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Acceleration and Contingent Remainders

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

A. M. Prichard
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Extract

The doctrine of acceleration may be described as a rule of construction whereby words introducing an interest in remainder into a limitation of property are liberally interpreted so as to enable that interest to take effect immediately after a premature determination of the prior interest. The doctrine is most frequently encountered in the context of wills. This is partly, no doubt, because wills are often less strictly worded than instruments executed inter vivos; and partly, especially in a modern context, because tax considerations have Jessened the incidence of use of the normal prior estate involved, the life interest, in settlements inter vivos more than in wills. Even so, one of the more significant cases where acceleration has recently been found to apply, Re Dawson's Settlement, concerned a settlement inter vivos.

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Articles
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , November 1973 , pp. 246 - 255
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1973

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References

1 Cf. Re Flower's S.T. [1957] 1 W.L.R. 401, 405; [1957] 1 All E.R. 462, 475;Google Scholarper Jenkins L.J.

2 [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1456; [1966] 3 All E.R. 68.

3 Vol. 3, s. 412. 1, pp. 2187–2188.

4 (1791) 3 Bro.C.C. 401.

5 [1927] 1 Ch. 466.

6 [1957] 1 W.L.R. 922; [1957] 3 All E.R. 52.

7 “Class-Closing, Accumulations and Acceleration” [1958] C.L.J. 39;Google Scholarcf. also Hawkins and Ryder, The Construction of Wills, pp. 112–113, 124; Theobald, Wills, 13th ed., pp. 204–205, 729–732.

8 [1969] 1 Ch. 339; cf. the note in (1968) 32 Conv.(N.s.) 68.

9 [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1124; [1969] 3 All E.R. 1; cf. the note in (1970) 34 Conv.(n.s.) 55.

10 34 Conv.(n.s.) 55.

11 Op. cit., p. 57.

12 [1894] 3 Ch. 30.

13 [1895] 2 Ch. 577.

14 [1928] Ch. 330.

15 [1967] Ch. 14. Cf. Lewin, Trusts, 16th ed., pp. 297–298; , Wolstenholme and , Cherry, Conveyancing Statutes, 13th ed., Vol. 4, p. 45Google Scholar; and Bailey, op. cit. [1958] C.L.J. 41–42.

16 Title, 15th ed., p. 1007.

17 Loc. cit.

18 Loc. cit.

19 (1726) 2 P.Wms. 361, affirmed by H.L. in Errington v. Carrick (1728) 5 Bro.P.C. 391.

20 [1958] Ch. 469.

21 [1928] Ch. 330.

22 [1955] Ch. 627.

23 [1898] 1 Ch. 523.

24 Cf. e.g., Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents, 4th ed., Vol. 8, pp. 763–764.

25 Cf. Re Stratton's Disclaimer [1958] Ch. 42.

26 Cf. Sergeant, Stamp Duties, 6th ed., pp. 160–161; Monroe, Stamp Duties, 4th ed., p. 51; Pinson, Revenue Law, 6th ed., p. 563; Morcom, Estate Duty Saving, 5th ed., pp. 56, 84.

27 [1958] Ch. at pp. 58–59 (especially), per Jenkins L.J.

28 Cf. Pinson, op. dt., pp. 424–426.

29 Finance Act 1971, s. 59 and Sched. 12, para. 6; cf. Pinson, op. dt., pp. 312–313.