This paper is a report from the Extreme Events Working Party. The paper considers some of the difficulties in calculating capital buffers to cover potential losses. This paper considers the reasons why a purely mechanical approach to calculating capital buffers may bot be possible or justified. A range of tools and techniques is presented to help address some of the difficulties identified.

This abstract relates to the following paper: FranklandR.EshunS.HewittL.JakhriaP.JarvisS.RoweA.SmithA.D.SharpA.C.SharpeJ. and WilkinsTDifficult risks and capital models: a report from the Extreme Events Working Party ‐ Abstract of the Edinburgh Discussion. British Actuarial Journal, doi: 10.1017/S1357321713000524

This paper investigates incentives and disincentives for risk reporting practices by global insurance companies. We examine various arguments for and against risk reporting, whether voluntary or compliance in nature. An important issue is whether reporting is dominated by shareholder, regulatory or managerial incentives. We evaluate whether current reporting practices are consistent with either political visibility, cultural effects or idiosyncratic managerial incentives. Our empirical analysis is based on (1) a content analysis of disclosures contained in annual reports of a sample of European, Asian and US global top 25 insurers between 2006 and 2012 and (2) a survey of internal business reporting practices. We re-characterise a disclosure index from prior research to examine the relation between the extent of risk disclosure and various managerial, agency and other characteristics. We predict that the extent and nature of risk disclosures depends on cultural imperatives and managerial incentives.

This abstract relates to the following paper: KlumpesP., KumarA. and DubeyR.Investigating risk reporting practices in the global insurance industry ‐ Abstract of the London Discussion. British Actuarial Journal, doi: 10.1017/S1357321714000087

This abstract relates to the following paper: KlumpesP., KumarA. and DubeyR.Investigating risk reporting practices in the global insurance industry ‐ Abstract of the Edinburgh Discussion. British Actuarial Journal, doi: 10.1017/S1357321714000087

At the end of 2013 the real yields that the UK government had to pay on its debt were negative over the whole curve. Several possible explanations are available for this phenomenon – central bank action, regulatory changes, demographic developments and economic conditions. The first two can result from deliberate interaction by the state into the financial markets and can be labelled as financial repression. We explain the historic precedents for Governments to use financial repression to manage their debt, look into the influence of regulation on asset allocation for insurers and pension funds, and introduce the concept of a balance-sheet recession.

This abstract relates to the following paper: FulcherPaul, BoardmanRichard, CollierIan, GasserHans-Christof, PriceRod, ShelleyPaul and SoftleySarah. Financial repression: what does it mean for savers and investors? ‐ Abstract of the Edinburgh DiscussionBritish Actuarial Journal, doi: 10.1017/S1357321714000154.