1986), pp. 128–32.Google Scholar

15. Heilongjiang ribao, 28 01 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 26 06 1986, pp. 38–39Google Scholar; and Heilongjiang ribao, 3 02 1986Google Scholar. Heilongjiang organs had also publicly opposed aspects of agricultural decollectivization in 1982. Zweig, David, “Context and content in policy implementation: household contracts and decollectivization, 1977–1983,”Google Scholar in Lampton, , Policy Implementation, p. 268.Google Scholar

16. Liaoning Provincial Radio Service, 29 11 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 7 01 1986, p. 105Google Scholar. Compare this statement with Wan Li's assertion in August 1986: “We must not regard a lot of new theories … as ‘sugar-coated bullets’ or heretical stuff, on the pretext of preserving the purity of Marxism …,” Renmin ribao, 15 08 1986Google Scholar; transl. in Chinese Law and Government, Spring 1987, p. 24Google Scholar. The discipline inspection commissions frequently challenged reform in cities like Shenyang where some significant economic experiments were attempted. See also fn. 25 below.

17. Substantial reductions in production at a Shenyang tractor factory illustrated the negative economic consequences of the reforms on heavy industry as the shift to smaller private plots in the countryside made further mechanization unnecessary. See, Terzani, Tiziano, The Forbidden Door (Hong Kong: Asia 2000 Ltd., 1985), p. 79Google Scholar. Unlike other north-east provinces, however, Liaoning has experimented with major economic: reforms, though not without considerable local opposition from well-entrenched heavy industrial interests, such as the Anshan Iron and Steel complex. See, Grow, Roy, “Changing the rules: Debating price and contract regulations in the northeast,” unpub. L paper.Google Scholar

18. CC “Resolution,” Hongqi, No. 19, 1 10 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 26 11 1986, pp. 1–13Google Scholar; and Jiefang ribao, 30 09 1986.Google Scholar

19. Tianjin ribao, 28 09 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 1 01 1986, p. 100Google Scholar; and Heilongjiang ribao, 3 02 1986Google Scholar. Although considered a reformer, Tianjin's mayor, Li Ruihuan, apparently cracked down hard on student demonstrators. AW, 25 01 1987, p. 11Google Scholar and Xinhua, , 16 02, 1987Google Scholar. Xinhua ribao (9 01 1987)Google Scholar repeated China's past humiliation by westerners, while Xinhua wenzhai (New China Digest; No. 12, 1984)Google Scholar noted “there are people who [link] together the open door with colonialism.”

20. The interior provinces of Shanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, and especially Guizhou all benefited from investment in the heavy industrial and military infrastructure of the “third front” (san xiari) constructed from 1964 to 1972. Naughton, Barry, “The Third Front,” unpub. paper, pp. 5, 8 and 34Google Scholar. Inland provinces concerned with their own infant industries have also resisted reform policies permitting nationwide sale of light industrial products (e.g. bicycles) from superior coastal factories.

21. AW, 7 12 1986, p. 43Google Scholar. Xinjiang authorities reacted by appealing to Beijing in early November 1986 for more central investment and greater local autonomy.

22. Uighurs frequently travel the country to major cities, setting up street food stalls and selling consumer products like motorcycles, especially in the growing economy of the south-east. Interviews, Canton, spring 1984 and Beijing, autumn 1986.

23. Xizang ribao, 22 05 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS 17 10 1986Google Scholar. Public demands for independence in Tibet followed the 1979 liberalization and erupted again in October 1987, apparently supported by recently recruited Tibetans in the provincial Party's grass-roots organization. Terzani, , The Forbidden Door, p. 144Google Scholar and Interview, CCP official, winter, 1987. For Tibetan Party officials' resistance to economic reforms, see, “Xizang gongzuo zuotanhui jiyao (jielu)” (Summary of a forum on work in Tibet [excerpts]), Shierda yilai: zhongyao wenxian xuanpian (zhong) [Important Selected Documents Since the Twelfth Congress (Middle Volume)] (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1986), pp. 443–44.Google Scholar

24. Ningxia ribao, 23 04 1986Google Scholar; also, Shaanxi ribao, 2 03 1986Google Scholar, Qinghai Provincial Radio Service, 10 03 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 10 04 1986Google Scholar, and Shanxi Provincial Radio Service, 21 10 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 6 12 1985.Google Scholar

25. Nanfang ribao (Southern Daily), 20 03 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 27 08 1986, p. 62Google Scholar. Criticism of purported corruption in the Special Economic Zones was an example of the pressure brought to bear on this centrepiece of reform by Chen Yun's CDIC. An army veteran visiting Shekou illustrated the PLA's animosity to the special zones: “If had known that this would be the result of the revolution … I would never have joined the Red Army.” Quoted in Heng, Liang and Shapiro, Judith, After the Nightmare (New York: Knopf, 1986), p. 86Google Scholar. The operation of a casino in Shenzhen since 1985 and the proposed construction of a racecourse there undoubtedly strengthened such negative views.

