Theories of punishment arc sometimes divided into retributive theories, deterrent theories, and remedial theories. The remedial theories frequently take the form of denying that there is any such thing as a just punishment: the task of society is to cure its criminals, not to punish them. In this paper I shall take it for granted that there are some punishments which are just: hence I shall not be concerned with remedial theories in the sense indicated. Retributive and deterrent theories have as common ground the assertion that punishment may be justly inflicted; they differ in their explanation of what constitutes the justice of a just punishment.

The retributive theory of punishment is very difficult to state accurately. Indeed, I shall be concerned to argue that it is impossible to state it coherently: but this must be the result, and not the premiss, of our investigation. I shall begin, therefore, by stating the theory as baldly as possible, and then go on to consider the defects of the theory so stated with a view to discovering whether they can be refined away.

To avert misunderstanding, I should remark that there can be no objection to saying that a person who is justly punished for a crime has met with just retribution. The question at issue is whether the notion of ‘just punishment’ is to be explained by means of the notion of ‘retribution’ or vice versa. According to the retributive theory of punishment which I wish to criticize, ‘retribution’ is not a synonym for ‘punishment’ (or a genus of which reward and punishment are species), but rather a quite independent concept which serves as an explanation of the justice of a just punishment.