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Reidian Dual Component Theory defended

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Todd Buras*
Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, One Bear Place #97273, Waco, TX, 76798


For Reid perception, broadly speaking, was a complex of two very different mental states. Calling such views dual component theory, A. D. Smith questions whether any such theory, and whether Reid's version in particular, is a viable theory of perception. The aim of this paper is to defend Reidian Dual Component Theory from Smith's critique. Answering Smith's critique reveals the depth and resilience of Reid's approach to perception, highlighting specifically the continued interest of his thought about the relationship between sensation and perception, the nature of illusion, the immediacy of perception, and the content of perceptual belief.

Copyright © The Authors 2011

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