English law sets out from the proposition that, lest it prejudice the tribunal, the prosecution in a criminal case may not adduce evidence that an accused has committed any wrongdoing other than the offence(s) actually charged. Although other misconduct evidence is still supposed only to be admitted if strongly relevant to the issues being tried, over the years the courts have steadily relaxed this self-denying ordinance. Most recently, in D.P.P. v. P [1992] 2 A.C. 447 Lord Mackay L.C. abandoned the view espoused by members of the House of Lords in D.P.P. v. Boardman [1975] A.C. 421 that other misconduct evidence may only be adduced if it displays a “striking similarity” to the misconduct charged. He declared that in determining its admissibility a judge had only to consider whether the probative force of the other misconduct was “sufficiently great to make it just to admit the evidence, notwithstanding that it is prejudicial to the accused in tending to show that he was guilty of another crime” (p. 460).