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How Quine Perceives Perceptual Similarity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Patricia Smith Churchland*
Affiliation:
University of Manitoba

Extract

The explanation of a child's discriminate responses to his environment turns on ascribing to the child a perceptual discrimination which counts certain things as more similar to one another than to some other thing. As Quine forcefully puts it:

If an individual is to learn at all, differences in degree of similarity must be implicit in his learning pattern. Otherwise any response, if reinforced, would be conditioned equally and indiscriminately to any and every future episode, all these being equally similar.

Now for those determined to cleave to behaviourist canons, the problem is to use ‘perceptual similarity’ in explaining the subject's discriminating responses in a way which does not imply the existence of mental states and entities. What this really means is that the behaviourist must reconstruct the notion of ‘perceptual similarity', purifying it of its mentalistic dimension. So long as physicalism is a reasonable position, and while we are awaiting and abetting the neurophysiological millennium, the behaviourist's project is of significant moment. Now in Word and Object Quine does not seriously attempt to provide behavioural criteria for a subject's perceiving similarities, and he provisionally permits himself the mentalistic idiom he avows finally to eschew.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1976

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References

1 Quine, W.V. The Roots of Reference, (Open Court 1974) p. 19Google Scholar

2 Ibid., p. 16

3 Ibid., p. 17

4 Ibid., p. 18

5 “asymmetry” is standardly defined for two-placed predicates, but the extension intended here should be obvious; i.e. asymmetry with respect to the last two arguments.