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Doubt: Affective States and the Regulation of Inquiry*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Christopher Hookway
Christopher Hookway*
Affiliation:
University of Sheffield
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Extract

Pragmatists challenge a sharp separation of issues of theoretical and practical rationality. This can encourage a sort of anti-realism: our classifications and theories are shaped by our interests and practical concerns. However, it need not do this. A more fundamental theme is that cognition is itself an activity, the attempt to solve problems and discover truths effectively and responsibly. Evidence has to be collected, experiments have to be devised and carried out, dialogues must be engaged in with fellow inquirers, decisions must be made about when we have scrutinized our opinions enough to trust our results. Even if our goals are “purely cognitive,” the attempt to achieve them through inquiry and deliberation is an activity. The normative standards that guide its conduct, like those governing any activity, will include standards of practical rationality. Indeed, we might suggest that a belief is justified so long as it is the product of responsible, well-executed inquiry.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 24: Pragmatism , 1998 , pp. 203 - 225
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1998

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Footnotes

*

Earlier versions of this paper were read at the University of Bradford and at Bolton Institute of Higher Education I am very grateful for the valuable comments and criticisms I received on each of those occasions. I have also been helped by comments and suggestions from Tobies Grimaltos.

References

1 “Mimicking Foundationalism: On Sentiments and Self-control,” European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1993): 156-74.

2 For an interesting exception to this, see Elgin's, CatherineConsidered Judgment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996)Google Scholar, Chapter 5.

3 See, for example, Cavell, StanleyThe Claim of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979)Google Scholar and Williams, MichaelUnnatural Doubts (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), passim.Google Scholar

4 If this is correct, then it suggests that there are rational limits to how reflective we should be in assessing our beliefs and inquiries; rational reflection is often fundamentally shallow. Mapping the limits of responsible or rational reflection was the main concern of my “Cognitive Virtues and Epistemic Evaluations,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (1994): 211-27. I discuss the topic further in Part 2 of Scepticism (London: Routledge, 1990) and in “Naturalised Epistemology and Epistemic Evaluation,” Inquiry 37 (1994): 465-85.

5 References to Peirce's work employ two sources: they take the following standard forms. Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition (Volumes 2 and 3), ed. Fisch, M. et al. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984-86)Google Scholar is referred to in the text as ‘'W” followed by volume and page. References to Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Hartshorne, C.Weiss, P. and Burks, A. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-58)Google Scholar identify volume and numbered paragraph.

6 Characterizing the kind of role in shaping actions which beliefs possess and doubts lack is not easy If my doubt that the car is ready for collection leads me to take the bus or train when I head for town, then that state can shape actions other than inquiries into the proposition doubted. I shall not pursue this issue here.

7 The final sentence was added to this 1877 passage in 1903 (Collected Papers 5.376).

8 The epistemic importance of the idea of self-trust has recently been emphasized by Lehrer, Keith in Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge and Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 I shall not discuss in detail exactly why the sort of self-trust described here is rational. At least two strategies suggest themselves, both familiar from pragmatist writings. First: it could be defended as a regulative presumption. If it is not warranted, then responsible rationality would be impossible, so it is rational to proceed on the hope that it is warranted. Second: appeal could be made to the fact that it is “natural” and, indeed, unavoidable much of the time. If my behaviour shows that I endorse it, then, in the absence of a positive reason for doubting it, I am warranted in relying upon it.

10 I have done so elsewhere: see “Mimicking Foundationalism” and “Sentiment and Self-control,” in The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Brunning, Jacqueline and Forster, Paul (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1997), 201-22CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also relevant is “Cognitive Virtues and Epistemic Evaluations,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (1994): 211-27.

11 This example is discussed by Catherine Elgin in Considered Judgment, Chapter 5; see esp. 146-47.

12 Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).Google Scholar

13 This then gives rise to the philosophical task of arriving at an explanation of our cognitive habits and goals that vindicates this presumption of their adequacy If we fail in this task, then scepticism may be unavoidable. Much of Peirce'ls work can be read as an attempt to carry out this task.