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What kind of neural coding and self does Hurley's shared circuit model presuppose?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2008

Georg Northoff
Affiliation:
Laboratory of Neuroimaging and Neurophilosophy, Department of Psychiatry, Otto-von-GuerickeUniversity of Magdeburg, 39120 Magdeburg, Germany. georg.northoff@medizin.uni-magdeburg.dehttp://www.med.uni-magdeburg.de/fme/znh/kpsy/northoff/
Corresponding

Abstract

Susan Hurley's impressive article about the shared circuit model (SCM) raises two important issues. First, I suggest that the SCM presupposes relational coding rather than translational coding as neural code. Second, the SCM being the basis for self implies that the self may be characterized as format, relational, and embodied and embedded, rather than by specific and isolated higher-order cognitive contents.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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What kind of neural coding and self does Hurley's shared circuit model presuppose?
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