26. Lilun yu shijian (Theory and Practice) (Shenyang), No. 15, 1 08 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 19 12 1985Google Scholar. This article was published on Army Day in Shenyang where a PLA unit began a “Learn from Lei Feng” campaign in 1985. AW, 15 03 1987, 25.Google Scholar

27. Gongchan dang yuan (Communist Party Member), No. 3 (10 03 1986), p. 6Google Scholar and Gansu ribao, 12 06 1986, p. 1Google Scholar. In 1985 Hu Yaobang attacked Party members advocating “western democracy.”

28. The degeneration of CCP political controls poses a threat to Deng's reforms, just as the 1898 reform movement was apparently defeated by the imperial court's concern over “losing its control over the formulation of national policy.” See, Cohen, Paul A., “The post-Mao reforms in historical perspective,” Journal of Asian Studies (forthcoming), p. 8.Google Scholar

29. Xin guancha (New Observations) (Beijing), No. 16, 25 08 1986Google Scholar, which also proposed that “cadres should sign their own files.”

30. Kaifang (Enlightenment) (Canton), No. 8, 8 08 1986Google Scholar (JPRS, 7 11 1986)Google Scholar. John Burns notes the removal of local officials opposed to reform in local elections. “Local cadre accommodation to the ‘responsibility system’ in rural China,” Pacific Affairs, winter 1985–1986, p. 621.Google Scholar

31. AW (I 03 1987, p. 14)Google Scholar noted Peng Zhen's and Chen Yun's protests about Deng's “dictatorial nature.” Other leaders complained, however, that the rectification of “unhealthy trends” was being used to “hamper the initiative of the reformers.” Hongqi, No. 16, 16 08 1986.Google Scholar

32. Emphasis added. Qun yan, No. 9, 1986 and Wen huibao, 25 05 1986.Google Scholar

33. Renmin ribao, 16 11 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 15 01 1985, p. 97Google Scholar, and Lizhi, Fang, “The duties of young intellectuals in our time,”Google Scholar reprinted in Inside China Mainland, 12 1986, pp. 8–16.Google Scholar Heilongjiang authorities apparently increased political pressure on Liu Binyan for his attack on Feng, Lei's “sheer blind obedience.” Pai hsing (Hong Kong), No. 105, 1 10 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 3 02 1986Google Scholar; and Chengming, No. 96, 10 1985.Google Scholar Fang Lizhi used such scientific discoveries as the cosmic black hole to challenge Marxist orthodoxy. Interview, Anhui University faculty, winter 1987.Google Scholar

34. Xin guancha, No. 11, 10 06 1986.Google Scholar Mao did, in fact, declare that: “In the course of one hundred flowers blossoming, bourgeois ideology will emerge more frequently.” See, Zedong, Mao, “The talk at the informal meeting with heads of propaganda and culture and education departments from nine provinces,” 6 03 1957, in MacFarquhar, Roderick (ed.), Mao at High Tide (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).Google Scholar

35. Chengming (Hong Kong), No. 106, 08 1986.Google Scholar Shao's statement on deaths in the Leap exemplified the negative information which conservatives oppose publicizing in the foreign press, an action for which Hu Yaobang was later criticized. Chinese authorities explicitly criticized Chengming in early 1987.Google ScholarAW, 10 05 1987, p. 25.Google Scholar

36. Wen huibao, 28 07 1986.Google Scholar Zhu's statement is attributed (but not directly quoted) from his speech and may have been related to the controversy over Hu Yaobang's April 1986 “contradictions” speech (examined below).

37. Hongqi, No. 19, 1 10 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 26 11 1986, p. 66.Google Scholar

38. Guangming ribao, 6 05 1985Google Scholar; Renmin ribao, 11 07 1986Google Scholar; and Nanfang ribao, 14 09 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 12 12 1986, p. 18.Google Scholar Earlier criticism of Marx, 's Das KapitalGoogle Scholar appeared in Shehui kexue (Social Science) (Shanghai), No. 7, 1984.Google Scholar

39. Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth Daily), 4 07 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 23 09 1986Google Scholar; and Xin guancha, No. 17 (10 09 1986), pp. 15–16.Google Scholar The CCP banned Yan's book on the Cultural Revolution in January 1987 for allegedly “reviving old quarrels.” AW, 25 01 1987, p. 13.Google Scholar North-east Party leaders also idealize the 1950s when the stress on heavy industry and trade with the Soviet Union benefited the region, especially Shenyang with its many Soviet-built plants. Terzani, , The Forbidden Door, p. 89.Google Scholar

40. Xin guancha (No. 16, 25 08 1986)Google Scholar reported that, when visiting Great Britain, Hu Yaobang quoted Montesquieu on freedom and obedience to the law.

