Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-5cfd469876-kgr8m Total loading time: 0.268 Render date: 2021-06-24T07:38:01.987Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true }

Understanding the research program

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Joseph Henrich
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z4, Canada. joseph.henrich@gmail.com
Maciej Chudek
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z4, Canada. maciek@interchange.ubc.ca http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/home.html
Corresponding

Abstract

The target article misunderstands the research program it criticizes. The work of Boyd, Richerson, Fehr, Gintis, Bowles and their collaborators has long included the theoretical and empirical study of models both with and without diffuse costly punishment. In triaging the situation, we aim to (1) clarify the theoretical landscape, (2) highlight key points of agreement, and (3) suggest a more productive line of debate.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below.

References

Alvard, M. (2003) Kinship, lineage, and an evolutionary perspective on cooperative hunting groups in Indonesia. Human Nature-an Interdisciplinary Biosocial Perspective 14(2):129–63.Google ScholarPubMed
Boyd, R., Gintis, H. & Bowles, S. (2010) Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare. Science 328(5978):617–20. Available at: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/328/5978/617.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S. & Richerson, P. (2003) The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 100(6):3531–35. Available at: http://www.pnas.org/content/100/6/3531.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. (1992) Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethology and Sociobiology 13(3):171–95. Available at: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/016230959290032Y.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chudek, M. & Henrich, J. (2010) Culture-gene coevolution, norm-psychology, and the emergence of human prosociality. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15(5):218–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, E. (2004) Human behaviour: Don't lose your reputation. Nature 432(7016):449–50.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fehr, E. & Henrich, J. (2003) Is strong reciprocity a maladaption? In: Genetic and Cultural evolution of cooperation, ed. Hammerstein, P., pp. 5582. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gintis, H., Smith, E. A. & Bowles, S. (2001) Costly signaling and cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology 213(1):103–19.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Guzman, R. A., Rodriguez-Sickert, C. & Rowthorn, R. (2007) When in Rome, do as the Romans do: The coevolution of altruistic punishment, conformist learning, and cooperation. Evolution and Human Behavior 28(2):112–17.Google Scholar
Henrich, J. (2000) Does culture matter in economic behavior: Ultimatum game bargaining among the Machiguenga. American Economic Review 90(4):973–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J. (2004) Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 53(1):335.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J. & Boyd, R. (2001) Why people punish defectors: Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology 208(1):7989. Available at: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022519300922021.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Gintis, H., eds. (2004) Foundations of human sociality: Economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from fifteen small-scale societies. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Henrich, N. S., Hill, K., Gil-White, F., Gurven, M., Marlowe, F. W., Patton, J. Q. & Tracer, D. (2005) “Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28(6):795855.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Gintis, H., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & McElreath, R. (2001) In search of Homo economicus: Experiments in 15 small-scale societies. American Economic Review 91:7378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J., Ensminger, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., Lesorogol, C., Marlowe, F., Tracer, D. P. & Ziker, J. (2010a) Market, religion, community size and the evolution of fairness and punishment. Science 327:1480–84. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1182238.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J. & Norenzayan, A. (2010b) Beyond WEIRD: Towards a broad-based behavioral science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2/3):5175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C. & Gächter, S. (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319(5868):1362–67. Available at: http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/sci;319/5868/1362 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Marlowe, F. W., Berbesque, J. C., Barr, A., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Ensminger, J., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, J., Henrich, N., Lesorogol, C., McElreath, L. & Tracer, D. (2008) More “altruistic” punishment in larger societies. Proceedings of the Royal Society B 275(1634):587–92. Available at: http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/cgi/content/abstract/275/1634/587.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Panchanathan, K. & Boyd, R. (2004) Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. Nature 432:499502.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Richerson, P. & Boyd, R. (1998) The evolution of ultrasociality. In: Indoctrinability, ideology and warfare, ed. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. & Salter, F. K., pp. 7195. Berghahn Books.Google Scholar
Rustagi, D., Engel, S. & Kosfeld, M. (2010) Conditional cooperation and costly monitoring explain success in forest commons management. Science 330(6006):961–65. Available at: http://www.sciencemag.org/content/330/6006/961 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Smith, E. A., Bleige-Bird, R. & Bird, D. W. (2003) The benefits of costly signaling: Meriam turtle hunters. Behavioral Ecology 14(1):116–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1
Cited by

Linked content

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Understanding the research program
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Understanding the research program
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Understanding the research program
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *