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The-Meaning-of-a-Word

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Stanley Munsat*
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Extract

In his paper “The Meaning of a Word” J. L. Austin argues that a set of questions and (hence?) a set of answers to these questions is nonsensical. The philosophical claim that a question or answer is nonsense is an important part of the philosopher's stock and trade; for to ask and to propose answers to nonsensical questions is to reveal confusion and the tracking down and unraveling of confusion is one of the valuable contributions that philosophy has to make in the advancement of understanding.

At the same time one must not accept too easily the charge that a question or a form of answer to a question is nonsensical, for to do this is to block off a whole avenue of inquiry and therein direct one's efforts away from a route that might yield positive results.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1974

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References

1 Austin, J. L. Philosophical Papers (London, 1961). pp. 2343.Google Scholar My paper was presented to the American Philosophical Association in Seattle, March 1973.

2 Austin says “we want to ask rather, ‘What is the meaning of a-word-in-general?’ or ‘of any word'-not meaning ‘any’ word you like to choose, but rather no particular word at all....” This suggests that Austin in writing this thought that one could sensibly ask “What-is-the-meaning-of any word you choose?” This, it seems to me, is indeed a sensible question, but only on the supposition that every word has the same meaning. If such were the case, then a definition that one gave as an answer to that question would give the meaning of any word you choose. For example, suppose that every word in the language meant “spiced with sex.” Then one could answer the question “What-is-the-meaning-of any word you choose?” by saying “spiced with sex.“ Unfortunately, in that language one could not ask the question.

3 Ordinarily, of course, that there is no such thing as the so-and-so does not entail that the phrase “the so-and-so” is not a referring expression, and hence not a definite description. The phrase “the cup on Munsat's desk” is a definite description even though there may not happen to be a cup on my desk. But it can be assumed that for the phrase “the meaning of the word ‘x'” (when a meaningful word replaces “x“) that if there is no such entity, then the phrase is not a definite description. The reasoning here is as follows: Let us suppose that the word “rat” is meaningful. If we suppose that the phrase “the meaning of the word ‘rat” is, at least in some sentences, a definite description, it must succeed, in any statement of the form “The meaning of the word 'rat’ is … ,” in referring to that entity and cannot merely purport to refer to that entity. For if it merely purported to refer to that entity but failed to succeed in referring to that entity because there was no such entity then the word “rat” would not have a meaning. But we are assuming that the word “rat” does have a meaning, and hence if the phrase “the meaning of the word ‘rat“’ is a definite description, and thus purports to refer, it must succeed in referring.