41. Hu criticized Mao for “badly confusing the two types of contradictions” and for “condemning good opinions he opposed as ‘rightist’ and ‘anti-Party.’” Hu also called on Party members not to fear “contradictions [i.e. internal policy debates] within the Party,” which apparently challenged the conservatives' vision of an organically unified CCP. Renmin ribao, 1 07 1986Google Scholar and Yaobang, Hu, “Guanyu zhengque chuli dangnei liangzhong butong de maodun de wenti” (“On the correct handling of two kinds of intra-party contradictions”), Shierda yilai, pp. 970–74.Google Scholar

42. Hongqi (No. 14, 15 07 1986)Google Scholar, and Lilun yuekan (No. 6, 25 06 1986)Google Scholar appeared to criticize Hu elliptically by generally ignoring his speech – while praising Liu Shaoqi's contributions to the theory of contradictions – and by criticizing leaders who “assign people to this or that faction,” as Hu had apparently done.

43. Hongqi, No. 17, 1 09 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 15 10 1986.Google Scholar Wang emphasized that “Comrade Mao Zedong on several occasions saved the Party … from crisis” and “opened up a way of socialist transformation of the private ownership of production…” [emphasis added]. The anniversaries of Mao's death and birth were given little publicity in Beijing in 1986, in great contrast to 1982–83. Hu Yaobang personalized his authority by frequently inscribing monuments with his calligraphy, a practice for which Hua Guofeng was criticized and Deng Xiaoping generally avoids.

44. Wan zhai bao, 14 12 1986.Google Scholar

45. Hongqi, No. 11, 1 06 1986Google Scholar, Beijing ribao, 5 12 1985Google Scholar; also Tianjin ribao, 28 09 1985.Google Scholar A major critic of some reforms, Li Ximing also insisted that “opening up to the world does not mean to copy foreign things indiscriminately” Li received a highly technical training and has had considerable contact with North Korea – common characteristics of national conservative leaders, such as Li Peng and Qiao Shi, and of provincial Party secretaries in Gansu, Guangxi, Liaoning, Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Shanghai. At the recent 13th Congress, Li reportedly received the highest number of votes for election to the Central Committee.

46. Hongqi, No. 11, 1 06 1986Google Scholar and Heilongjiang ribao, 28 01 1986.Google ScholarGuangming ribao (31 05 1986)Google Scholar describes the debate over whether the reforms have strengthened “connections” (guanxi) in the CCP, an issue Thomas Gold discusses for all of Chinese society. See, “After comradeship: personal relations in China since the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly (hereafter CQ), No. 104 (12 1985), pp. 659–64.Google Scholar

47. Fendou (Struggle) (Harbin), No. 7, 1 07 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 9 10 1986, p. 28Google Scholar, and Renmin ribao, 10 09 1985Google Scholar, which further criticized Hebei Party organs for failing to carry out “criticism and self-criticism” in the past five years despite widespread corruption.

48. Editorial, , Hongqi, No. 20, 16 10 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 9 12 1986.Google Scholar This statement was a possible subtle attack on Hu Yaobang or even Deng Xiaoping.

49. Sichuan ribao, 29 11 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 16 04 1986Google Scholar, and Renmin ribao, 5 07 1986Google Scholar, which noted further that the declining “proportion of Communist Youth League members among rural youth” in Hunan left “more Party members than youth league members, an abnormal phenomenon.” Also, see complaints that “stressing production had replaced Party rectification,” Gansu ribao, 2 04 1986.Google Scholar

50. Hongqi, No. 10, 16 05 1986.Google Scholar Zhang also noted that only one-fifth of Party members had a “university, technical secondary school, or senior secondary school” education while many were still illiterate.

51. Quoted from the generally pro-reform newspaper Nongmin ribao (Peasant Daily), 17 05 1986.Google Scholar John Burns documents the recent loss of rural cadres, “Local cadre accommodation,” p. 615.Google Scholar Similar loss of Party members in Poland during the Solidarity movement helped prompt the regime's harsh crack down.

52. Hebei ribao, 13 04 1986Google Scholar; also Renmin ribao, 29 06 1986.Google Scholar

53. Hongqi, No. 15, 1 08 1986Google Scholar, which also called on the militia – an old leftist bailiwick – to “safeguard our army's iron discipline.” Relatively few articles, however, criticized the PLA, indicating a continued reluctance to reveal corruption among the officer corps.

54. Xinhua 27 September 1986 and AW, 15 03 1987, p. 25.Google Scholar

55. Renmin ribao, 14 01 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 24 04 1986, p. 15.Google ScholarBan yue tan (No. 17, 10 09 1985)Google Scholar warned that “if we fail to crack down on economic crimes…, it will be impossible to fulfil the open-door policy….”

