Most current theoretical treatments view business associations as rent-seeking, special interest groups. Yet, empirical research in a wide range of developing countries reveals a broad range of functions and activities undertaken by business associations, many of which promote efficiency. These positive functions address crucial development issues (emphasized in the New Institutional Economics) such as strengthening property rights, facilitating vertical and horizontal coordination, reducing information costs, and upgrading worker training. The associations that engage in these developmental activities tend to be well organized and staffed. This institutional strength depends in turn on high member density, valuable selective benefits (often delegated by governments), and effective internal mediation of member interests. In addition external factors, especially competitive markets and government pressure, encourage associations to use their institutional strength for productive ends.

This study explores sources of variation in the efficacy of constituency building as corporate political strategy. The theoretical focus is on the persistent agency problems inherent in the principal-agent relationship between constituents and legislators. Analysis of data from key congressional respondents indicates that the nature of these agency problems significantly determines the relative effectiveness of corporate constituency building as a means to influence legislative decisionmaking. Corporate constituency building appears to be more effective for influencing legislators' voting behavior than for influencing the specific content of legislation; more effective in the House than the Senate; contingent on party affiliation; contingent on the types of feedback corporate stakeholders use to communicate with legislative offices; contingent on the types of corporate stakeholders involved. This paper discusses these findings in the context of the existing literature and makes suggestions for further inquiry into the use, efficacy, and evolution of constituency-based lobbying as corporate political strategy.

Taxation reform has dominated Australian politics over the past twenty-five years. Despite this prominence on the political agenda, until recently Australian governments have lacked the capacity to consolidate key elements of this tax reform agenda. While the problematic nature of Australian tax reform can be explained in part by macro-level variables, this protracted policy deadlock has also influenced historical patterns of business-government intermediation. The article argues that the evolution of the Australian tax policy network over the study period was prompted by both associational and state actors reassessing their strategies in the context of the political failure of tax reform proposals. These developments provide empirical insights into the ongoing debate relating to the factors which lead to the formation and evolution of sectoral level policy networks. The article concludes that while the increasing levels of business mobilization experienced over the study period enhanced the electoral viability of reform proposals, these new patterns of sectoral business politics should be regarded as a consequence of the policy deadlock relating to tax reform rather than primary cause of policy change.

In recent decades, both South Korea and Taiwan have made remarkable leaps in the development and production of semiconductors-the core element in burgeoning global telecommunications, computer, and computer equipment industries. Although many aspects of their sectoral industrial strategies have differed, both countries are now moving aggressively to adapt their semiconductor industries to turbulent global markets. In the wake of the severe regional financial crisis that began in 1997, this case study compares and contrasts continuing processes of adaptation among primary semiconductor manufacturers in the two countries. The crisis had observable effects, especially in Korea, but it was not deep enough to force fundamental adjustments in either country. In the early days of the industry in both places, a sense of vulnerability-the need to come from behind-gave rise to quite different corporate structures and attendant strategies. Remarkable differences persist in the ways in which the South Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor firms are seeking new advantages in rapidly changing regional and global markets. Strategic change and structural continuity mark the attempt of two relatively small countries to stay competitive in a key industry.