It is common for people to misstate their bargaining positions during business negotiations. This paper will focus on cases of the following sort: I am selling a house and tell a prospective buyer that $90,000 is absolutely the lowest price that I will accept, when I know that I would be willing to accept as little as $80, 000 for the house. This is a lie according to standard definitions of lying—it is a deliberate false statement which is intended to deceive others. I will defend the following two theses:

a. Appearances to the contrary, this kind of bluffing typically does not constitute lying. (I will argue that standard dictionary definitions of lying are untenable and defend an alternative definition hinted at, but never clearly formulated by, W. D. Ross. On my definition, deliberate false statements about one’s negotiating position would rarely constitute lies in this society.)

b. It is usually permissible to misstate one’s bargaining position when one has good reason to think that one’s negotiating partner is doing the same and it is usually impermissible to misstate one’s negotiating bargaining if one does not have good reason to think that the other party is misstating her position.

This paper examines how unethical behavior in the workplace occurs when management places inordinately strong emphasis on goal attainment without a corresponding emphasis on following legitimate procedures. Robert Merton’s theory of social structure and anomie provides a foundation to discuss this argument. Key factors affecting ethical climates in work organizations are also addressed. Based on this analysis, the paper proposes strategies for developing and changing aspects of organizational culture to reduce anomie, thereby creating work climates which discourage unethical practices and provide employees with mechanisms to resolve ethical conflicts in a constructive way.

In a competitive and morally imperfect world, business people are often faced with serious ethical challenges. Harboring suspicions about the ethics of others, many feel justified in engaging in less-than-ideal conduct to protect their own interests. The most sophisticated moral arguments are unlikely to counteract this behavior. We believe that this morally defensive behavior is responsible, in large part, for much undesirable deception in negotiation. Drawing on recent work in the literature of negotiations, we present some practical guidance on how negotiators might build trust, establish common interests, and secure credibility for their statements, thereby promoting honesty. We also point out the types of social and institutional arrangements, many of which have become commonplace, that work to promote credibility, trust, and honesty in business dealings. Our approach is offered not only as a specific response to the problem of deception in negotiation, but as one model of how research in business ethics might offer constructive advice to practitioners.

—Niccolo Machiavelli

—George Bernard Shaw

The Machiavellian model is often praised as a realistic description of modern corporate life. My analysis of The Prince follows Rousseau in arguing that the prince can survive and prosper most easily by creating an environment in which almost all the citizens prosper. Far from licensing unrestrained self-aggrandizement, in this model success only comes from providing real value to almost every citizen for the entire period of one's leadership.

Translation from the early sixteenth to the late twentieth century is far from simple; for example, the CEO is in many ways far less powerful than a Medici prince. The closest approximation is a far less bureaucratic organization with very small units possessing maximum autonomy. Also, deciding who is, and who is not, a citizen is not nearly as straightforward as it was for Machiavelli; it probably includes every stakeholder on whom the corporation has a major impact.

In all the criticisms that have shadowed the financial industry in recent years, the burden seems to be, that the reckless (as opposed to malicious) bankers too often took money of which they were the appointed stewards, and used it for speculation, especially in junk bonds. As Shaheen Borna and James Lowry argue in their “Gambling and Speculation” (the only article on gambling that I was able to raise on my computer) business speculation is probably wrong, since it is very like gambling, which everyone knows is wrong. But why is gambling wrong? If we, as the ethicists of business, are to adopt an uncharacteristically judgmental posture toward the most venerable American institutions, occupying the tallest and closest of American buildings, by calling their residents “gamblers,” then surely we ought to be able to provide an account of the blameworthiness of gambling itself. That, at any rate, is the challenge I set myself for this paper.

Grounded upon the late 1970s phrase “institutionalizing ethics into business,” I present a multi-component model and research agenda to enhance our understanding of organizations' efforts to integrate ethics into the daily decision-making process of employees. Three research foci are emphasized: (1) the need to establish consistent categorical frameworks to describe business organizations' efforts in the field, (2) the study of the interrelationships between the various components presented in the model, and (3) the exploration of the linkage between organizational efforts to institutionalize ethics and ethical employee behavior. Research and organizational implications evolving from these research foci are discussed.

This commentary finds much to like about the work of Professor Thomas I. White, “Business, Ethics, and Carol Gilligan's ‘Two Voices.” (Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1992) At the same time it suggests further work is needed on the following points: (1) White must consider how males respond to dilemmas if he hopes to articulate a difference between male and female methods of responding; (2) White must support his conclusion that the “ethics of care” is the ethic most likely to produce the results that he assumes to be true, and further explain why he thinks that the studies he chooses support the “ethics of care,” and (3) White must explain why the “ethics of care” is not just as likely to produce a result opposite to that found by researchers.