56. Faxue jikan (Jurisprudence Quarterly), 2 04 1986.Google Scholar

57. See, China Daily, 12 07 1986Google Scholar, which also blamed “loose living” on the effects of the Cultural Revolution; Renmin ribao, 8 07 1986Google Scholar, which traced the “sex cult” to “foreign exchange students or instructors, particularly English teachers”; Wenhua yu shenghuo (Culture and Life), No. 1, 1986Google Scholar, which revealed the sexual perils of “bourgeois life” abroad; Shehui (Sociology), No. 4, 08 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 25 04 1986Google Scholar; and the concern over dramatic increases in adultery, purportedly encouraged by reform (cited in New York Times, 4 02 1986, p. 4).Google Scholar Concern with “decadent life-style,” one pro-reform source noted, led some leaders to “panic over the first sight of some negative thing by closing our doors and windows again.” Xuexi daobao (Study Report), No. 27, 9 03 1986.Google Scholar It was not surprising, therefore, that Party officials came down hard in early 1987 on writers whose work stressed sexual themes, such as Zhang Xianliang. FEER, 12 03 1987, pp. 74–75.Google Scholar

58. Shanghai City Radio Service, 26 November 1985, in JPRS, 7 01 1986Google Scholar and Faxue jikan, 2 04 1986.Google Scholar Notwithstanding similar phenomena among Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, conservatives emphasized the unprecedented nature of such problems.

59. Faxue jikan, 2 04 1986.Google Scholar The threat to village social order is probably one of the strongest arguments for tightening rural bureaucratic controls.

60. Guizhou Provincial Radio Service, 5 12 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 24 01 1986Google Scholar; Renmin ribao, 27 09 1985Google Scholar; and Zhongguo Xinwen She (China News Agency), 25 12 1985Google Scholar in JPRS, 28 01 1986.Google Scholar Deng Xiaoping was especially critical of Guangdong where, he claimed, “prostitution has run wild.” Exhibiting considerable frustration over the inability to control such ills as “selling children” and “promoting superstition,” Deng advocated more use of the death penalty. Deng Xiaoping, “Zai zhongyang zhengzhiju changwei huishang de jianghua” (“Speech to the central Politburo Standing Committee”), 17 January 1986, Shierda yilai, p. 891.Google Scholar

61. Emphasis added. Yunnan ribao, 4 04 1986.Google Scholar Also, Xinhua 19 December 1985, in JPRS, 20 01 1986.Google Scholar An early experimenter in enterprise reform, Yunnan published conservative positions rather infrequently.

62. Xinhua, , 10 10 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 7 11 1986.Google Scholar

63. Faxue (Jurisprudence) (Shanghai), No. 11, 11 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 11 04 1986, p. 27.Google Scholar

64. Shehui, No. 4, 20 08 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 25 04 1986.Google Scholar The problem was intensified by the “considerable number of enterprises [which] have either eliminated the ideological-political and public security structures, or have cut down on the staff….”

65. Liaowang (Overseas Edit.), No. 18, 5 05 1986Google Scholar, and Gansu ribao, 1 04 1986.Google Scholar Such concerns were reinforced by blatant drug use and sale by foreign residents and Central Asians in major cities, and the tremendous increase in geographical mobility encouraged by the reforms. In January 1986 Deng Xiaoping vented his frustration over the inability to punish such offenders – “[W]hy can't we legally increase the penalties?” – which apparently led to the September 1986 “Regulations on Offences Against Public Order” with stiff penalties for prostitution and drug related activities. Shierda yilai, p. 891Google Scholar and Xinhua, , 5 09 1986.Google Scholar

66. Anti-Japanese student demonstrations in Beijing and protests against nuclear weapons testing and occupation by the PLA in Urumqi, Xinjiang, broke out in December 1985. Agence France Presse (hereafter AFP), 2 January 1986.

67. Faxue (Shanghai), No. 11, 11 1985Google Scholar, Renmin ribao, 3 05 1986Google Scholar, and China Daily Business Week Supplement, 30 07 1986Google Scholar, which further noted the large urban black market in grain ration coupons for non-resident construction workers. Also, Shaanxi ribao, 21 06 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 11 07 1986.Google Scholar

68. Shaanxi Provincial Radio Service, 27 March 1986, in JPRS, 28 04 1986Google Scholar; and Renmin ribao, 10 12 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 28 04 1986.Google Scholar

69. Nongmin ribao, 4 06 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 30 06 1986Google Scholar; and Xinjiang ribao, 14 03 1986.Google Scholar CCP concern with the “dark satanic mills” which have sprouted up in rural areas and the power of the “big boss” in privately-run establishments is reported in AW, 23 11 1986, pp. 56–57.Google Scholar Fujian's former pro-reform Party secretary, Chen Guangyi, admitted to “the people's fear of change” and their “lack of a commodity concept.” Ming pao (Hong Kong), 13 10 1986, p. 8.Google Scholar Other sources, however, denied reforms were responsible for price rises. Henan Provincial Radio Services, 14 November 1985, in JPRS, 17 12 1985.Google Scholar I detected considerable animosity (and perhaps jealousy) by Han residents in Beijing towards Uighur street vendors, who were even accused of selling “human flesh” as shish kebab.

