This paper defends a version of the doctrine that the mens rea of a criminal attempt should consist in intention as to the central or consequential aspects of the actus reus of the complete offence, even when such intention is not required for that complete offence, but need only involve recklessness as to the circumstantial aspects of the complete offence if such recklessness suffices for the complete offence. Attempted rape should require an intention to have sexual intercourse, but only recklessness as to the fact that the woman does not consent. Attempted criminal damage should require an intention to destroy or damage (though the complete offence requires no such intention), but only recklessness as to the fact that what is destroyed or damaged is“property belonging to another”.

The problem that Mr. Duff discusses in the preceding article is this. A man attempts to commit the act of sex with a woman, nolens volens. He is aware that she may not be consenting, and is indifferent about it. In fact she does not consent. Public policy and common sense strongly suggest that he should be convicted of attempted rape, but the problem is to square this with the statutory rule that rape requires intention.

In what circumstances, and under what conditions, should a journalist be obliged by law to divulge the identity of the source of information contained in a published article—when anonymity may have been promised the source, or receipt of information in the future may be thought to depend on the preservation of anonymity now? Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides a framework for determining an answer to that controversial question, as it arises in particular cases before the courts: