Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-568f69f84b-56sbs Total loading time: 0.29 Render date: 2021-09-19T21:25:04.339Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true, "newUsageEvents": true }

The Unfulfilled Potential of the Court and Legislature Dialogue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2009

Grégoire C. N. Webber*
Affiliation:
McGill University
*Corresponding
Grégoire C. N. Webber, Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism, McGill University, 3661 Peel Street, Montreal, Quebec, H3A 1X1; gregoire.webber@elf.mcgill.ca.

Abstract

Abstract. Constitutional scholarship has been exploring the idea that the court and the legislature engage in a dialogue over the meaning of the constitution. Yet, despite many contributions to the idea of dialogue over the last decade, its potential remains unfulfilled. The epistemological potential of dialogue remains understudied, in part because the court continues to be viewed as the supreme, if not also the sole, expounder of the constitution. For dialogue's potential to be realized, the legislature should be acknowledged as a co-ordinate actor in expounding constitutional meaning and both court and legislature should assume a disposition for dialogue.

Résumé. La littérature en matière constitutionnelle explore l'idée que la cour et le législateur s'engagent dans un dialogue sur le sens à donner à la constitution. Cependant, malgré les nombreuses contributions à l'idée du dialogue au cours de la dernière décennie, son potentiel ne s'est pas épanoui. Le potentiel épistémologique de l'idée du dialogue demeure sous-étudié, en partie parce que la cour continue d'être considérée comme étant l'entité suprême, sinon la seule entité, qui puisse développer le sens de la constitution. Pour que l'idée du dialogue puisse être actualisée, le législateur devrait être reconnu comme étant un acteur complémentaire à la cour pour développer le sens de la constitution et tant la cour que le législateur devraient être disposés au dialogue.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alexander, Larry and Shauer, Frederic. 1997. “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation.” Harvard Law Review 110: 1359.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alexy, Robert. 2005. “Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 3: 572.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baker, Dennis and Knopff, Rainer. 2002. “Minority Retort: A Parliamentary Power to Resolve Judicial Disagreement in Close Cases.” Windsor Year Book of Access to Justice 21: 347.Google Scholar
Bickel, Alexander M. 1986. The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics. 2nd ed.New Haven CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Cameron, Jamie. 2000. “Dialogue and Hierarchy in Charter Interpretation: A Comment on R. v. Mills.” Alberta Law Review 38: 1051.Google Scholar
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) c. 11.Google Scholar
Cardozo, Benjamin N. 1926. Berkley v. Third Ave Railway. 244 NY 84.Google Scholar
Chevrette, François and Webber, Grégoire C. N.. 2003. “L'utilisation de la procédure de l'avis consultatif devant la Cour suprême du Canada: Essai de typologie.” Canadian Bar Review 82: 757.Google Scholar
Clayton, Richard. 2004. “Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: The Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998.” Public Law 33.Google Scholar
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) c. 11.Google Scholar
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (Canada), s. 25.1(2).Google Scholar
Devins, Neal and Fisher, Louis. 2004. The Democratic Constitution. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Dickson, Brian. 1983. “The Public Responsibilities of Lawyers.” Manitoba Law Journal 13: 175.Google Scholar
Dworkin, Ronald. 1981. “The Forum of Principle.” New York University Law Review 56: 469.Google Scholar
Dworkin, Ronald. 1996. Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Dworkin, Ronald. 2000. Taking Rights Seriously. London: Duckworth.Google Scholar
Ewing, Keith. 2003. “Human Rights.” In The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, ed. Cane, Peter and Tushnet, Mark. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Friedman, Barry. 1993. “Dialogue and Judicial Review.” University of Michigan Law Review 91: 577682.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fuller, Lon L. 1978. “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication.” Harvard Law Review 92: 353.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gardbaum, Stephen. 2001. “The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism.” American Journal of Comparative Law 49: 707.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greschner, D. 2000. “The Supreme Court, Federalism and Metaphors of Moderation.” Canadian Bar Review 79: 47.Google Scholar
Gutmann, Amy and Thompson, Dennis. 1996. Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Habermas, Jürgen. 2005. “Three Normative Models of Democracy.” In The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, ed. Cronin, Ciaran and De Greiff, Pablo. Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar
Hennigar, Matthew A. 2004. “Expanding the ‘Dialogue’ Debate: Canadian Federal Government Responses to Lower Court Charter Decisions.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 37 (1): 321.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hiebert, Janet L. 2002. Charter Conflicts: What is Parliament's Role? Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.Google Scholar
Hogg, Peter W. and Bushell, Alison A.. 1997. “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing After All).” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 35 (1): 75.Google Scholar
Hogg, Peter W. 2004. “Discovering Dialogue.” Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 23: 3.Google Scholar
Hogg, Peter W., Thornton, Alison A. Bushell and Wright, Wade K.. 2007. “Charter Dialogue Revisited—Or ‘Much Ado About Metaphors.’Osgoode Hall Law Journal 45: 1.Google Scholar
Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), c. 42, s. 4(2).Google Scholar
Hunt, Murray. 2003. “Sovereignty's Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law Needs the Concept of ‘Due Deference’.” In Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution, ed. Bamforth, Nicholas and Leyland, Peter. Portland OR: Hart Publishing.Google Scholar
