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The Potempa Murder

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Richard Bessel
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Extract

I recall a remarkable statement made by Hitler to some visitors, of whom I was one, at Obersalzburg in 1932. The death sentence had just been pronounced on the murderers at Potempa, and the unforgotten declaration of solidarity with the murderers made by the leader of the Party had just become publicly known. A nation—so ran the declaration—may overlook and forget anything in so disturbed a time as the present, if it happens in an open conflict between holders of opposed views. If the Storm Troopers were given a free hand, if it came to street fighting and twenty to thirty thousand Germans lost their lives, the nation would be able to recover from that. The wound would heal. It would be like fighting in the field. But a miscarriage of justice, a death sentence pronounced after cool deliberation, and pronounced and carried out against the people's unerring sense of justice, an execution of men who had acted in national passion, like those who had been sentenced at Potempa as common murderers —that would never be forgotten. —Hermann Rauschning

From my point of view it is certain that the whole affair [Potempa] must be regarded less as a political but much more as a criminal one, even taking as a basis the yardstick that any fighter for the movement takes in view of the events of that time. —The Kreisleiter of the NSDAP in Rosenberg, Upper Silesia

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Articles
Information
Central European History , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , September 1977 , pp. 241 - 254
Copyright
Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1977

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References

1. Rauschning, Hermann, Germany's Revolution of Destruction (London and Toronto, 1939), p. 11.Google Scholar

2. Berlin Document Center (BDC), Akten des Obersten Parteigerichts (OPG), Paul Lachmann: Kreisleiter Preiss to the Gauschatzmeister Scholz, Rosenberg O/S, Aug. 2, 1939.

3. In newspaper accounts at the time the name was spelled “Pietczuch” or “Pietrzuch,” although it was given as “Pietzuch” in the court proceedings.

4. A few months earlier, in the district of Kreuzberg in Upper Silesia, local SA members committed a murder very similar to the crime at Potempa. However, although this murder also had clear political overtones, it created only a passing sensation in the press and was quickly forgotten in the wave of violence during the months which followed. For accounts of the murder of August Bassy on Feb. 16, 1932, see Schlesische Bergwacht, Feb. 18, 1932; Volkswacht (Breslau), Feb. 18, 1932; Archiwum Państwowe Wroclaw (APWr), Rejencja Opolska I/1806, p. 469: the Landrat to Dr. Wagner, Kreuberg O/S, Feb. 18, 1932.

5. See Bullock, Alan, Hitler, a Study in Tyranny (Harmondsworth, 1962), pp. 223–24.Google Scholar Bullock concludes: “There is no doubt that Hitler's action shocked German public opinion, for the justice of the sentence scarcely admitted dispute. Yet this was the price which Hitler had to pay if he meant to keep his movement together and preserve his own authority.”

6. For a representative evaluation of the Potempa case from this standpoint, see Bracher, Karl Dietrich, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik (Villingen, 1955), p. 169.Google Scholar The decision of the court in the Potempa case, with an accompanying commentary which stresses the ramifications of the affair upon German politics and public opinion, is published in Kluke, Paul, “Der Fall Potempa,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 5 (1957): 279–97.Google Scholar Another account, which focuses primarily upon the legal aspects and the national ramifications of the case, is to be found in Heinrich Hannover and Hannover-Drück, Elisabeth, Politische Justiz 1918–1933 (Frankfurt am Main, 1966), pp. 301–10.Google Scholar

7. For an overview of the increasing radicalization of the SA throughout Germany at this time, as well as a short account of the Potempa murder and the extraordinary situation in Silesia, see Bennecke, Heinrich, Hitler und die SA (Munich, 1962), pp. 185–200.Google Scholar

8. Reichsgesetzblatt, 1932, 1: 389.

9. One of the members of the SA Sturm which carried out the Potempa raid (but not a member of the actual raiding party) later wrote that the murder and the rash of bombings in Silesia in early Aug. 1932 were the result of Terrorparolen and orders from higher up. BDC, OPG, Paul Lachmann: Kreisgeschäftsführer Blachnik to the deputy Gauleiter Bracht in Breslau, Gleiwitz, Aug. 7, 1939. It appears that Röhm was ultimately responsible for the orders behind the terror campaign, and that Heines proved his most enthusiastic lieutenant in carrying them out. See Bennecke, Hitler und die SA, pp. 194–95.

10. Reichsgesetzblatt, 1932, 1: 403–7; Kluke, “Der Fall Potempa,” pp. 279–82; Vogelsang, Thilo, Reichswehr, Staat und NSDAP (Stuttgart, 1962), p. 259.Google Scholar

11. Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 11, 1932.

12. In the late 1930s, when the Nazi government changed many foreign-sounding place names, particularly of communities with names of Polish or Lithuanian origin, Potempa was given the name of Wüstenrode. Other towns which figured in the Potempa murder were also rechristened: Tworog became Horneck, and Broslawitz became Dramatal.

