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On the adaptive advantage of always being right (even when one is not)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2010

Nathalia L. Gjersoe  and
Bruce M. Hood
Nathalia L. Gjersoe
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TU, United Kingdom. N.L.Gjersoe@bristol.ac.ukB.M.Hood@bristol.ac.ukhttp://psychology.psy.bris.ac.uk/people/nathaliagjersoe.htmlhttp://brucemhood.wordpress.com
Bruce M. Hood
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TU, United Kingdom. N.L.Gjersoe@bristol.ac.ukB.M.Hood@bristol.ac.ukhttp://psychology.psy.bris.ac.uk/people/nathaliagjersoe.htmlhttp://brucemhood.wordpress.com
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Abstract

We propose another positive illusion – overconfidence in the generalisability of one's theory – that fits with McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) criteria for adaptive misbeliefs. This illusion is pervasive in adult reasoning but we focus on its prevalence in children's developing theories. It is a strongly held conviction arising from normal functioning of the doxastic system that confers adaptive advantage on the individual.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 6 , December 2009 , pp. 521 - 522
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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