Huscroft, Grant. 1995. “The Attorney General and Charter Challenges to Legislation: Advocate or Adjudicator?National Journal of Constitutional Law 5: 125.Google Scholar
Huscroft, Grant A. 2004. “‘Thank God We're Here’: Judicial Exclusivity in Charter Interpretation and Its Consequences.” Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 25: 241.Google Scholar
Kaufmann, Walter. 1965. Hegel: A Re-Interpretation. Garden City, NY: Anchor.Google Scholar
Kavanagh, Aileen. 2004. “The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24: 259–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, James B. 1999. “Bureaucratic Activism and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: The Department of Justice and Its Entry into the Centre of Government.” Canadian Public Administration 42: 476511.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Komesar, Neil K. 1994. Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Leclair, Jean. 2003. “Réflexions critiques au sujet de la métaphore du dialogue en droit constitutionnel canadien.” Revue du Barreau du Québec/numéro spécial 377.Google Scholar
Manfredi, Christopher P. 2004. “The Life of a Metaphor: Dialogue in the Supreme Court, 1998–2003.” Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 23: 105.Google Scholar
Manfredi, Christopher P. 2006. “The Unfulfilled Promise of Dialogic Constitutionalism: Judicial-Legislative Relationships under the Canadian Charter.” In Protecting Rights without a Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance and Reform in Australia, ed. Campbell, Tom, Goldsworthy, Jeffrey and Stone, Adrienne. Burlington VT: Ashgate.Google Scholar
Manfredi, Christopher P. 2007. “The Day the Dialogue Died: A Comment on Sauvé v. Canada.” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 45: 105.Google Scholar
Manfredi, Christopher P. and Kelly, James B.. 1999. “Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell.” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 37: 513–27.Google Scholar
McDonald, Leighton. 2004. “New Directions in the Australian Bill of Rights Debate.” Public Law: 22.Google Scholar
McKeon, Richard. 1954. “Dialectic and Political Thought and Action.” Ethics 65: 133.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McLachlin, Beverly. 1999. “Charter Myths.” University of British Columbia Law Review 33: 23.Google Scholar
Morton, F.L. 1999. “Dialogue or Monologue.” Policy Options April: 23.Google Scholar
Mueller, Gustav E. 1958. “The Hegel Legend of ‘Thesis–Antithesis–Synthesis’.” Journal of the History of Ideas 19: 411–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, no. 109, s. 6.Google Scholar
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 2007. 45: 1202.Google Scholar
Petter, Andrew. 2007. “Taking Dialogue Theory Much Too Seriously (or Perhaps Charter Dialogue Isn't such a Good Thing After All).” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 45: 147.Google Scholar
Popper, Karl R. 1940. “What is Dialectic?Mind 49: 403426.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roach, Kent. 2001a. The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue. Toronto: Irwin Law.Google Scholar
Roach, Kent. 2001b. “The Uses and Audiences of Preambles in Legislation.” McGill Law Journal 47: 129.Google Scholar
Roach, Kent. 2004. “Dialogic Judicial Review and its Critics.” Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 23: 49.Google Scholar
Roach, Kent. 2006. “Dialogue or defiance: Legislative reversals of Supreme Court decisions in Canada and the United States.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 4: 347.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slattery, Brian. 1987. “A Theory of the Charter.” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 25: 702.Google Scholar
Supreme Court of Canada. Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., 2007 SCC 30.Google Scholar
Supreme Court of Canada. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.Google Scholar
Supreme Court of Canada. R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.Google Scholar
Supreme Court of Canada. R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309.Google Scholar
Supreme Court of Canada. R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668.Google Scholar
Supreme Court of Canada. Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of P.E.I. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.Google Scholar
Supreme Court of Canada. RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.Google Scholar
Supreme Court of Canada. Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519.Google Scholar
Thayer, James B. 1901. John Marshall. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.Google Scholar
Tobacco Act, 1997, c. 13 (Canada), s. 4.Google Scholar
Tremblay, Luc B. 2005. “Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 3: 617.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tushnet, Mark. 2003a. “Judicial Activism or Restraint in a Section 33 World.” University of Toronto Law Journal 53: 89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tushnet, Mark. 2003b. “Judicial Review of Legislation.” In The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, ed. Cane, Peter and Tushnet, Mark. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Tushnet, Mark. 2004. “Weak-Form Judicial Review: Its Implications for Legislatures.” Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 23: 213.Google Scholar
Waldron, Jeremy. 1999. Law and Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Waldron, Jeremy. 2004. “Some Models of Dialogue between Judges and Legislators.” Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 23: 7.Google Scholar
Whittington, Keith E. 2002. “Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses.” North Carolina Law Review 80: 773.Google Scholar
2
Cited by

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

The Unfulfilled Potential of the Court and Legislature Dialogue
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

The Unfulfilled Potential of the Court and Legislature Dialogue
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

The Unfulfilled Potential of the Court and Legislature Dialogue
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *