American or Australian readers will not be surprised, at least at first glance, that a province should have kept a bicameral system for so long as Quebec since in their own country all but one of the states has a second legislative chamber. For other readers, and Canadians particularly, the survival of a Legislative Council poses a whole series of problems which, for the most part, are explained by the economic and social evolution of Quebec.

Why has Quebec maintained an upper chamber for so long when the other Canadian provinces have never had one or have abolished it a long time ago? The facts here presented confirm on several counts the classical theories about bicameralism, and add to them certain points arising specifically from Quebec's unique socio-cultural context: the overrepresentation of privileged social classes, irrespective of partisan attachment; or the representation in the Legislative Council of the English-speaking minority whose spokesmen were, however, closely tied to the French-speaking members by a community of economic interests.

It was during the last century that the Legislative Council exhibited most energy; it frequently interfered with the most progressive projects of the different Liberal governments. In the twentieth century, however, it was thought wiser to adapt itself to the changing mood, and it gradually became more self-effacing with respect to the elected chamber. Therefore its reasons for existence became doubtful as it either adopted without question all the proposals of the Legislative Assembly (and so provoked the accusation that it did nothing), or if it did object to anything in any way, it was accused of going against the wishes of the elected representatives of the people. Groups which had supported it finally decided that the council had become obsolete and their representatives have allied themselves with the enemies of the council to vote out of existence the last provincial upper chamber in Canada.

L'article examine les lacunes de la carte électorale provinciale en Alberta. Dans une première partie, l'auteur discute de la nouvelle carte électorale, adoptée par l'Assemblée législative au cours de la session de 1969, et la controverse qu'elle a soulevée. Cette carte, qui change le rapport du nombre de sièges attribués aux centres urbains et ruraux, traduit l'effort du gouvernement créditiste de donner suite au désir des districts urbains de la province d'accéder à une représentation égalitaire à l'assemblée, tout en maintenant par ailleurs la surreprésentation rurale. La deuxième partie de l'article explore les effets théoriques de la mauvaise distribution électorale sur l'égalité politique: elle désavantage injustement non seulement les électeurs urbains mais aussi les partis dont ils constituent la clientèle. Dans une troisième partie, l'auteur établit un indice de mauvaise distribution, à partir de la carte en vigueur lors des élections provinciales de 1967. Cet indice, qui mesure la qualité de la distribution des sièges d'un district législatif entre les diverses formations électorales, a été proposé par Henry F. Kaiser, sur le principe « un homme, un vote ». Cette distribution de la carte électorale provinciale de l'Alberta est comparée avec celle de la carte fédérale, de meilleure qualité, pour la même province. L'article se termine par la proposition de « critères de tolérance » auxquels devrait se conformer, dans l'avenir, la carte électorale provinciale albertaine afin de répondre aux exigences d'une bonne distribution, telles qu'établies par Kaiser.

Professor Crowley's “Comment on Professor Macpherson's Interpretation of Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom” is beguilingly titled. But my article was not an “interpretation.” Interpretation is an exercise which, as Professor Crowley rightly implies, involves reading some assumptions into the text that is being interpreted. What I offered, on the contrary, was logical criticism of quite specific arguments of Friedman's, criticism which did not depend on speculation about his unstated assumptions. It is Professor Crowley who offers an interpretation, both of Friedman and of me, based on speculation about our assumptions. It is interesting, but it does not constitute the criticism of my arguments that Professor Crowley thinks it does. I have no quarrel in principle with speculation about assumptions: I am the last person to deny the usefulness of reading between the lines where that is necessary to clarify a text. But Friedman's text is quite clear. I thought mine was too: at least I addressed myself directly to Friedman's. Professor Crowley does not address himself as directly to mine. His criticism is sometimes not a criticism of what I wrote, but of what he, diverted by his own speculations, thought I must have meant (or of what he would have meant if, inconceivably, he had written what I wrote).