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Priming primates: Human and otherwise

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1998

Mark Chen
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003-6634 markc@xp.psych.nyu.edutanyac@xp.psych.nyu.eduannette@xp.psych.nyu.edubargh@xp.psych.nyu.edu
Tanya L. Chartrand
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003-6634 markc@xp.psych.nyu.edutanyac@xp.psych.nyu.eduannette@xp.psych.nyu.edubargh@xp.psych.nyu.edu
Annette Y. Lee-Chai
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003-6634 markc@xp.psych.nyu.edutanyac@xp.psych.nyu.eduannette@xp.psych.nyu.edubargh@xp.psych.nyu.edu
John A. Bargh
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003-6634 markc@xp.psych.nyu.edutanyac@xp.psych.nyu.eduannette@xp.psych.nyu.edubargh@xp.psych.nyu.edu

Abstract

The radical nub of Byrne & Russon's argument is that passive priming effects can produce much of the evidence of higher-order cognition in nonhuman primates. In support of their position we review evidence of similar behavioral priming effects n humans. However, that evidence further suggests that even program-level imitative behavior can be produced through priming.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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