13. Lachmann, Paul, the instigator of the murder expedition, later alleged that Potempa was 85 percent Polish, as well as being strongly Communist. BDC, OPG, Paul Lachmann: Lachmann to the NSDAP Gauleitung Schlesien, Gaugericht, Hindenburg, July 8, 1940.Google Scholar

14. Karl Ulitzka, the leader of the Upper Silesian Zentrum during the Weimar period, discussed this problem quite frankly in his essay, “Die Verselbständigung Oberschlesiens und die Zentrumspartei,” in Presse-, Statistisches und Verkehrsamt der Provinzverwaltung Oberschlesien, von, Zehn Jahre Provinz Oberschlesien (Ratibor, 1929), p. 3.Google Scholar See also Schofer, Lawrence, The Formation of a Modern Labor Force: Upper Silesia 1865–1914 (Berkeley and London, 1975).Google Scholar

15. See, for example, the police report of a speech made by Josef-Joachim Adamczyk, the NSDAP Untergauleiter of Upper Silesia, at a rally in Kieferstädtel in June 1929, in Wojewódzkie Archiwum Państwowe Katowice, Oddzial Terenowy w Gliwicach (WAP Gliwice), Landratsamt Gleiwitz/G 63, pp. 22–25: Landjägeramt Kieferstädtel to the Landrat in Gleiwitz, Kieferstädtel, June 9, 1929. The Silesian Nazi press described National Socialism as the Pole's “greatest enemy in Germany.” See Schlesischer N.S. Beobachter, Jan. 7, 1933.

16. Kluke described Pietzuch as a miner. Kluke, “Der Fall Potempa,” p. 279. However, this seems improbable, since Potempa was nearly forty kilometers by road from the mining and industrial centers of Upper Silesia. In a Communist pamphlet about the murder, published in 1932, Pietzuch was described as an unemployed agricultural laborer, which is more plausible. See Potempa: Die Ermordung des Arbeiters Pietczuch (Berlin, n.d.), p. 1.Google Scholar Police reports noted that Pietzuch had been unemployed for years, and described him simply as a “worker.” Wojewódzkie Archiwum Państwowe (WAP) Opole, Oberpräsidium Oppeln/1025, pp. 378–81: “Bericht über den Totschlag an dem Arbeiter Konrad Pietzuch—Potempa,” Der Polizeipräsident, Landeskriminalpolizeistelle, to the Regierungspräsident in Oppeln, Oppeln, Aug. 24, 1932. It seems most likely that, in an agricultural area such as the region around Potempa, when the unemployed laborer Konrad Pietzuch did find casual work, it was probably on a farm.

17. Kluke, “Der Fall Potempa,” p. 283.

18. WAP Opole, Oberpräsidium Oppeln/1025, pp. 378–81.

19. BDC, OPG, Paul Lachmann: the deputy Gauleiter to the Gaugericht der NSDAP, Breslau, Nov. 22, 1939.

20. Lachmann later claimed that each fifty votes for the NSDAP in the community had cost him a quarter of a barrel of beer. BDC, OPG, Paul Lachmann: Lachmann to the NSDAP Gauleitung Schlesien, Gaugericht, Hindenburg, July 8, 1940.

21. WAP Opole, Oberpräsidium Oppeln/1025, pp. 378–81.

22. See the account of Lachmann's testimony in Kluke, “Der Fall Potempa,” p. 293.

23. See BDC, OPG, Paul Lachmann: Kreisgeschäftsführer Blachnik to the deputy Gauleiter Bracht, Gleiwitz, Aug. 7, 1939; ibid.: Kreisleiter Preiss, M.d.R., to the Gauschatzmeister Scholz, Rosenberg O/S, Aug. 2, 1939. In 1940 Lachmann was found guilty of two cases of poaching by the NSDAP Gau court. Ibid.: Lachmann to the NSDAP Gauleitung Schlesien, Gaugericht, Hindenburg, July 8, 1940.

24. The most complete published account of the Potempa murder and resulting trial is to be found in Kluke, “Der Fall Potempa,” pp. 286–97. An animated account of the case was given in the Communist pamphlet, Potempa: Die Ermordung des Arbeiters Pietczuch. The most complete collections of police reports and court documents concerning the case are to be found in WAP Opole, Oberpräsidium Oppeln/1025, pp. 175–226: police reports and statements about the Potempa case; ibid.: pp. 378–503: further reports, including the sentence of the special court in Beuthen (pp. 447–68), and newspaper clippings; and WAP Gliwice, Landratsamt Gleiwitz/G 63, pp. 336–44: “Anklageschrift” of the Oberstaatsanwalt to the Sondergericht, Beuthen, Aug. 14, 1932. Immediately after the murder, short accounts were given in the regional press; see, for example, Oberschlesische Volksstimme, Aug. 11, 1932. During the trial the national newspapers covered the case with great interest. For the press reaction to the case, see Kluke, “Der Fall Potempa,” pp. 279–86.

