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Quick and Smart? Modularity and the Pro-Emotion Consensus

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Karen Jones
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Extract

Within both philosophy and psychology, a new pro-emotion consensus is replacing the old dogmas that emotions disrupt practical rationality, that they are at best arational, if not outright irrational, and that we can understand what is really central to human cognition without studying them. Emotions are now commonly viewed as evolved capacities that are integral to our practical rationality. An infinite mind, unencumbered by a body, might get along just fine without emotions; but we finite embodied creatures need them if we are to be capable of responding appropriately to our reasons and navigating in a risky world with poor information, limited attention, and restricted computational power. Emotions are clever design solutions to the problem of making fast decisions in response to significant practical problems posed by the natural and social worlds: we perceive a danger and fear immediately primes us to take protective action. On this view, the theory of emotions is an essential part of a theory of ecologically situated and constrained rationality - that is to say, of human rationality (Samuels et al. 1999; Gigerenzer 2000).

Type
1. Modularity and the Rationality of Emotions
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 32: The Modularity of Emotions , 2006 , pp. 3 - 27
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2006

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