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2 “Argentine-Russian Trade is Surging as Soviet Takes 77% of Crop Exports,” The New York Times, April 18, 1982.Google Scholar

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6 “U.S. Asks NATO Support,” Journal of Commerce (New York). August 9, 1960.Google Scholar

7 “U.S. to Ask Allies: Halt Cuba Trade,” New York Herald Tribune, February 19, 1962.Google Scholar

8 “U.S. Bids NATO End Trade in Strategic Goods with Cuba,” The New YorkTimes, February 21, 1962.Google Scholar

9 “West's Ships Major Carriers,” The New York Times, September 28, 1962; “Our Allies Still Trade With Cuba,” New York Herald Tribune, September 16, 1962.Google Scholar

10 Quoted in “Japan Will Shun Trade With Cuba,” The New York Times, September 26, 1962.Google Scholar

11 Quoted in United States House of Representatives, Select Committee on Export Control, Investigation and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949, and Related Acts, Part 3, 87th Congress, 2nd Session (1962), 808.Google Scholar

12 Gardner, C. Harvey, “The Japanese in Cuba,” Caribbean Studies 12 (1972), 70Google Scholar; United States Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba: Foreign Trade, A(ER) 75–79 (1975), 10.

13 At the time of the nationalization of all local and foreign-owned banks in Cuba, the Royal Bank of Canada and the Bank of Nova Scotia had combined assets on the island minimally estimated to be worth $100 million. When, in December 1960, both banks decided to cease operations in Cuba, a satisfactory compensation agreement was negotiated with the Cuban government. Under the terms of the agreement, the Banco Nacional de Cuba assumed all the liabilities of the two financial institutions, purchased their capital assets at book value which were paid for in American dollars, and agreed to the remission of the banks' invested capital and accumulated profits to Canada. See McWhinney, Edward, “Canadian-United States Commercial Relations and International Law: The Cuban Affair as a Case Study,” in Deener, David R.(ed.), Canada-United States Treaty Relations (Durham: Duke University Press. 1963), 136–38.Google Scholar

14 Statement in the House of Commons, quoted in Harold Boyer, “Canada and Cuba: A Study in International Relations” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Simon Fraser University, 1972), 176.

15 “Not Paid for Goods; Cash Deals With Cuba New,” Globe and Mail, November 1, 1962.Google Scholar

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17 Quoted in Lyon, Peyton V., Canada in World Affairs, 1961-1963 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 415.Google Scholar

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19 Quoted in “Rusk Raps U.S. Allies for Trade with Castro,” The Washington Post, January 23, 1964.Google Scholar

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21 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of East-West Trade, United States Commercial Relations With Cuba: A Survey (1975), 41.Google Scholar

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23 Study prepared by the Maritime Administration, Department of Commerce, reprinted in United States House of Representatives, Investigation and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949, and Related Acts, Part 3, 816.Google Scholar

24 Quoted in “U.S. Fails to Curb Allies Over Cuba,” The New York Times, September 16, 1962.Google Scholar

25 United States House of Representatives, Investigation and Enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949, and Related Acts, Part 3, 809.Google Scholar

26 United States Department of State, “On Current Status U.S. Policy Re Cuban Shipping,” Telegram, October 31, 1962, 937.7300/10–3162, DFOIA.

27 United States Department of State to London, Athens, Bonn, Oslo, Madrid, Rome, The Hague, Beirut, Rabat, Paris, Telegram, January 3, 1963, 937.7300/1–1163, DFOIA.

28 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Briefing on Cuban Developments, January 25, 1963, Record Group 46, National Archives of the United States, 17.Google Scholar

29 United States Department of State statement on Current Cuban Policy, June 1, 1963, Box 115, Cuba 1/63–3/63, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (Mass.).

30 United States Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, List of Free World and Polish Flag Vessels Arriving in Cuba Since January 1, 1963, Report No. 128, September 23, 1975.Google Scholar

31 Department of State Bulletin, 55 (December 5, 1966), 867. Although Western airline links with Cuba were accorded less attention, for there remained few connections between Cuba and nonsocialist countries after 1962, diplomatic efforts persisted throughout the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies to ensure that no significant expansion of service occurred.

32 Confidential interview, Department of State official, Washington, July 13, 1973, and June 6, 1975. The respondent was a senior economic official intimately involved with operationalizing the blockade policy between 1963 and 1967.