25. BDC, OPG, Paul Lachmann: Kreisgeschäftsführer Blachnik to the deputy Gauleiter Bracht, Gleiwitz, Aug. 7, 1939.

26. According to the testimony given at the trial, Lachmann and Golombek, who actually led the raid, asserted that a certain “Emil” had less than twenty-four hours to live, and Lachmann reminded the group before it left to do a thorough job; “Emil,” it appears, was Konrad Pietzuch. While in prison, Lachmann claimed that he was not the instigator of the raid, and years later wrote that his role had been only to supply to the terrorist band a list of Communists in the region and that the real instigator had been Nowak. National Archives Microfilm, T-253, roll 23, frames 1474238–39: Paul Lachmann to E. Jenke, Brandenburg, Dec. 15, 1932; BDC, OPG, Paul Lachmann: Lachmann to the NSDAP Gauleitung Schlesien, Gaugericht, Hindenburg, July 8, 1940. Lachmann's protestations of innocence seem questionable, although Nowak probably did share more of the responsibility for the raid than assumed by the court at the time.

27. See Kluke, “Der Fall Potempa,” p. 279.

28. Gliwice, WAP, Landratsamt Gleiwitz/G 63, pp. 333–34: Der Kreisleiter der Landjägerei Gleiwitz-Beuthen-Tarnowitz to the Landrat in Gleiwitz, Gleiwitz, Aug. 15, 1932.Google Scholar

29. Ibid., pp. 333–34.

30. Oberschlesische Volksstimme, Aug. 12, 1932.

31. WAP Opole, Oberpräsidium Oppeln/1025, pp. 378–81.

32. See Cygański, Mirostaw, “SS w pruskich prowincjach śląska w latach 1929–1935,” in Studia Śląskie 25 (1974): 216. There is, however, no evidence to indicate that the SS itself had anything to do with the incident.Google Scholar

33. See Kluke, “Der Fall Potempa,” p. 283. The Nazi press likewise regarded SA violence as justified self-defense against the “red terror.” For a Nazi press account of the Potempa case, see Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 21/22, 1932. The NSDAP gave considerable press coverage to the trial at Brieg of Reichsbanner members accused of shooting SA members in Ohlau in July; the Brieg trial took place simultaneously with the trial in Beuthen, and the juxtaposition of the two trials was used to reinforce the point about the terror from the left.

34. Volkswacht, Aug. 23, 1932.

35. In the July 1932 Reichstag elections the KPD polled very well in the Beuthen region. In the city of Beuthen it was the third strongest political party, after the NSDAP and the Zentrum, with 18.8 percent of the vote; in the Landkreis Beuthen-Tarnowitz it was the strongest party, with 37.8 percent of the vote. In the nearby city of Hindenburg as well the KPD was the strongest political party in 1932. See Die Wahlen zum Reichstag am 31. Juli und 6. November 1932 und am 5. März 1933, Reichs, Statistik des Deutschen, vol. 434 (Berlin, 1935), p. 48.Google Scholar

36. For accounts of the violence which immediately followed the trial, see Schlesische Bergwacht, Aug. 23, 1932; Volkswacht, Aug. 23, 1932. For photographs of the demonstrations and the crowds at the Potempa trial, and of the broken windows of the Jewish shops which were attacked, see Vom Kampf und Sieg der schlesischen SA: Ein Ehrenbuch (Breslau, 1933), pp. 156–58.Google Scholar

37. It made little difference to the Nazis that the Ohlau incident was not premeditated and occurred before the new antiterror decrees had come into effect, and that therefore the Reichsbanner members were not subject to the harsher penalties.

38. APWr, Rejencja Opolska I/1806, pp. 15–16: Der Polizeipräsident in Oppeln, Landespolizeistelle, to the Oberpräsident, Oppeln, Sept. 8, 1932.

39. Kluke, “Der Fall Potempa,” p. 284.

40. Völkischer Beobachter, Aug. 24, 1932. Within the Silesian SA Hitler's telegram did have the desired effect. In Sept. 1932 Hans Hayn, Heines's chief of staff, reported that Hitler's support for those convicted in Beuthen had improved the morale in the SA. Bundesarchiv Koblenz, NS 23/474, pp. 105178–81: Der Gruppenführer Schlesien (written and signed by Hayn in Heines's absence) to the Oberste SA-Führung, Breslau, Sept. 22, 1932.

41. For example, the Gleiwitz Ortsgruppe of the Vereinigte Verbände heimattreuer Oberschlesier, the Stahlhelm, and the Königin-Luise-Bund petitioned the government to pardon the Potempa murderers. See Kluke, “Der Fall Potempa,” p. 284.

42. Breslauer 8 Uhr-Abendblatt, Sept. 2, 1932.

43. Two members of the Potempa raiding party who had initially fled, Paul Golombek and Albert Dutzki, were not brought to trial but were later captured and remanded in custody. They were also set free in Mar. 1933. Schlesischer N.S. Beobachter, Mar. 18,1933.

44. BDC, OPG, Paul Lachmann: Kreisgeschäftsführer Blachnik to the deputy Gauleiter Bracht, Gleiwitz, Aug. 7, 1939.