70. Harbin ribao, 29 05 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 17 10 1986Google Scholar; and Xinhua, , 18 10 1986Google Scholar; “litigation mania” and the “philosophy of all for the individual” were also criticized. Guizhou ribao, 2 06 1986, p. 3.Google Scholar Also, Gold, “After comradeship,” p. 664.Google Scholar

71. Such concerns also resonate with China's Confucian tradition of “impartial public service” by the bureaucratic elite. See Dardess, John W., Confucianism and Autocracy: Professional Elites in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 108.Google Scholar

72. Nongmin ribao, 27 05 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 6 06 1986Google Scholar; and Die Zeit, 1 08 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS 18 12 1986, p. 38.Google Scholar

73. Shaanxi ribao, 9 08 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 21 10 1986Google Scholar; Henan Provincial Radio Service, 12 01 1987Google Scholar; and Nongmin ribao 27 06 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI 16 07 1986Google Scholar. Hongqi, No. 19, 1 10 1986, p. 46Google Scholar, also warned rural cadres against belief in “demons and gods” instead of “scientific Marxism.” Culture Minister Wang Meng argued, however, that the reforms would eliminate, not strengthen, China's “feudal” traditions. Zhongguo Xinwen She, 20 July 1986.

74. Xuexi yu yanjiu (Study and Research), No. 3, 5 03 1986Google Scholar; and Renmin ribao, 14 11 1985.Google Scholar

75. Hunan Provincial Radio Service, 30 03 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 25 04 1986.Google Scholar

76. Hongqi, No. 14, 15 07 1986Google Scholar; and No. 21, 1 November 1986, in JPRS, 16 01 1987, p. 15Google Scholar, which also claimed that in Hebei “more than 50 per cent of the people belonging to rich and specialized households have been involved in gambling.”

77. Beijing ribao, 5 09 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 18 09 1986, p. R1Google Scholar; Heilongjiang Provincial Radio Service, 16 06 1986Google Scholar; also, Ningxia ribao, 21 05 1986Google Scholar and Liaoning ribao, 28 01 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 11 03 1986.Google Scholar Warnings that urban commercial opportunities were encouraging “younger and skilled workers to flow away from the countryside…” were also expressed. Nongmin jingji wenti (Agroeconomic Problems), No. 12 (1985)Google Scholar, transl. in Inside China Mainland, 04 1986, p. 21.Google Scholar A highlevel Party intellectual testified to the political conservatism of the Beijing City Committee. Interview, autumn 1986.Google Scholar

78. Hubei Provincial Radio Service, 4 11 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 17 12 1985Google Scholar; and China Daily Business Weekly Supplement, 30 07 1986.Google Scholar

79. Xinhua, , 14 06 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 23 06 1986.Google Scholar

80. Xinhua, , 13 08 1986Google Scholar; and Hongqi, No. 17, 1 09 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 15 10 1986.Google Scholar

81. “Leading cadres” – perhaps an allusion to Hu Yaobang – were also criticized for “assigning agriculture to a secondary position … during the changes in the rural production structure.” Qinghai Provincial Radio Service, 9 06 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 11 06 1986, p. T3.Google ScholarLiaowang, No. 6 (1986)Google Scholar similarly warned that the recent “drop in agricultural investment” reflected the neglect of “long-term farm projects.” China's apparent inability to import substantial grain supplies because of foreign exchange shortages contributed to concern over domestic grain production, reiterated by Zhao Ziyang at the October 1987 13th Party Congress.

82. Xinhua, , 26 01 and 14 06 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 23 06 1986Google Scholar; also, Hongqi, No. 1, 1 01 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 13 02 1986.Google Scholar According to Li Ximing: “If we blindly stimulate consumption regardless of the present economic conditions, we will probably artificially destroy the balance between the social demand and social supply…” Hongqi, No. 11, 1 06 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 6 08 1986, p. 31.Google Scholar Recent anticonsumerism mirrored Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward critique of “individual material interest … one house … one automobile … [and] one television ….” Quoted in Dittmer, Lowell, China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 41.Google Scholar

83. Hongqi, No. 17, 1 09 1986 and No. 1, 1 01 1986Google Scholar, which also warned that China “must work hard for another 30 to 50 years before it can approach the advanced nations' standard.” Zhu Houze argued, in contrast, that China's debt problem was overstated. China Daily, 11 08 1986.Google Scholar

84. Hongqi, No. 17, 1 09 1986Google Scholar, and Xizang ribao, 22 05 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 17 10 1986, p. 64Google Scholar, which in claiming “we gave too much publicity to ‘10,000-yuan households’” (a criticism Chen Yun also voiced in September 1985), called, instead, for “those who are already rich to help those who have yet become rich.” For Chen's September speech, see Inside China Mainland, 11 1985, p. 19.Google Scholar

