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Reason and trust in Reid

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Nicholas Wolterstorff*
Affiliation:
Yale Divinity School, Yale University, USA Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture, University of Virginia, USA

Abstract

My theme in this essay is the anti-rationalism in Reid's thought. I explore three areas of Reid's thought in which anti-rationalism is a prominent feature: Reid's attack on the Way of Ideas and his own account of how beliefs are formed, in particular, perceptual beliefs, his response to the skeptic, and his understanding of the task of the philosopher.

Type
Epistemology
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2011

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References

Cuneo, T. and Woudenberg, R. van eds. 2004. The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goodman, Nelson 1978. Ways of Worldmaking. New York: Hackett Publishing Co.Google Scholar
Kant, I. 1950. Prologemena, Translated by Beck, Lewis White New York: The Liberal Arts Press.Google Scholar
Kuehn, Manfred 1987. Scottish Common Sense Philosophy in Germany. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, Hilary 1992. Renewing Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Van Cleve, James 2004. “Reid's Theory of Perception.” In The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, edited by Cuneo, T. and Woudenberg, R. van 101133. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wolterstorff, Nicholas 2001. Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

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