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Animal concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Colin Allen
Colin Allen
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4237 colin.allen@tamu.edusnaefell.tamu.edu/~colin/
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Abstract

Millikan's account of concepts is applicable to questions about concepts in nonhuman animals. I raise three questions in this context: (1) Does classical conditioning entail the possession of simple concepts? (2) Are movement property concepts more basic than substance concepts? (3) What is the empirical content of claiming that concept meanings do not necessarily change as dispositions change?

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , February 1998 , pp. 66
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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