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In Favor of the Classical Quine on Ontology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2019

Gary Kemp*
Affiliation:
Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, U.K.

Abstract

I make a Quinean case that Quine’s ontological relativity marked a wrong turn in his philosophy, that his fundamental commitments point toward the classical view of ontology that was worked out in most detail in his Word and Object (1960). This removes the impetus toward (a version of) structuralism in his later philosophy.

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Article
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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