85. The State Council addressed the issue of extreme poverty by allocating special loans in November 1986 for “basically solving the people's food and clothing problems in 5 years time,” a theme Zhao Ziyang also stressed at the 13th Party Congress. Renmin ribao, 20 06 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 26 06 1986Google Scholar; and Zhao, , “Report,” p. 23.Google Scholar Although Renmin ribao (2 06 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 13 06 1986, p. K4Google Scholar) noted the growing “income gap” in the countryside, Hongqi (No. 1, 1 01 1986)Google Scholar took a surprisingly pro-reform line by arguing that the gap between the rich and poor is “between those who have become well off and … those who have extricated themselves earlier or later from poverty, rather than polarization.”

86. Ningxia ribao, 27 05 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 23 06 1986.Google Scholar Pro-reform journals argued, however, that it was the successfully reformed industrial enterprises which were being heavily investigated “with apparent desire to find fault.” Conservative cadres were also accused of infringing on the “legal rights of specialized households” in the countryside. Jingji ribao (Economic Daily), 3 06 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 16 06 1986Google Scholar; and Anhui ribao, 6 10 1984.Google Scholar

87. Hongqi, No. 17, 1 09 1986.Google Scholar Li Peng and Peng Zhen also criticized the exponential growth of superfluous companies under reform policies, which proreformers, like Shanghai's World Economic Herald editor, Qin Benli, and even Deng Xiaoping, have also criticized, especially when high-level cadres promote relatives into company positions. Chengming, No. 107, 09 1986Google Scholar; Ching pao, No. 9, 09 1986Google Scholar; Ming pao, 30 04 1986Google Scholar; and Gansu ribao, 16 03 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 7 07 1986, p. 104.Google Scholar One-third of all provincial Party secretaries and two-thirds of the top 1,400 provincial government officials were replaced in 1982–83. But Chen Yizi claims there were still 20,700,000 cadres in China in 1986, a cadre-to-population ratio of 2·7%, which is actually well below Hungary's 6%. “Zhengzhi tizhi.”

88. See Zhongguo fazhi bao (China Legal News), 25 08 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 26 11 1986, p. 37Google Scholar, which also condemned “the seemingly ubiquitous selfaggrandizing power of some organizations and individuals.”

89. Dazhong ribao (Masses' Daily), 17 06 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 2 07 1986Google Scholar; and Zhongguo qingnian bao, 11 01 1986.Google Scholar Andrew G. Walder documents the stagnation of industrial labour productivity under the reforms and the recent high rate of bankruptcies by private companies. “Wage Reform and the web of factory interests,” CQ, No. 109 (03 1987), p. 26Google Scholar; also, AW, 23 11 1986, p. 57.Google Scholar

90. Hongqi, No. 18, 15 09 1986Google Scholar and Xinhua, , 13 06 1986.Google Scholar Also, Hongqi, No. 17, 1 09 1986Google Scholar, where Wang Zhaoguo invoked the Daqing model for developing industry.

91. Anhui ribao, 22 06 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 10 07 1986.Google Scholar Popular appeal of Party leaders devoted to collective interests in rural China is documented by Madsen, Richard. Morality and Power in a Chinese Village (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 36 and 229.Google Scholar Social commitment and obligation (yiwu) were also stressed in previous campaigns, such as tree planting in 1981. Lester Ross, “Obligatory tree planting: the role of campaigns in policy implementation in post-Mao China,” in Lampton. Policy Implementation, pp. 232–39.Google Scholar

92. Hubei Provincial Radio Service, 17 11 1985Google Scholar and Xinhua, , 22 10 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 24 10 1986.Google Scholar Yang's speech illustrated the great contrast between the “heroic” past and the “degenerate” present undoubtedly felt by some conservatives. Also, see Wen zhai bao, No. 297, 23 03 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 18 08 1986Google Scholar, which noted that “intellectuals' appeals for improving their living conditions have become more vocal….”

93. Emphasis added. Zhejiang ribao, 23 01 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 21 04 1986Google Scholar. Part of the campaign to promote the PLA as the “National Model of New Morality,” this article also stressed the leading role of the Party committee, however.

94. Fendou (Harbin), No. 7, 1 07 1986Google Scholar; Ningxia ribao, 19 02 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 24 04 1986, p. 41Google Scholar; and Qinghai Provincial Radio Service, 7 11 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 12 11 1986Google Scholar. Sichuan ribao, 17 07 1986Google Scholar, in contrast, attacked the view that since “[e]veryone is individualistic, it's impossible to serve the people.”

95. Heilongjiang ribao, 26 11 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS 11 03 1986.Google Scholar

96. Examining Shanxi, 's land development and forestry problems, Hongqi, No. 21, 1 11 1986Google Scholar, invoked the Dazhai model of economic self-reliance and popular mobilization to promote tree-planting and anti-erosion work, which, the journal insisted, would allow the state to “spend as little money as possible” on such projects.

