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The ontology of creature consciousness: A challenge for philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 May 2007

Gualtiero Piccinini
Gualtiero Piccinini
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri – St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63121-4400. piccininig@umsl.eduwww.umsl.edu/~piccininig/
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Abstract

I appeal to Merker's theory to motivate a hypothesis about the ontology of consciousness: Creature consciousness is (at least partially) constitutive of phenomenal consciousness. Rather than elaborating theories of phenomenal consciousness couched solely in terms of state consciousness, as philosophers are fond of doing, a correct approach to phenomenal consciousness should begin with an account of creature consciousness.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 1 , February 2007 , pp. 103 - 104
Copyright
2007 Cambridge University Press

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