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Nonconceptual content and the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Ingar Brinck
Ingar Brinck
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Lund University, S-222 22 Lund, Swedeningar.brinck@fil.lu.se
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Abstract

The notion of nonconceptual content in Dienes & Perner's theory is examined. A subject may be in a state with nonconceptual content without having the concepts that would be used to describe the state. Nonconceptual content does not seem to be a clear-cut case of either implicit or explicit knowledge. It underlies a kind of practical knowledge, which is not reducible to procedural knowledge, but is accessible to the subject and under voluntary control.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 5 , October 1999 , pp. 760 - 761
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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