97. Hongqi, No. 17, 1 09 1986Google Scholar and Hubei Provincial Radio Service, 14 09 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 19 09 1986, p. K30Google Scholar. The minister of civil affairs estimated in January 1985 that about 70 million rural people lived in desperate poverty and required state aid. Cited in Riskin, Carl, China's Political Economy: The Quest for Development Since 1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 308.Google Scholar

98. Xinhua, , 30 06 and 19 07 1986Google Scholar. Provincial leaders in the north-east and south-west complained about the dearth of technically trained personnel in remote mountain areas and the recent absence of volunteers to reclaim land and cut timber – work formerly performed by sent-down youth and inmates of labour reform camps. Terzani, , The Forbidden Poor, pp. 92–93Google Scholar and Nongye jingji yu jishu (Agricultural Economics and Technology), 25 02 1987Google Scholar; reprinted in Gongchan dang (Communist Party) (Beijing), People's University, 03 1987.Google Scholar

99. Zhongguo gaodeng jiaoyu (China's Higher Education), No. 7, 13 07 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 12 12 1986, pp. 1–2Google Scholar, Wen huibao, 9 10 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 25 04 1986, pp. 59–60Google Scholar, and Renmin ribao, 27 09 1985Google Scholar. Professors at Beida were made “responsible for their classes' ideological and political work.” Zhongguo jiaoyu bao (China Education News), 8 04 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 27 08 1986, p. 73Google Scholar. Such political control measures did not, however, prevent student protests at Jiaotong in December 1986, which apparently led Peng, Li to demand compulsoryGoogle Scholar service in the countryside or factories by students who, Li, claimed, are “divorced from practical experience.” New York Times, 29 03 1987.Google Scholar

100. Guangming ribao, 19 06 1986Google Scholar; Lilun yu shijian, Nos. 21 and 22, 15 11 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 16 06 1986Google Scholar; and Jiefang ribao, 21 05 1986Google Scholar. In contrast, Hongqi, No. 12, 16 06 1986Google Scholar, criticized the continuing influence of “‘leftist’ biases held over from the Cultural Revolution against intellectuals.”

101. Jiefang ribao, 29 01 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 2 05 1986Google Scholar, and Liaowang, 13 01 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 24 04 1986Google Scholar; also Xuexi yu yanjiu, No. 3, 5 03 1986Google Scholar, which complained that many “university graduates are disdainful of political work….”

102. Liaowang, No. 44, 4 11 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 20 01 1986Google Scholar, and Xuexiyu yanjiu, No. 3, 5 03 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 7 07 1986Google Scholar. Similar to the 1983 “anti-spiritual pollution campaign,” these criticisms were perhaps directed at Hu Yaobang for his purported distortion of Maoist theory discussed above.

103. See Xinhua, , 10 09 1986Google Scholar for Yu's and Deng's hard-hitting speeches on ideological guidance of literature. Shaanxi ribao, 15 02 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 6 06 1986, p. 82Google Scholar, proposed that “one leading cadre… take charge of ideological and political work,” and Gansu ribao, 26 04 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 19 08 1986, p. 75Google Scholar, suggested that “the provincial standing committee deliberate on ideological-political work at least once every six months….” As the weakest link in ideological and political work, rural Party organs were a major target of the ongoing rectification, especially after January 1986. Hebei ribao, 13 04 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 27 05 1986, p. 56Google Scholar; and Shaanxi ribao, 6 03 1986Google Scholar. Despite the complaints against inadequate theoretical training, Beijing Party School officials claim their curriculum now includes considerably less material on conventional “ideological and political work” in favour of economics and other subjects more appropriate to reform. Interview, Beijing Party School, December 1986.

104. Heilongjiang ribao, 28 06 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 18 08 1986, pp. 49–57Google Scholar. In an apparent appeal to cadres and workers in the industrial north-east who have complained about the “poor quality of imported machines” and the excessive automation which “reduced job opportunities,” Sun also praised the leaders of the “self-reliant” Daqing oil fields. Terzani, , The Forbidden Door, p. 83Google Scholar. Similar warnings against succumbing to the lures of western technology (and culture) were voiced by the PLA. “Central Military Committee decision on army political work,” in JPRS, 15 05 1987, pp. 79–80.Google Scholar

105. Shehui kexue (Jiangxi), No. 6, 15 12 1985Google Scholar, in JPRS, 17 03 1986, pp. 42–50Google Scholar. The appearance of such a conservative article in a publication from generally pro-reform Jiangxi, indicates the lack of homogeneous political views in the provinces.