33 United States Department of Commerce, United Stales Commercial Relations with Cuba: A Survey, 41.Google Scholar

34 Pollard, Sidney, The Development of the British Economy 1914–1967 (London: Edward Arnold, 1969), 444Google Scholar; Kirby, M. W., The Decline of British Economic Power Since 1877 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 149.Google Scholar

35 United States Department of State to London Embassy, Telegram, January 24, 1964, No. 4256, STR-10 Cuba, DFOIA.

36 “British Firm Sells Buses to Cuba,” The Times, January 8, 1964, and “British Sell Buses to Cuba, Defying U.S. Trade Curb,” The New York Times, January 8, 1964.Google Scholar

37 See Economist Intelligence Unit (London), Quarterly Economic Review of Cuba (March 1964), 2.Google Scholar

38 Confidential correspondence, Department of State official, California, March 5, 1975. The respondent was a senior Department Inter-American Affairs official during the mid-1960s.

39 Confidential interview, Department of State official, Washington, July 13, 1973 and June 6, 1975.

40 Memorandum for the President from Secretary of State Dean Rusk, February 7, 1964 and Memorandum for the President from State Department, February 7, 1964, in Visit of Prime Minister Alex Douglas-Home, February 12–13, 1964, Briefing Book, February 5–7, 1964, National Security Files, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library (Texas). Emphasis added.

41 “U.S. Curtails Aid to Five Countries That Sell to Cuba,” The New York Times, February 19, 1964. Also see “British to Maintain Red Trade,” The Washington Post, February 14, 1964.Google Scholar

42 See United Kingdom, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates/Hansard (February 24 to March 6, 1964), 238.Google Scholar

43 Confidential interviews, Department of State official, Washington, July 13, 1973, and June 6, 1975.

44 Quoted in Geyelin, Philip, Lyndon B. Johnson and his World (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 92–93.Google Scholar

45 “LBJ Raps Cuba Trade in Talks With Butler,” The Washington Post, May 1, 1964.Google Scholar

46 “British Firm to Sell Cuba More Buses,” The Washington Post, May 8, 1964.Google Scholar

47 “British Concessions to U.S. on Cuba Trade,” The Times, May 12, 1964.Google Scholar

48 Quoted in “Rusk Calls Dispute ‘minor’,” The New York Times, May 11, 1964.Google Scholar

49 Quoted in “U.S. Opposed British Credit to Aid Cuba,” The Washington Post, January 4, 1967.Google Scholar

50 “British Give Cuba Credit For Plant,” The Washington Post January 4, 1967;”Cuba in £16m. deal with Britain,” The Times, May 20, 1967.Google Scholar

51 See Kolodziej, Edward A., French International Policy Under De Gaulle and Pompidou (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 71–82.Google Scholar

52 Economist Intelligence Unit (London), Quarterly Economic Review of Cuba (March 1964), 2.

53 United States Department of State to Paris Embassy, Telegram. February 5, 1964, Paris 4004, STR 10-Cuba, DFOIA.

54 See “French Complete Cuba Truck Sale,” The New York Times, February 8, 1964.Google Scholar

55 See “U.S. Muffles Ire Over Sale to Cuba,” The Washington Post, May 6, 1964.Google Scholar

56 Quoted in “U.S. Cuba Policy Stalled,” Christian Science Monitor, May 7, 1964.Google Scholar

57 Hispanic American Report, 17 (August for June 1964), 513.

58 “U.S. Cuba Policy Stalled,” Christian Science Monitor, May 7, 1964.Google Scholar

59 See Economist Intelligence Unit (London), Quarterly Economic Review of Cuba (November 1964), 6–7.

60 United States Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, Trade of NATO Countries with Communist Countries, 1963–1966 (December 6, 1967); Trade of NATO Countries with Communist Countries, 1965–1968 (December 15, 1969).Google Scholar

61 Confidential interview, Department of State official, Washington, June 23, 1973. The respondent was an economist specializing in Latin America in the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research during the 1960s and early 1970s.

62 See Wright, Alison, The Spanish Economy 1959–1976 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977), 405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

63 “Spain is Cautioned by U.S. on Rise in Cuban Trade,” The New York Times, December 21, 1963.Google Scholar

64 See Ibid..

65 United States Department of State to Madrid Embassy, January 24, 1964, DFOIA.

66 Quoted in “Spain Warns on Aid Cutoff,” The New York Times, February 23, 1964.Google Scholar

67 See “Spain to Cut Back Air Cargo to Cuba,” The New York Times, March 3, 1964; “Spain to Halt Cargoes to Cuba,” New York Herald Tribune, March 5, 1964.Google Scholar

68 See “Spain Increasing Cuban Trade Despite U.S. Pleas for Blockade,” The New York Times, September 28, 1964; “Madrid Tightens Ties with Cuba,” Christian Science Monitor, October 21, 1964.Google Scholar

69 See Ibid..; “Spain in World Trade,” Bank of London & South America Review 1 (1967), 246–47Google Scholar; “Madrid Doubles Exports to Cuba,” The New York Times, January 15, 1967; United States Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, Trade of European Non-NATO Countries and Japan with Communist Countries, 1964–1967 (March 19, 1969).

