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Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2020

Sharon E. Berry*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Oakland University, Rochester, MI, USA

Abstract

In this article, I discuss a trivialization worry for Hartry Field’s official formulation of the access problem for mathematical realists, which was pointed out by Øystein Linnebo (and has recently been made much of by Justin Clarke-Doane). I argue that various attempted reformulations of the Benacerraf problem fail to block trivialization, but that access worriers can better defend themselves by sticking closer to Hartry Field’s initial informal characterization of the access problem in terms of (something like) general epistemic norms of coincidence avoidance.

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Article
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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References

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