106. Zhongguo qingnian bao, 29 04 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 10 07 1986, p. 43 and 30 May 1986Google Scholar, and, Hongqi No. 17, 1 09 1986Google Scholar; also Gongren ribao (Worker's Daily), 5 09 1986Google Scholar, and Wen huibao, 25 05 1986Google Scholar, which further lamented the long-standing influence of the leftist slogan “take class struggle as the key link” on ideological work. For an analysis of the conservatives' “holistic, totalistic view of culture that regards intellectual ferment as a serious threat to the political system,” see Carol Lee Hamrin's concluding chapter in Goldman, Merle (ed.), China's Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New Relationship (Cambridge, Mass.: The Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University, 1987), pp. 278–301.Google Scholar

107. Yu Guangyuan noted that “the role of public opinion may influence the policymakers and make them waiver in their determination to carry out the ‘double hundred policy,’” which, in fact, occurred in 1956 when, Yu claims, the populace supposedly feared writings “antagonistic to the popular or even ruling thought in society.” Xinhua, , 4 08 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 6 08 1986.Google Scholar

108. AFP, Hong Kong, 11 09 1986Google Scholar and Pai hsing, No. 19, 1 05 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 7 07 1986Google Scholar. Positive foreign reaction to Ma Ding's 2 November 1985 Gongren ribao article apparently put liberal supporters on the defensive. Shijie jingji daobao (World Economic Herald), 28 04 1986Google Scholar. Hunan authorities tried to refurbish Mao Zedong's “thinking on literature and art” by publishing his “theoretical essays” critical of “bourgeois liberalization.” Hongqi, No. 19, 1 10 1986.Google Scholar

109. Xuexi yu yanjiu, No. 3, 5 03 1986Google Scholar and Shaanxi ribao, 26 10 1986Google Scholar, in FBIS-CHI, 13 11 1986Google Scholar. Recent public opinion surveys in Shenyang indicate popular belief that Chinese society is becoming “too money oriented.” New York Times, 29 11 1987.Google Scholar

110. Hongqi, No. 11, 1 06 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 6 08 1986Google Scholar; Xuexi yu yanjiu, in JPRS, 6 08 1986Google Scholar; Wen huibao, 12 06 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 4 12 1986, pp. 78 and 83Google Scholar; and Faxue, No. 8, 08 1986Google Scholar. Zhu Houze, in contrast, opposed coming down hard on unorthodox opinion (China Daily, 11 08 1986)Google Scholar, and even Deng Liqun took a surprisingly liberal position by advocating the translation of “all the world's noted works [into] Chinese.”

111. Qun yan, No. 4, 7 04 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 19 08 1986Google Scholar. Wen huibao, 16 05 1986Google Scholar, quickly retorted: “When we say ‘a hundred schools contend,’ we mean a hundred schools, not ‘two schools.’”

112. See Zhongguo baokan, 19 03 1986Google Scholar, for the CCP Secretariat's announcement “tightening up the screening and approving processes” for the press and Xinhua's 18 January 1986 statement on the banning of unregistered publishers by the Culture and Finance Ministries. Chengming, No. 92, 1 06 1985Google Scholar, suggested that the 1985 ban on local “tabloids” (xiaobao), which numbered in the hundreds, was probably enacted to “oppose reform,” indicating that Hu Yaobang's policies were already under heavy pressure.

113. Hongqi, No. 11, 1 06 1986.Google Scholar

114. See, Jiefang ribao, 29 01 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 2 05 1986Google Scholar, and Guangming ribao, 7 06 1986Google Scholar, which in drawing explicit parallels to the May Fourth Movement, argued against the “psychology of fear” that “indiscriminately negates and rejects western culture.” For more on the debate over Chinese culture which has accompanied the reforms, see Renmin ribao, 11 07 1986Google Scholar, in JPRS, 18 08 1986, pp. 15–17Google Scholar, and Nanfang ribao, 14 09 1986.Google Scholar

115. Hu Qiaomu's alleged criticism of Ziyang, Zhao for “acting ‘like a shikuai [i.e. money-minded and greedy] merchant’” is an example of this view. AW, 10 05 1987, p. 26Google Scholar. The recent fear of AIDS (aizi bing) spreading to China from the west strengthens the conservatives' organic imagery to condemn “open-door” policies.

116. Similar visions informed early 20th-century German “reactionary modernists,” who also wanted to reconcile technical modernity and rational organization with antiwestern sentiments. See, Herf, Jeffrey, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 1–48Google Scholar. Li Peng, Qiao Shi and Wang Zhaoguo, and the provincial Party secretaries of Guangxi, Liaoning, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Shanghai, and Beijing, were all trained in such technical fields as the power industry and steel production and have had extensive contacts with East Germany and North Korea.

117. The strong representation of conservative leaders, especially Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Sun Weiben and Li Ximing, on top policy-making bodies elected by the 13th Party Congress held in October 1987, and the attention Zhao Ziyang gave in his report to many conservative positions, such as the importance of grain production, fears of overconsumption, and opposition to liberal political reforms, signal continued influence of the conservative agenda on China's future policies, despite the retirement of both Deng Liqun and He Jingzhi.