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Random effects won't solve the problem of generalizability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2022

Adam Bear
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA02138, USAadambear@fas.harvard.edu; https://adambear.me
Jonathan Phillips
Affiliation:
Program in Cognitive Science, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH03755, USA. jonathan.s.phillips@dartmouth.edu; https://www.dartmouth.edu/~phillab/phillips.html

Abstract

Yarkoni argues that researchers making broad inferences often use impoverished statistical models that fail to include important sources of variation as random effects. We argue, however, that for many common study designs, random effects are inappropriate and insufficient to draw general inferences, as the source of variation is not random, but systematic.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Strickland, B., & Suben, A. (2012). Experimenter philosophy: The problem of experimenter bias in experimental philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3, 457467.CrossRefGoogle Scholar