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A complete theory of psychosis and autism as diametric disorders of social brain must consider full range of clinical syndromes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 June 2008

Katharine N. Thakkar ,
Natasha Matthews  and
Sohee Park
Katharine N. Thakkar
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37240. katy.thakkar@vanderbilt.edu natasha.matthews@vanderbilt.edu sohee.park@vanderbilt.edu URL: http://www.psy.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/sohee/
Natasha Matthews
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37240. katy.thakkar@vanderbilt.edu natasha.matthews@vanderbilt.edu sohee.park@vanderbilt.edu URL: http://www.psy.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/sohee/
Sohee Park
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37240. katy.thakkar@vanderbilt.edu natasha.matthews@vanderbilt.edu sohee.park@vanderbilt.edu URL: http://www.psy.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/sohee/
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Abstract

We argue that autism and psychosis spectrum disorders cannot be conceptualized as polar extremes of mentalizing ability. We raise two main objections: (1) the autistic-psychotic continuum, as conceptualized by the authors, excludes defining features of schizophrenia spectrum: negative symptoms, which correlate more strongly with mentalizing impairments; and (2) little evidence exists for a relationship between mentalizing ability and positive symptoms.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , June 2008 , pp. 277 - 278
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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