Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 July 2017
In this article, we examine the administrative functions that have been carried out by social organizations (SOs) in China since 2013. We use evidence from Guangdong to demonstrate that the transfer of authority to SOs is selective, tends to create more burdens for local government, and generally does not lead to greater autonomy for SOs. We focus on five types of SOs that are undertaking new administrative functions with varying degrees of operational autonomy, which relates to the consultative authoritarian model proposed by Jessica Teets. Consultative authoritarianism allows for the expansion of relatively autonomous SOs and the development of indirect state control mechanisms. The model is designed to improve governance without democratization by expanding the role played by intermediaries such as SOs in public administration and service delivery. The evidence from Guangdong permits us to conclude that the transfer of authority to SOs allows for innovations in public administration, but that politics continues to motivate government decisions as to which functions are suitable for SOs to undertake, casting doubt on the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to achieve sustainable improvements in local governance and public service provision.
2013 年以来, 社会组织承接了越来越多的政府职能, 但是通过在广东省的实地调研资料发现, 政府向社会组织转移的职能具有随机性, 为地方政府带来了更多的工作负担也并未实现对社会组织的实质性赋权。本研究选取了五类承接政府职能转移且具不同程度自主性的社会组织, 并进一步验证了 Jessica Teets 所提出的协商式威权主义模式, 即政府既允许社会组织培育自身的自主性, 同时也不放松对社会组织的控制, 其根本目的在于不以西方式民主的方式推动实现政府治理。从广东省的调研数据来看, 政府职能转移给社会组织在一定程度上促进了政府公共管理创新, 但是政治要素持续影响了政府的改革举措, 例如在决定究竟何种政府职能适合由社会组织承担上, 这些问题的存在使得中国共产党在地方治理与公共服务提供的能力遭到质疑。