70 Quoted in “Japan's Increasing Trade With Cuba Worries U.S.,” The Japan Times, June 28, 1964. On Japanese-Cuban trade, see United States Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports (March 1964), 2: United States Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, Trade of European Non-NATO Countries and Japan with Communist Countries, 1963–1966 (February 15, 1968).

71 Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba: Foreign Trade, 10.

72 “U.S. Sees Solution Through Negotiation,” The Japan Times, August 20, 1964.Google Scholar

73 United States Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, Trade of European Non-NATO Countries and Japan with Communist Countries, 1963–1966 (February 15, 1968): Trade of European Non-NATO Countries and Japan with Communist Countries, 1965–1968 (April 7, 1970).

74 See Ogelsby, J. C. M.. “Canada and Latin America,” in Lyon, Peyton V. and Ismael, Tareq Y. (eds.), Canada and the Third World (Toronto: Macmillan. 1976). 178.Google Scholar

75 See Boyer, “Canada and Cuba: A Study in International Relations,” 373–76.

76 See Behrman, Jack N., National Interest and the Multinational Enterprise (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970), 108.Google Scholar

77 United States Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, Trade of NATO Countries with Communist Countries, 1964–1967 (December 26, 1968); Trade of NATO Countries with Communist Countries, 1965–1968 (December 15, 1969).

78 United States Department of Commerce, United Stales Commercial Relations With Cuba: A Survey, 41. Also see “Cuba's Links With Nonsocialist World Expanding Through Trade and Technology Deals,” Business Latin America (April 20, 1972), 121–22. On the other hand, the shipping sanctions pursued by Washington apparently had more permanent effects. Between 1968 and 1975, the average annual number of capitalist flag vessels calling at Cuban ports remained significantly below the levels during the years prior to 1962 and through the period (1963–1968) when the blockade policy was most vigorously promoted. See United States Department of Commerce, List of Free World and Polish Flag Vessels Arriving in Cuba Since January 1, 1963.

79 See Business International Corporation, Cuba at the Turning Point (New York, 1977); United States Department of Commerce, United States Commercial Relations With Cuba: A Survey, 52–53. Of course, the levels of Cuba's capitalist bloc trade was also directly tied to the fortunes of the island's most important hard currency (sugar) export. Abnormally high world sugar prices in 1974 provided the wherewithal for a major expansion of capital goods purchases from Western Europe, Japan and Canada during 1975. The dramatic fall in the sugar price during the latter half of the 1970s had a significant effect on Cuba's imports from the capitalist world which declined from 48 percent of total imports in 1975 to 17 percent in 1979. See World Bank, Commodity Trade and Price Trends (1978 Edition) Report No. EC-166/78 (August 1978), 51; United States Department of Commerce, Cuban Trade with the Industrialized West 1974–1979, Project D-76 (May 1981), 6.

80 See Business International Corporation, Cuba at the Turning Point, 79; “France Ready to Invest $350 Million in Cuba,” Journal of Commerce (New York), January 22, 1975Google Scholar; “Canadians Arrange Loans for Cubans,” Journal of Commerce (New York), March 24, 1975Google Scholar; “U.K. to give Cuba£250m. credit,” Financial Times, May 21. 1975.Google Scholar

81 Quoted in “Japan Finds a Ready Market in Cuba,” Wall Street Journal, October 27, 1975.Google Scholar

82 See United States House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Currency, Extension of the Export Administration Act of 1969, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session (1972), 39, 44–45, 47; United States House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, United States-Cuba Trade Promotion, 94th Congress, 2nd Session (1976), 42.Google Scholar

83 See, for example, “Should US Affiliates Trade With Cuba? Argentina Says Yes, US Says No,” Business Latin America (December 12, 1973), 393–94;Google Scholar“Embargo on Cuba Faces Challenge From Canada,” The Washington Post, February 28, 1974Google Scholar; “US/Canadian Conflicts on Cuba Continue to Squeeze Firms,” Business Latin America (March 26, 1975), 102.

84 Quoted in “US Urged to Reassess Trade, Political Goals,” Journal of Commerce (New York), August 18, 1976.Google Scholar

85 United States House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, U.S. Trade Embargo of Cuba, 94th Congress, 1st Session (1975), 369.Google Scholar

86 Ibid..

87 Confidential interview, Department of State official, Washington, June 23, 1973.

88 Confidential interview, Department of State official, Washington, July 11, 1973. The respondent was an international relations officer on the Department's Cuba Desk between 1961 and 1964.

89 Confidential interview, Department of State official, Washington, March 14, 1975. The respondent was a Department foreign affairs and international economic specialist during the mid-1960s.

90 Confidential correspondence, Department of State official, California, March 5, 1975.